

Angang Hu · Xiao Tang
Zhusong Yang · Yilong Yan

The Modernization of China's State Governance



 Springer

The Modernization of China's State Governance

Angang Hu · Xiao Tang
Zhusong Yang · Yilong Yan

The Modernization of China's State Governance



Angang Hu
Institute for Contemporary China Studies
Tsinghua University
Beijing
China

Zhusong Yang
School of Public Policy and Management
Tsinghua University
Beijing
China

Xiao Tang
School of Public Policy and Management
Tsinghua University
Beijing
China

Yilong Yan
School of Public Policy and Management
Tsinghua University
Beijing
China

ISBN 978-981-10-3369-8

ISBN 978-981-10-3370-4 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3370-4

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016960279

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.

The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #22-06/08 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

*The original version of the book was revised:
Author names and their affiliations have
been included. The erratum to the book is
available at [10.1007/978-981-10-3370-4_8](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3370-4_8)*

Acknowledgements

On the completion of this book, I should like to express my deepest gratitude to all my colleagues and students, whose hard work and efforts have made this work possible. Doctor Yan Yilong assisted me in organizing the special study on the ‘Modernization of China’s National Governance’ selected by Research Institute of National Conditions, and acted as one of its authors. My young doctoral students Tang Xiao and Yang Zhusong have been directly involved with the writing, organization of material, research and calculations, editing, and modification, for which they deserve respect.

Contents

1	The Construction of China's State System	1
1.1	Mao Zedong: A State System for New China	2
1.2	Mao Zedong: Major System Innovations	9
1.3	Mao Zedong: Mistakes of the Later Years	16
1.4	Deng Xiaoping: Reconstruction of the Basic Party System, and the State Selection of 'Three Paths' After the Cultural Revolution	20
1.5	Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao: Consolidating and Improving the Basic Socialist System	33
1.6	Summary: China's Path Versus the Western Way	36
2	The Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the C.P.C.—A New Milestone in China's Reform	39
2.1	The Third Plenary Session—A Milestone in China's Reform (11th–18th)	40
2.2	High Praise for China's Reform, and a Summary of Important Experiences	44
2.3	The Guiding Ideology of the Decision and the Overall Goal of Comprehensively Deepening Reform.	57
2.4	Construction and Reform of a 'Five in One' System	62
2.5	Summary: Raising Confidence in the System and Comprehensively Deepening Reform	65
3	Modernization of State Governance.	69
3.1	Modernization of the State	70
3.2	Modernization of State Governance	73
3.3	Modernization of the State Governance's Capacities	77
3.4	Modernization of the State Governance System	80
3.5	Non-western Modernization of China's State Governance	85
3.6	Summary: Major Tasks for the Future	89

4	The Relationship Between the Government and the Market	93
4.1	A Significant Relationship and a Prominent Contradiction	93
4.2	Understanding the History	94
4.3	More Respect for Market Rule	104
4.4	Accelerating Government Transformation.	108
4.5	Summary: Two Hands Are Always Better Than One.	116
5	The Relationship Between the State-Owned and Private Economies	119
5.1	Evolution of the Relationship	119
5.2	State-Owned and Private: A Dual System	130
5.3	The Future of China's Mixed Economy	133
5.4	Summary: Two Legs Are Better Than One	138
6	Central-Local Relations	141
6.1	The History of China's Central-Local Relations	142
6.2	Changes in Central-Local Relations After the Establishment of New China.	145
6.3	Changes in Central-Local Relations After Reform and Opening.	152
6.4	Reform of the Tax Distribution System and Changes in Central and Local Systems	156
6.5	Further Development of Central-Local Relations	161
6.6	The Future of Central-Local Relations	165
6.7	Summary: Two Initiatives Are Better Than One.	167
7	Governance of China and the U.S.A.—A Comparison and Analysis	169
7.1	Comparison of Governance Performance (2000–2012).	171
7.2	Comparison of Political Systems	180
7.3	Summary: Can China's National Governance Be Viewed as Superior?	182
	Erratum to: The Modernization of China's State Governance	E1
	Postscript	185

Chapter 1

The Construction of China's State System

On November 8, 2012, Hu Jintao issued a report at the 18th National Congress of the C.P.C. in which he emphasized the importance of the road ahead: 'Forging an onward path is the lifeblood of the Party. It is the future and destiny of the nation, and is crucial to the wellbeing of the people.'¹

On January 5, 2013, Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the opening ceremony of a seminar in which new and alternate members of the Central Committee analyzed the spirit of the 18th National Congress of the C.P.C. He also stressed the importance of this 'path'. 'Problems with the path ahead relate to the prosperity of the Party, since the path is integral to our progress.'²

Why is this much-vaunted 'path' so important and so critical? What relationship does it have with the construction of the Chinese socialist state system?

On June 25, 2013, Xi Jinping made a speech about collective learning at the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C., stating that history is the

This paper is a draft of Prof. Hu Angang's address to the seminar on 'China's National Situation and Road Networks' for cadres of central state organs, which was organized by Yang Zhulong on April 8, 2013 and modified on July 25. It was also modified on August 9, 2013, and on April 1, 2014; Report on the National Situation, Issue 10 of 2014, April 30; on May 20, central leaders made important comments.

¹Hu Jintao: *Making Progress along the Socialist Road with Chinese Characteristics, and Striving For Comprehensive Completion of a Prosperous Society*—Report at the 18th C.P.C. National Congress, November 18, 2012.

²On January 6, 2013, Xi Jinping delivered a speech to the new members of the Central Committee at a candidates' seminar on learning and implementing the spirit of the 18th National People's Congress. Xinhua News Agency, January 5, 2013, Beijing.

best textbook. Indeed, the history of the Party and the nation are required courses within the Chinese education system.³

To understand China's 'path' in the past, present and future, it is necessary to look back to the founding of New China—how Mao Zedong and his colleagues innovated a modern state system; how they achieved national unity, the liberation of the people, and a well ordered state for a large population and vast territory. It is also essential to consider the, disintegration and disunity that followed, and the origins of Reform and Opening, as well as Deng Xiaoping's rebuilding of the Party and the state, auguring economic takeoff and prosperity, social progress and opening to the outside world. In order to make sense of China's rapid rise, full liberalization and comprehensive innovation, attention must be given to Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, and their subsequent improvements to the Party and state systems.

1.1 Mao Zedong: A State System for New China

Before the Communists came to power in 1949, China was disunited. In 1924, Sun Yat-sen had pointed out that 'Old China' was characterized by individual freedom, disintegration and disunity. He claimed '**people say that the Chinese are like a heap of loose sand**', referring to the surfeit of freedom he believed was responsible for foreign imperialism and commercial oppression by economic powers. It was Sun's opinion that resisting foreign oppression was only possible through moving away from individual freedom towards forming a solid group. If a party or an army is disunited, order cannot be reached and unification will be impossible. It was through collective power that Yuan Shi-kai defeated the revolutionary party. What was fought for was liberty of the state and the nation, not individual freedom. Sun Yat-sen understood this, yet he was unable to solve the problem during his tenure.

On September 30, 1949, Mao Zedong stated: 'We must organize the vast majority of people all over China into political, military, economic and cultural organizations, so as to move way from the undisciplined and disorganized state of Old China. We should use the great collective power of the masses to support the People's Government and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and to build an independent democratic, peaceful, unified and prosperous New China'.⁴ Mao was well aware that in order to realize these targets, organization was necessary.

³On June 25, 2013, the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee organized the seventh collective study of the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee on the theories and practices of socialism with Chinese characteristics. During the study, General Secretary Xi emphasized that history is the best textbook. To understand the history of the Party and the state is a compulsory course, designed to promote and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics and encourage various Party and country causes to press ahead. The course is not only compulsory, but must be studied thoroughly. Xinhua News Agency, June 25, 2013, Beijing.

⁴Mao Zedong: *Unity and Longevity of the Chinese Nation*, September 30, 1949, Mao Zedong's Collected Works, Volume 5, P. 348, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1998.

The task that lay ahead of him was to unify 540 million people, and create the foundations for a modern state system.

On January 8, 1949, at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C., Mao proposed: 'If the national revolutionary task is to be completed, we must eradicate the original foundations, which will take 30 years'. In fact, the task was to take dozens of years.⁵ **First it was necessary to raze the remnants of Old China, and then to establish the foundation of a New China.** Mao Zedong is the creator and founder of New China. This included a set of new systems, both tangible and intangible, such as the *Common Programme* of 1949, the *Constitution of the People's Republic of China* of 1954, and the *Constitution of Communist Party of China* of 1956. These systems not only realized the fundamental change from the old system to new, but also transcended the Soviet socialist system and American capitalist system, which were regarded as the best. Mao opened the historical process of modernizing China's state system by organizing the Chinese people (which accounted for one fifth of the total world population), and ending the fragmented and disintegrating state that had lasted for half a century.

In March 1949, Mao Zedong made the *Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the C.P.C.* The session passed the resolution to transfer the Party's focus from villages to cities, after putting down the Kuomintang and winning the civil war. Production and construction was marked as the central task. The session also called for China to move from an agricultural economy to an industrial nation, developing from a 'new democracy' into a fully functioning socialist society.

In September 1949, the *Common Programme* (the founding programme of the new-democratic society) was jointly formulated by the Communist Party of China and other democratic parties. It became the guiding document for the construction of a new democratic society. According to the regulations laid out in the *Common Programme*, China was to establish itself as a 'new democratic' country. The coalition government was constituted by four classes⁶; multi-party cooperation and a political consultation system was set up under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and a 'people's democratic dictatorship' was implemented.⁷

⁵Jin Chongji: *A Biography of Mao Zedong (1893–1949)*, P. 908, Central Party Literature Press, 1996.

⁶The preface to the *Common Programme* specifies that the Chinese people's democratic dictatorship constitutes the working class, peasant class, petty bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie and other patriotic nationalist political powers of the people's democracy and united front. It is based on a worker-peasant alliance, and is led by the working class. The *Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference* (September 29, 1949, the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference was passed), C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office: *Selected Works of Important Literature since the Founding of the P.R. C.*, Book 1, Central Party Literature Press, 1992.

⁷Liu Shaoqi once explained that imperialist threats guaranteed cooperation from the bourgeoisie, meaning that a dictatorship of the proletariat was unfeasible. What was formed instead was a people's democratic dictatorship led by the bourgeoisie, based on a worker-peasant alliance, and uniting the petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie (Recorded in Liu Shaoqi's Address at the Northeast Bureau Cadre Meeting, August 28, 1949, Jin Chongji, *A Biography of Liu Shaoqi*, P. 655, Central Party Literature Press, 1998).

The people's democratic dictatorship of China is different from the dictatorship of the Soviet Union's proletariat, and China's political consultation system is also different from the single-party political system of the Soviet Union.⁸ Thus, three basic political systems were innovated for New China—the system of the National People's Congress (1954), the system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (1949), and the system of national regional autonomy (1952).

From the perspective of historical comparison, Mao Zedong's founding idea is not only fundamentally different from the economic foundation, political system and social structure of all previous feudal dynasties,⁹ but is also essentially different from the method of founding a state using bureaucratic capital and a landlord class, like the Kuomintang government under Chiang Kai-shek.¹⁰ From the perspective of international comparison, New China's was not a capitalist economy on the basis of private ownership, as in European and American countries, nor was it a socialist economy on the basis of public ownership, as in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries. It was something altogether novel: a new-democratic economy, with both a capitalist sector and a socialist element.¹¹

China's founding process was a transition from division to unity, from decentralization to concentration, and then from decentralization of power to concentration of power.¹² From 1948, the concentration of power began to be

⁸In a report about the *Drafting Process and Characteristics of the Common Programme Draft by Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference*, Zhou Enlai pointed out that the regime of the new democracy was a system of democratic centralism designed by the National People's Congress. It was totally different from the parliamentary system of the former democracy, and belonged to the classification of the representatives' conference of the socialist Soviet Union. However, it was also completely different from the Soviet system, because it eradicated class, while the Chinese system was based on an alliance of all revolutionary classes. Zhou Enlai, *Characteristics of the Common Programme Draft by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference*, September 22, 1949, C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office: Book 1, P. 17–18, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 1992.

⁹Jin Chunming, *Comment on Cambridge P.R.C. History*, P. 8, Wuhan, Hubei People's Press, 2001.

¹⁰See detailed analysis in Mao Zedong's *On Federal Government*, Mao Zedong's Selected Works, Volume 3, P. 1047–1049, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1991.

¹¹Hu Angang: *China's Economic and Political Center (1949–1976)*, Beijing, Tsinghua University Press, 2011.

¹²Zhou Enlai expressed explicitly: 'now we are in the transitional period from basically fighting the Kuomintang to radically combating it. It will take several years instead of several months to finish. The transitional period is characteristic, and we must seize it, or we will make mistakes. Our target is to step towards unification with a focus on the basis of division management. Zhou Enlai's Address was recorded at the Second Plenary Session of the 7th C.P.C. Central Committee, March 13, 1949. Jin Chongji: *A Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976)* (I), P. 826, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2008.

strengthened. The Party led the state, the army, and the people,¹³ and this basic system was constantly improved and reformed. The centralized leadership that had been formed during the War Against Japanese Aggression was inherited, yet new developments in party organizations at all levels provided the most important organizational foundation, leadership methods, and working system for the national regime.¹⁴ Systems led by Mao Zedong during this period mainly included.

Concentration of central decision-making power

On August 14, 1948, the Central Committee of the C.P.C. issued the *Instructions on Strict Implementation of the Reporting System*. This informed the Central Committee about the implementation of routes, guidelines and policies of various regions. In September, a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. passed the *Resolution on the System of Requesting Instructions by Central Offices, Branch Offices, Military Area Commands, Central Military Commission Branches and Front Committees to the Central Government*, aiming to strengthen the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee, and to centralize all powers to the central government and representative organs (but not to place subordinate organizations a par with the central government, the Party, or the army). On September 20, Mao Zedong drafted a decision to perfect the Party committee system for the Central Committee of the C.P.C. The decision stated that the Party committee system was crucial for ensuring collective leadership and preventing any individual from monopolizing the conduct of affairs. All of the important problems were to be submitted to the committee for discussion, and after receiving all opinions, a clear decision would be made, and executed in due course. It was stipulated that neither collective leadership nor individual responsibility was to take precedence.

Unification of the financial and economic systems

In early July 1948, the Ministry of Central Finance and Economy was established, with Dong Biwu at its head. In September, after the founding of the People's Government of North China, the Finance and Economy Committee of North China was established, issuing a *Decision on Unifying the Financial Work of North China*. On December 1, the People's Bank of China was founded by a merger of the original Bank of North China, Beihai Bank, and Peasant Bank of Northwest. Thereafter, the *renminbi* was nominated as the standard currency of New China, and the PLA's finances were unified.¹⁵

¹³Wang Shaoguang: *Central and Local Relations in New China*, Lecture on October 14, 2009, School of Public Policy Management of Tsinghua University.

¹⁴C.P.C. Party History Research Office: *C.P.C. History Volume II (1949–1976)*, Book I, P. 173, Beijing, C.P.C. History Press, 2011.

¹⁵C.P.C. Party History Research Office: *C.P.C. History Volume II (1921–1949)*, Book II, P. 771, Beijing, C.P.C. History Press, 2011.

Selection of the PLA as the uniform organizational system and unified military command

On November 1, 1948, the Central Military Commission issued the *Regulations on Unifying Army Organization and Military Designation*, stipulating that the PLA would be divided into field forces, local forces and guerrilla forces. Field forces were renamed corps, brigades were unified as divisions, and two levels of command, regiment and field army were established above the corps. A three-three system establishment was made below the corps. Designation of regiments or above was made according to the uniform sequence of the whole army. Local forces took the brigade as the highest fighting unit, belonging to the military command. Military command was divided into first-level, second-level, and third-level command as well as military sub-command. Guerrilla forces retained the model of columns and detachments. In September 1949, the *Common Programme* stated that 'the People's Republic of China must establish a unified army, namely, the People's Liberation Army and the People's Public Security Forces. They are under the command of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central People's Government, receiving unified commands, systems, establishments, and laws'.

Proper handling of the relationship between centralization and decentralization

The *Common Programme* ruled that 'local governments throughout the country are subject to the central People's Government'. This has subsequently become the foundational system of national unity.

Strengthening the leadership responsibility of the Party for government work

In December 1952, Mao Zedong explained the responsibilities of the Party Central Committee and party committees at all levels for the government, financial and economic work, and industrial construction:

- (I) All the main and important guidelines, policies and plans must be made by the Party Central Committee, which will make the Party's decisions and instructions, and conduct examination and approval of proposals from relevant authority leaders and party groups. The central representative agencies and party committees at all levels shall guarantee to make resolutions or instructions within the scope of the wider resolutions, instructions and decrees of the Party Central Committee and the Central People's Government, and to complete the tasks issued by the Central Government and superior bodies.
- (II) Checking the implementation of the Party's resolution and instructions.¹⁶

This basic system arrangement formed the principle of the Party in leading the government and the subordination of the Party to the central government. Under this regime, China quickly transformed from 'a heap of loose sand' to a state of political unity, with centralized decision-making and systems.

¹⁶Mao Zedong: *The Party's Leading Responsibility for Government Work*, December, 1952, *Mao Zedong's Collected Works*, Volume 6, P. 252, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1999.

Establishment of an inner-party supervision mechanism

In November 1949, the Central Committee of the C.P.C. decided to set up the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, with Zhu De as the secretary and local discipline inspection organizations at all levels. Their main task was to conduct checks and trials of Party organizations at all levels, and audit the behavior of cadres to ensure no violation of Party rules.

A system was implemented for greater administrative areas. Local five-level governments were established, consisting of greater administrative area governments, provincial governments (43 in 1952), local governments (259), county-level governments (2762), and township governments (275,000).¹⁷

Whereas the founding of the central government had been relatively easy, the establishment of the local government system required a lengthy construction process. One of the simplest ways was to establish a government administrative system with direct reference to the model of the People's Liberation Army. Just as the PLA set up army headquarters, field army barracks, corps, divisions and regiment, governments established central and greater administrative areas, then provincial level, prefecture level and county level layers. **This greatly reduced the cost of establishing a new government, and also cut down the learning process.**

A system of national regional autonomy was implemented in minority areas, and a unified multi-ethnic unitary state was established. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai promoted the regional autonomy of ethnic minorities with the aim of establishing a unified republic without imposing a federal system or a union republic.¹⁸ New China took a unitary state system and created a new system of national autonomy. This system was different from the united multi-ethnic federal system

¹⁷Department of Comprehensive Statistics of National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China: *China Compendium of Statistics 1949–2008*, P. 4, Beijing, China Statistics Press, 2009.

¹⁸During the drafting of the Common Programme, Mao Zedong proposed either federal, republic or regional autonomy for ethnic minorities. With the C.P.C. Central Committee he eventually decided on regional autonomy. Pang Xianzhi, Jin Chongji: *A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976)*, Volume 1, P. 22, Central Party Literature Press, 2003. On September 7, 1949, when introducing the reasons for the C.P.C. Central Committee offering regional autonomy to ethnic minorities, Zhou Enlai advocated national autonomy, but wished to prevent imperialists from using national issues to disrupt China's unification. His plan was to unite all sub-nations into a single family. Imperialists wanted to split Tibet, Taiwan and even Xinjiang, but Zhou expressed hope that imperialism would not win out. For this purpose, China was named a 'People's Republic' instead of 'Federation'. It is not a federal state, yet it proposes the regional autonomy of ethnic minorities, and exercises the right to national autonomy. See Zhou Enlai's *Collected Works of the United Front*, P. 137, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1984. In March, 1958, Mao Zedong said that among the total population of the Soviet Union, Russian nationality accounted for over 50%, and minorities accounted for almost 50%; however, among the total population of China, Han nationality accounted for 94%, and minorities 6%, so China could not be a federal republic like the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong: *Speech at the Chengdu Meeting, March, 1958*, Mao Zedong's *Collected Works*, Volume 7, P. 371, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1999.

adopted by the Soviet Union in 1922—¹⁹the ‘diversity in unity’ model that had a union republic as its sovereign state, and reserved the right to force down the wider Soviet Union. The *Common Programme* stipulated that: ‘all nationalities in the People’s Republic of China are equal’, and a system of national regional autonomy was implemented. It was called the²⁰ ‘integrated diversity’ model, and promoted diversity within a unitary system.

Based on the process of founding the state and his early explorations and practices, in 1953 Mao Zedong put forward a concept known as ‘One Transformation and Three Reforms’ during the transition period. In 1954, the *Constitution of the People’s Republic of China* (the first constitution of the new nation) was formally established. It laid down the three basic political systems of the People’s Republic of China, namely the People’s Congress, multi-party cooperation and political consultation, and national regional autonomy. In the aftermath of World War II, the United Nations was formed with only 50 member countries; in the subsequent 70 years it grew to 193 member countries. With the exception of developed industrialized countries, most member states retained national unity. The vast majority of the developing countries have since undergone civil unrest, civil war and national disintegration, particularly socialist nations. For example, the former Yugoslavia was divided into five and then six countries; the former Soviet Union was split into 15 countries. Only China has maintained national unity.

In fact, China’s system innovation has transcended that of the European Union—the state coalition with the so-called strongest economy in the world and highest level of integration after 50 years—which was the historical choice for system innovation after two world wars at the cost of tens of millions of lives. Yet compared with the China’s modern state system of integrated diversity, the E.U.’s diversity is theoretical. Countries within it are sovereign states, and have the

¹⁹In 1922, based on Lenin’s proposal, an alliance composed of Soviet republics with sovereignty was built, consisting of four former Soviet republics: the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, the Ukraine, and the Republic of Caucasus. In 1924, the first constitution of the Soviet Union was passed at the Second Soviet Representatives’ Meeting. The constitution provided that all union republics were sovereign states, with the Soviet Union protecting their sovereignty; all union republics reserved the right to exit the Soviet Union; all union republics could formulate their own constitutions based on the basic principles of the constitution of the Soviet Union. Later, the number of Soviet Union members expanded to 15 union republics, and its territorial area reached 20 million km². In 1991, the Soviet Union officially collapsed, and was divided into 15 independent states. Now, the territorial area of Russia is 17.0754 million km², accounting for 76% of the former Soviet Union’s territory, ranking first in the world. The Russian Federation is made up of 89 federal subjects, including 21 republics, six frontier regions, 49 states, two federal municipalities, one autonomous region, and 10 national autonomous regions.

²⁰Article 51 of the *Common Programme* states that: ‘In the areas that minority nationalities inhabit, the regional autonomy of minority nationalities must be guaranteed, and various national autonomous organizations should be built based on the population of minority inhabitants and territorial area. The *Common Programme of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference* (passed at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference September 29, 1949), C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office: *Selected Works of Important Literature since the Founding of the P.R.C.*, Book 1, Page 12, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 1992.

freedom to exit, making it a quasi-super national body. So-called integration is held above diversity, market integration and economic integration. The E.U. espouses situations of quasi-integration and semi-integration, such as monetary semi-integration (16 countries currently use the Euro), and diversity of official languages (there are 24), official script (there are 24), political systems, financial systems, national defense, and diplomacy. Once a crisis occurs (such as the international financial crisis), most countries will fall to opportunistic free riding. For example, the *Maastricht Treaty* of 1993 stipulated that the proportion of fiscal deficit accounting for G.D.P. of member countries should not exceed 3%, and the proportion of government debt accounting for G.D.P. should not go above 60%. The *Stability and Growth Pact* of 1997 demanded that the budgets of member countries in 2004 realized a basic balance or a slight surplus, and stipulated that if the deficit ratio of a member country was over 3% for three consecutive years, the country would be fined 0.5% of its G.D.P. However, the proportion of budget deficit accounting for G.D.P. of most Eurozone countries was more than 3%, and the proportion of government debt accounting for G.D.P. was more than 60%. There is the possibility that some countries will quit or be expelled from the European Union in the future, so the realization of fiscal integration is very unlikely.

1.2 Mao Zedong: Major System Innovations

A number of major principles and system arrangements were formed within the Communist Party of China during Mao Zedong's rule. The first was the organizational principle that subordinated the Party to the Party Central Committee, ensuring that party organizations at all levels came under the power of the Party Central Committee. The second was the principle of Party command over defense, placing the Party Central Committee in control of the People's Liberation Army and other armed forces. The third was to place cadres under Party supervision. These basic tenets ensured unity for the Party, the army, and the nation overall. They are directly reflected in the adjustment of organizational structure and system construction within the Party.

They not only strengthened the political and economic centralization of central government, but also greatly strengthened the political leadership of the Party Central Committee for the Central People's Government, forming a 'reporting system' and decision-making mode with Chinese characteristics. In November 1949, the Central Committee of the C.P.C. issued the *Decision on the Organization of the Party Committee of the C.P.C. within the Central People's Government* and the *Decision on the Establishment of the Party Group of the C.P.C. within the Central People's Government*, and put them into practice in central and local government departments at all levels. Adjustments were also made in the leadership system of the Party Central Committee. Working conferences for the central secretary-general and standing secretary-general were held to assist the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. and Secretariat of the Central

Committee in researching and handling daily affairs, and became the transition vehicle and predecessor of carrying out the working system of the Secretariat of the Central Committee Meeting after the 8th National Congress of the C.P.C.

Organization of greater administrative areas was gradually weakened and canceled, and direct political and administrative leadership of the Central Government over provincial and municipal governments was strengthened. In March 1950, the Government Administration Council began to withdraw partial financial power from greater administrative areas according to the *Decision on Unifying National Financial and Economic Work*. In December 1951, power over personnel in greater administrative areas was withdrawn according to the *Decision on Adjusting Staff Reduction (Draft)*. In November 1952, the Central Government decided to change the People's Government Committees (or military and administrative committees) of all greater administrative areas into administrative committees, determining that the administrative committee of the greater administrative area was the organ that led an area and supervised its local government on behalf of the Central People's Government. The administrative power of greater administrative areas was withdrawn. In 1953, the Central Committee of the C.P.C. decided to transfer all secretaries of central offices, chairs of administrative committees in greater administrative areas, and other people in charge to the central government.²¹ In April 1954, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. decided to cancel all first-level administrative organizations in greater administrative areas, for which the Central People's Government issued an executive decision in June. Accordingly, the Central Committee of the C.P.C. decided to cancel six central offices, and brought the leadership of Party committees in all provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government. This was a major reform for the party-government system.

Reforms were also rife in the armed forces. The Central Military Commission dismissed six major field army commands, and established 13 major military commands that were led directly by the Central Military Commission. A branch-to-branch and level-to-level management cadre system was gradually put into place. The principle of placing cadres under party supervision was applied, and in addition to the separate management of army cadres, all other cadres came under the unified management of the organization department of the Central Party Committee and party committees at all levels. In November 1953, the Central Committee of the C.P.C. issued the *Decision on Strengthening Cadre Management*, and put forward the establishment of a branch-to-branch and level-to-level management cadre system under the unified leadership of the Central Party Committee and party committee at all levels.

From 1948 until 1954, the Communist Party of China quickly and successfully established a basic system of Party leadership of the country and the army, and also set up a centralized political and economic system that became the most powerful in

²¹Pang Song: *China in Mao Zedong Times (1949–1976)* (I), P. 212, Beijing, C.P.C. History Press, 2003.

China's history. Its main characteristics include a ruling centralized party that holds state power; a central government that controls people, property, goods and economic administration of all regions; centralized military power consisting of a People's Liberation Army and other armed forces; and the implementation of a unitary-system regime, in which legislative power belongs to the central government.

Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, China realized the transition from a traditional to a modern state, from disintegration to unification, and from decentralization to centralization of power. Neither the Beiyang Government (1912–1928) nor the Chiang Kai-shek Government (1928–1949) was able to do this. The age of Mao Zedong was China's most centralized period since 1840. Under his strong centralized system, China went from the poorest and most backward of economic and social conditions, mobilizing social resources and power, concentrating its manpower, and taking control of national affairs. This led to successful industrialization, urbanization and modernization, as well as unprecedented economic development and social progress. However, any centralized political system and individual decision-making mechanism has its natural defects, and China fell foul of 'improvement' schemes like the Great Leap Forward, Four Clean-ups, and the Cultural Revolution.

Mao Zedong's system innovation included:

Systematization of the National Congress of the Party

Plenary session system of the Central Committee

Plenary session system of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C.

Congressional system of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee

Congressional system of the Secretariat of the Central Committee

Discipline Inspection of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

Particularly important was the collective leadership system of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. that was established following Mao Zedong's ideas. In 1956, Mao put forward the addition of a Standing Committee to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, to be led by a President, a Vice President of the Party Central Committee, and a General Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Its purpose was ensuring national security.

Mao feared that a President and a Vice President (referring to Liu Shaoqi) would not be adequate, so other positions were added. It was his opinion that 'something unexpected may happen any time, since man's fate is as uncertain as the weather'. If only individual was forced to leave the committee, there would always be a replacement waiting in the wings, so the country would not be affected, unlike the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. Early additions to the Standing Committee were 'young Turks' Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, who were 52 and 51 years old respectively.²²

²²Mao Zedong: Issues of the C.P.C. Central Committee Appointing Vice President and General Secretary (September 13, 1956), *Mao Zedong's Collected Works*, Volume 7, P. 110–112, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1999.

Seven members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee stood on behalf of six institutions: the Central Committee of the C.P.C., the National People's Congress, the State President, the State Council, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and the Central Military Commission. The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee gave full play to collective leadership, personal division of labor, internal coordination, and forming a resultant force.

Mao Zedong's idea was thoughtful and forward-looking. China was the country with the highest population in the world, and was a socialist country; if it encountered unforeseen accidents, it was extremely dangerous to leave the nation's future and destiny in the hands of just one or two people. Stalin's death and his successor's changes had triggered upheaval in the Soviet Union and in the wider socialist camp, leading to troubled times. Mao's aim was to avoid a similar situation.

His legacy also included innovations in the socialist state system. This was mainly reflected in the *Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, composed in 1954. The constitution summed up the issues China had faced since the late Qing Dynasty and Chiang Kai-shek's pseudo constitution, and also referred to the advantages of the constitutions of the Soviet Union and other people's democratic states. Mao believed that when it came to constitutional matters, the bourgeoisie was an antecedent. Aside from in Britain, France and the United States, no bourgeoisie had experienced a revolution during which a constitution was formed. Mao Zedong wanted China's constitution to be different—socialist instead of bourgeois.²³ As a latecomer to the game, China had the 'late-mover advantage'. When drafting its constitution, Mao consciously or unconsciously exploited this. He summarized the positive and negative, advantageous and disadvantageous, progressive and regressive experience and lessons of predecessors and foreigners (including the constitutions of socialist countries like the Soviet Union and capitalist countries like the United States. **For this, Mao concluded that China's constitution was superior to its Western counterparts.** This was hard to accept at that time, but after practical and historical inspection and international comparison, Mao's prophecy was verified: China did indeed create a unique socialist state system.

The constitution called for:

Democratic centralism. Article 3 of the *Constitution of the People's Republic of China* stipulates that the state agency of the People's Republic of China shall follow the principle of democratic centralism. It is not a democracy, nor is it centralism. Only a mix of democracy and centralism can achieve the goals of political democracy and a lively political situation of discipline and freedom, unified will and individual thought. In this sense, **China's democratic centralism transcended Western democracy.**

²³Mao Zedong: *On the Drafting of the Constitution of the P.R.C.*, June 14, 1954, *Mao Zedong's Collected Works*, Volume 6, P. 325–326, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1999.

At the National People's Congress in September 1948, Mao Zedong chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C.²⁴ on the issue of establishing a people's congress at all levels of democratic centralism. The question was which method to adopt—a parliamentary system or democratic centralism? The Soviet Union had been viewed as a congress in the past, so a 'People's Congress' was a possibility. However, Yuan Shi-kai and Cao Kun used the term 'parliamentary system' for their failed attempt at governance, so that was not an option. 'Democratic centralism' seemed to fit the bill. **There was no need for a bourgeois parliamentary system, nor for a separation of three powers.**²⁵ **After the founding of New China, the system of governance by the people officially became China's fundamental political mode.** It was stipulated under the *Constitution of the People's Republic of China* that 'all power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people'. The organs through which the people exercise state power are the National People's Congress and the local people's congresses at all levels. The National People's Congress is the highest organ of state power, under which operate the local people's congresses at all levels. All administrative, judicial and prosecution organs of the state are created by the people's congress for which they are responsible and by which they are supervised. This system is essentially different from the parliamentary model widely used in foreign countries. Firstly, the parliamentary system is based on parliamentary cells that represent different interest groups. The people's congress system has no parliamentary group, nor does it carry out constituency activities; it chooses delegates to attend the congress according to the electoral unit (generally in accordance with the administrative division except the delegation of the People's Liberation Army). Secondly, the Western system usually adopts the separation of three powers—legislative, executive, and judicial. China maintains the relationship between the People's Congress and the government, court, and procuratorate. Thirdly, the members of the parliamentary system are basically representatives of various parties, while the members of China's People's Congress are elected by the people. Finally, a parliamentary system adopts alternate ruling under two or more parties, with changes to the ruling program or policy. China falls under the leadership of the Communist Party, and adopts multi-party participation in politics and political consultation to ensure the continuity, stability and security of guidelines and policies.

A State President system

This system was designed to give the State President the power of a head of state, allowing him or her to command the national armed forces, and serve as the chair of the National Defense Commission and Supreme State Conference. The role was

²⁴Department of Comprehensive Statistics of National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China: *China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2008*, P. 4, Beijing, China Statistics Press, 2009.

²⁵Mao Zedong: *Report and Conclusions of the Conference of the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee* (September 8, 1948), *Mao Zedong's Collected Works*, Volume 5, P. 136, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1999.

designed by Mao Zedong to ensure the security of the Party and the state, given China's huge size. To have a Speaker, a Prime Minister and a State President allowed for a spreading of duty and responsibility. **The President acted as a cushion between the State Council and the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.**²⁶ Mao Zedong pointed out in the *Constitution Draft Description* (which he personally modified and examined) that **'the role of President is completely different from the presidential government of capitalist countries, and is distinct in the history of our country. The President of the People's Republic of China is a symbol of the people's solidarity. He is neither the head nor the executor of legislation; he has no special powers, but relies on his status and prestige to offer proposals to the National People's Congress, the Executive Committee of the National People's Congress, and the State Council, or convene state conferences.'** The post of President of the People's Republic of China was established in the 1954 Constitution. The State President is an independent state organ within the political system. He or she is not only the representative of the state, but also the symbol of the state. Due to the 'Lin Biao incident', the role of State President was canceled in the 1975 Constitution, only to be reinstated in the 1982 Constitution.

The authority of the State President allows him or her to publicize laws, appoint or remove premiers and vice-premiers of the State Council, as well as state councilors, ministers, directors of committees, auditors-general and secretaries-general; it also covers the awarding of state medals and titles of honor, the releasing of decrees of special pardon and orders of martial law, the declaration of a state of war, and the issuing of mobilization orders. A State President can send for and recall ambassadors stationed abroad, approve and abolish treaties and important agreements concluded with foreign countries, and receive foreign ambassadors on behalf of the state according to the decision of the National People's Congress and the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Presidents and Vice Presidents of the People's Republic of China are elected by the National People's Congress, and must accept the supervision of the National People's Congress. **The activities of the State President are conducted according to the decision of National People's Congress and the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Therefore, the head of state system in China is collective, and is implemented by the combination of the State President and the National People's Congress and its standing committee.**²⁷

A State Council System. As the supreme executive organ of the state, the State Council implements a system of central first-level government. The State Council implements the working system with the prime minister presiding over the plenary session and executive meeting, and is responsible for the daily work of the government and the unified leadership of local state administrative organs at all levels

²⁶Pang Xianzhi, Jin Chongji: *A Biography of Mao Zedong, (1949–1976)*, Volume 1, P. 323–324, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2003.

²⁷http://www.gov.cn/test/2005-06/26/content_9626.htm.

in the country. As state administrative organs under the unified leadership of the State Council, local people's governments at various levels are responsible for the people's congresses at the same level, and report to the superior state administrative organ. Various departments of the local people's governments at various levels operate under the unified leadership of the people's government at the same level, and are subject to the leadership of the competent department of the superior people's government (up to the State Council). Thus a system of administrative leadership that combines vertical and dual leadership with Chinese characteristic is formed. In 1956, Mao Zedong wrote in the *On the Ten Major Relationships* that the central department could be divided into two categories. The first category's leader could conduct management beyond the enterprise, and local agencies and enterprises all came under local supervision. **Under the second category, their task was to put forward guidelines, formulate work plans, and rely on local offices to handle affairs.** Mao also pointed out that China's constitution called for legislative power to be centralized in the Party Central Committee. However, without violating the central policy and maintaining accordance with the situation and job demands, a local government could make rules, regulations, methods and constitutions, without constraint.²⁸ Thus a system was established that combined unique centralization and decentralization. In order to build a powerful socialist country, centralization must have the powerful unified central leadership, as well as unified planning and discipline. Decentralization is used to enlarge the power of local governments on the premise of consolidating the central unified leadership, giving more independence to local governments to encourage them to do more things.

Mao Zedong's conclusion was that China was so large, its population so great, and its situation so complicated that it was better to have initiatives coming from two sources (central and local governments) than from only one. However, he feared that his nation did not yet have enough experience to forge a relationship between central and the local.²⁹ From the perspective of subsequent practice, initiatives coming from two sources can be further extended into a situation whereby the central government takes a leading position with the local government as the main body. **A central government taking the leading position means that it must conduct leadership, direction and guidance for local governments beneath it. Having a local government as the main body subjects it to central decision-making, and forces it to bears overall responsibility for local affairs. This constitutes an incentive compatibility mechanism between a central government and a local government. This covers national unity, the avoidance of fragmentation, and flexible control; it also means local independence, and encouraging autonomy, initiative and creativity in local government.**

²⁸Mao Zedong: *On Ten Great Relations* (April 25, 1956), *Mao Zedong's Collected Works*, Volume 7, P. 32, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1999.

²⁹Mao Zedong: *On Ten Great Relations* (April 25, 1956), *Mao Zedong's Collected Works*, Volume 7, P. 31–33, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1999.

In addition are the systems of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference National Committee, the system of the Central Military Commission, the central judicial system, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate.

China's ability to implement Western-style democracy has long been subject to consideration. As early as 1949, Mao Zedong compared the relationship between the West and China as that of a teacher and a student. He also claimed that imperialist aggression disabused the Chinese of the notion of learning from Western nations. Modes of bourgeois democratization never succeeded; economic condition worsened with every attempt.³⁰ **This is why Mao's New China was not set up as a bourgeois democratic republic, but a state ruled by the people.**

As a new socialist system, it was not perfect. It contained many defects and weak points, particularly in how to implement, execute, and improve. Unfortunately, Mao did not adhere consistently to the system in his old age, often violating it. Examples include the replacement during the Cultural Revolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and Secretariat of the Central Committee; the National People's Congress, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the central committee of democratic parties were stopped; and the role of State President was abolished. As pointed out in the *Resolution on Several Historical Issues of the Party since the Founding*, issued by the Party Central Committee in 1981, China was a country with long feudal history. The pernicious influence of long-term feudal autocracy on ideology and politics was not easily removed, and many historical reasons caused a failure to conduct institutionalization and legalization for inner-party democracy and democracy of national political and social life; although laws were formulated, there was no tangible authority.³¹ It was against this backdrop that setbacks such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution took place.

1.3 Mao Zedong: Mistakes of the Later Years

It is difficult to evaluate Mao Zedong's contributions to New China's governance, particularly given the mistakes he made in his later years. It is a case of both dialectical and historical materialism.

Dialectical materialism holds that every coin has two sides. The root cause of development lies in internal contradiction. Similarly, people have two sides. Thus, the root cause of strengths and weaknesses, of right and wrong, lies in the contradictions inherent in people themselves. This model can be used to evaluate Mao Zedong.

³⁰Mao Zedong: *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, June 30, 1949, *Mao Zedong's Selected Works*, Volume 4, P. 1470–1471, People's Publishing House, 1991.

³¹*Decisions on Several of the Party's Historic Issues since the Founding of the P.R.C.* was passed in the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th C.P.C. Central Committee on June 27, 1981.

Evaluation of Mao is essentially the evaluation of a great innovator. The Communist Party of China is the nation's core strength, and Mao Zedong was its leader. Therefore, **his innovation is not only personal; it represents the innovation of the Party Central Committee, the Communist Party of China, and modern China.** Mao's greatest innovation was exploring and opening China's road system, which was instrumental to its progress. From the perspective of world development, **every innovator experiences both success and failure. Failure is often more meaningful than success. Failure is also the mother of success, so by this token, no failure means no success. Even if an innovator experiences success, he may fail in re-innovation. In this sense, no success means no failure. This shows that an innovator can be a winner and a loser simultaneously.** This is the case for Mao Zedong.

On September 9, 1963, he told Chairman Williams of the Central Communist Party of New Zealand: **'I knew that China had walked for a long time down a long road, with both successes and failures.'**³² To this end, any evaluation of Mao Zedong as a great man in history must be completed on a **'case by case'** basis³³ rather than relying on the customary ratio of 70% achievements and 30% mistakes.

During certain periods of Mao's political career, his successes numbered higher than his failures. On such era was the time between 1949 and 1956—New China's first period of development, and a golden age for Mao in terms of innovation. Between 1957 and 1976, his failures were more apparent than his successes. It was a period of tortuous development, replete with mistakes on Mao's part. However, many of the fatal decisions were not made by Mao alone. He was advised by the likes of Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Lin Biao, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao, all of whom served as members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.

The path to creating a nation is never smooth, and no leader is without sin. In this way, Mao's legacy cannot be overlooked. The basic socialist system he invented, as well as his many theoretical and practical innovations, were inherited and developed by subsequent innovators, just as his errors serve as important cautionary examples. It is important to view him as a historical figure in a wider context, not merely as an individual.

Tang Dynasty scholar Liu Zongyuan wrote in his *Feudal Theory* that 'The failure of the Western Zhou Dynasty lay in the patriarchal clan system, while the Qin Dynasty's failure lay in tyranny and not in the system of prefectures and

³²A *Chronicle of Mao Zedong's Life (1949–1976)*, Volume 5, P. 226, Central Party Literature Press, 2013.

³³'Concrete analysis of concrete issues' was first put forward by Lenin, who wrote: 'He has ignored Marxist essence and the living soul of Marxism' when criticizing Béla Kun, a member of the Communist Party of Hungary in *Communism (Lenin Selected Works, Volume 4, P. 290)*. In 1937, Mao Zedong reiterated Lenin's views in his *On Contradiction*, writing that 'the essence and living soul of Marxism constitute concrete analysis of concrete issue.' *Mao Zedong's Selected Works, Volume 1, P. 312*.

counties'.³⁴ Similarly, the mistakes of Mao Zedong's later years came down to administration rather than the system. One possible explanation is that Mao's errors did not lie in the socialist system designed for the development of New China, but in policy failure during the process of exploring socialism.

The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were not failures of the socialist system itself, but were grave errors of decision-making among the leadership.³⁵ Thinking in these terms, Mao Zedong's later mistakes can be seen to lie not in the Communist Party of China and the People's Republic of China, but in wrongful policy-making. The opposite was the case for **Soviet reform. Its failure was hugely disruptive. Mikhail Gorbachev implemented a presidential system,**³⁶ giving up

³⁴The 'system' standards for a complete set of institutions. In the Qin Dynasty, a system of prefectures and counties was established to replace the system of enfeoffment that had existed since the Zhou Dynasty. This episode in China's ancient history has profound historic significance in terms of building a centralized mode of governance, and has become the basic mode of feudal states over 2000 years later. The 'politics' standards for a complete set of policies. With excessive, extreme and overdue policies, national finance is overwhelmed, and people cannot rehabilitate; thus the Qin was a 'short-lived' dynasty.

³⁵In 1981, a resolution of the C.P.C. Central Committee pointed out that in the past, left-leaning mistakes had occurred in China's economic work, namely, breaking away from the national situation and stretching beyond actual capacity. *Decisions on Several of the Party's Historic Issues since the Founding of the P.R.C.* was passed at the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th C.P.C. Central Committee on June 27, 1981.

In 1987, the report of the 13th C.P.C. National Congress pointed that **'for this issue, the Party has made beneficial explorations and important achievements; it has experienced twists and turns, and paid a high price.** Since the late 1950s, we were affected by 'left-leaning' mistakes, and were anxious for success, went blindly to extremes, and thought that productivity would increase sharply by means of subjective wishes and depending on mass movement. We believed that socialist public ownership would be larger, better, and more public. In addition, we once put the task of developing productivity in second place, and insisted on class struggle even after the socialist transformation was basically finished. Many matters that restricted the development of productivity did not match the socialist essence, or were only suitable for particular historic conditions—regarded as 'socialist principles' and followed firmly; many things conducive to productivity development, product commercialization, socialization and modernization under socialist conditions were considered as 'restorations of capitalism' and opposed. The sole ownership structure and rigid economic system thereby developed, and a political system with excessive centralization of power closely related to such economic system has seriously constrained the development of productivity and a socialist commodity economy. This situation teaches us that a clear understanding of China's national conditions and history is extremely important'. Zhao Ziyang's *Marching Forward Along the Socialist Road with Chinese Characteristics—Report of the 13th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee*, October 25, 1987.

³⁶On March 14, 1990, the *Revised and Supplementary Law on Setting up the Presidency and Constitution of the Soviet Union (Fundamental Law)* was passed at the Third Soviet Union People's Congress, mandating the creation of the post of the President of the Soviet Union. This replaced the system of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet exercising the right of the head of the Soviet Union. In accordance with the law, the President of the Soviet Union must be elected by Soviet citizens by means of a secret ballot based on universal, equal and first election rights. If a candidate wins over 50% of the vote, he or she is declared President. Mikhail Gorbachev was thus indirectly elected as the President of Soviet Union at the Congress.

the leadership of the C.P.C.,³⁷ and auguring a multi-party system.³⁸ As the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he took it upon himself to dissolve the party, and³⁹ as the first President of the Soviet Union, he announced its collapse,⁴⁰ dividing it into 15 countries. Russia's reduction to a second-class country lies in this change to the basic system. The overall failure of the Soviet Union lies in the system but not the administration.

Mao Zedong's exploration of the Chinese system seems to prove the old adage that counts failure as the mother of success. In 1981, the Party Central Committee made a public announcement that 'our Party dares to face up to and correct its mistakes. It has the determination and ability to prevent repeating the grave errors of the past.' **Looking at its development in the long term, the Party's mistakes and setbacks were mere blips on the radar. With the determination of the people** and the armed forces, it can continue to flourish.⁴¹ Over 30 years of reform practice show that Chinese socialist modernization is influenced by decisive factors that play a long-term role; any influence brought by mistakes will be weakened.

Mao Zedong's later mistakes are the mother of Deng Xiaoping's successful reform. Deng changed failures into achievements, and guided China into a new era of development.

The 'Cultural Revolution' was the direct impetus for Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening, and was also the root cause of China's determination to maintain order (i.e. political and social stability) after 1978. 'Seeking truth from facts' was a legacy of Maoism, which Deng Xiaoping held dear. His ideological emancipation, reform, and opening up were Maoist in their origins.

³⁷In March, 1990, the Soviet Union People's Congress approved a resolution and abolished Article 6 of the Constitution.' 'The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the leading and guiding force of Soviet society, its political system, and the core of national and social organizations. The Soviet Union no longer enjoys legal leading status'. Mikhail Gorbachev stated that such constitutional changes would initiate a new stage of socialist development.

³⁸In July, 1990, after the 28th Soviet Union People's Congress, the Soviet Union officially announced 'the closure of political monopoly' and the implementation of a multi-party system.

³⁹On August 24, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev, then President of the Soviet Union, announced his resignation from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and suggests that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dissolve voluntarily, and all republics' parties and local party organizations decide their own fate.

⁴⁰On December 25, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as President of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union was officially dissolved.

⁴¹*Decisions on Several of the Party's Historic Issues since the Founding of the P.R.C.* was passed at the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th C.P.C. Central Committee on June 27, 1981.

1.4 Deng Xiaoping: Reconstruction of the Basic Party System, and the State Selection of 'Three Paths' After the Cultural Revolution

After Mao's death, China stood at a crossroads. Several paths lay ahead. The first was the old way,⁴² namely, adhering to Mao's 'Two Whatever's' and continuing his traditional dogmatic socialism. Its proponents were Hua Guofeng (Mao's personally selected successor) and Wang Dongxing, who had been a great influence on the late Chairman. The fight between Cultural Revolution leaders headed by Hua Guofeng and reformists under Deng Xiaoping was in fact a battle between adhering to Mao Zedong's traditional socialist ways or beginning a new era of Reform and Opening. It was a period of both political hesitation and of preparation. In fact, when Hua Guofeng declared the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution (which had been initiated and led by Mao) it was an indication that the 'old path' had also ended. The time was ripe for Deng Xiaoping to take the stage.

Another option was to turn away from socialism and move towards a Western style of governance. Since Chinese socialism had suffered serious setbacks under Mao's Communist Party, many people were keen to abandon it altogether in favor of a Western capitalist liberal democracy. As Deng Xiaoping pointed out, this line of thought was most popular after the crushing of the 'Gang of Four'.

It was held up as 'bourgeois liberalization', namely, seeking the democracy and freedom of Western capitalist countries and denying socialism.⁴³ Only a handful of intellectuals supported this idea. They set themselves up as 'innovationists', and gained public and media support from European and American countries, which saw them as 'Chinese democrats'. Deng Xiaoping publicly rejected this capitalist option, seeing how former socialist countries like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia and failed on assuming it.

Deng's way came to be known as socialism with Chinese characteristics. Under a basic socialist direction, he used gradualism to reform the traditional highly centralized planned economic system and political system, conducting initiatives and comprehensive opening to the outside world, and forging new path for development. With its billion-strong population, this path was the safest for China.⁴⁴

⁴²On April 30, 1976, after Mao Zedong met Prime Minister Muldoon of New Zealand, he wrote three instructions to Hua Guofeng: 'Take it easy', 'follow past methods', and 'I trust you'. Mao Zedong: *Several Sentences Written during the Discussion with Hua Guofeng* (April 30, 1976), C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office: *Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the P.R.C.*, Book 13, P. 538, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 1998.

⁴³Deng Xiaoping: *Implementing Capitalist Liberalization through Taking the Capitalist Road* (May and June, 1985), *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume 3, P. 123–124, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1993.

⁴⁴Gong Yuzhi, Yang Chungui, Shi Zhongquan, Zhou Xiaowen: *Re-reading Deng Xiaoping*, P. 56–57, Party School of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. Press, 2004.

However, the new road path did not begin automatically at the end of the Cultural Revolution. It was only inaugurated after a period of complex yet ultimately peaceful political wrangling inside the Party Central Committee. The historical starting point of the new era was marked by the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in December 1978. From that point until the Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Deng's attention was focused solely on development.⁴⁵

Restoring the basic Party and state system (1977–1981)⁴⁶

As pointed out in the resolution issued by the Party Central Committee in 1981, step-by-step construction of a highly democratic socialist political system was the basic task of socialist revolution. This task had not received adequate attention since the founding of New China, a problem that contributed to the Cultural Revolution.⁴⁷ Deng Xiaoping viewed this as a painful experience, and set the construction of a highly democratic socialist political system as his most important political duty.

Thus, China's economic and political reform came from the inside. It was a period of reflection, criticism, and renewal for the ruling party after the failures of the Cultural Revolution. On August 18, 1980, Deng Xiaoping published his speech entitled *Reform of the Party and State Leading System* from the Extended Meeting of the Political Bureau of the of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in which he conducted deep and trenchant analysis of China's political situation.⁴⁸ Deng's understanding of its characteristics and disadvantages was materialistic and objective, as well as historical and realistic. He was determined to reconstruct the basic Party and state system, with gradual reform of the political system.

Re-modification of the *Constitution of the Communist Party of China* (1977)

In light of the lessons learned from the Cultural Revolution, Article 6 of the *Constitution of the Communist Party of China* from the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China stipulated that disciplinary punishment of members and alternate members of the Central Committee were to be decided by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. It also stated that when the Party organization made a decision to punish a party member, the member had to attend

⁴⁵Deng Xiaoping: *Implementing the Heart and Soul of Construction* (September 18, 1982), see *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume 3, P.11, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1993.

⁴⁶See details in Hu Angang's *Theory on China's Political and Economic History (1977–1991)*, Research Institute of the National Conditions of Tsinghua University, August, 2011.

⁴⁷*Decisions on Several of the Party's Historic Issues since the Founding of the P.R.C.* was passed at the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th C.P.C. Central Committee on June 27, 1981.

⁴⁸Deng Liqun introduced the drafting process of the address: 'the key points and issues of the address were proposed by Deng Xiaoping himself. The drafting was held by me, and attended by Teng Wensheng, Zheng Hui and Wei Jianlin from the Research Office of the Secretariat of the C.P.C. Central Committee.'

the decision meeting. In addition, party members receiving punishment were granted the right to petition. The *Constitution of the Communist Party of China* restored the principles of centralization on the basis of democracy under the centralized guidance of the Eighth C.P.C. National Congress.

In February 1980, the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China discussed the modified draft of the *Constitution of the Communist Party of China*, and first stipulated that members of the Communist Party of China and the Party organization must act within the scope prescribed by the constitution and the law. This was designed to avoid mistakes like the Cultural Revolution. The modified draft also laid out a series of new regulations for the Party's cadre system, canceling the system of life tenure for leading cadres.⁴⁹

Reconstruction of the central leadership organization structure (1980)

From 1978 to 1980, Chen Yun proposed the establishment of the Secretariat of the Central Committee for the third time. He believed that it was an important and necessary measure for the Party.⁵⁰ The Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to restore the system established in the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which had been effective for ten years (1956–1966). The Secretariat of the Central Committee became a standing organization under the leadership of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and its Standing Committee,⁵¹ which doubtlessly greatly enriched the central collective leadership of the Party.

A leadership system with three levels was created, namely the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. This structure held the function of separating powers and enforcing mutual restrictions within the Party Central Committee. The Secretariat of the Central Committee was superior, with the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China falling underneath (the former was the standing organization under the leadership of the latter). This restored the leadership system of the Party Central Committee that had been established in the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1956.

⁴⁹*Communiqué from the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th C.P.C. Central Committee* (approved on February 29, 1980). This document was issued to all Party members for discussion, and was modified based on the opinions proposed in the discussion, before being submitted to the 12th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee for approval.

⁵⁰Chen Yun: *Cadre Handover—A Major Issue for the Party*, (February 30, 1982), *Chen Yun's Collected Works*, Volume II, P. 508 Central Party Literature Press, 2005.

⁵¹*Communiqué from the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th C.P.C. Central Committee* (approved on February 29, 1980).

In addition, Chen Yun called for a collective handover and takeover based on that of Mao. He also suggested that the Secretariat of the Central Committee implement a system of collective leadership, and begin collective office meetings.⁵²

The Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. was established in early 1979 to strengthen inner-party system construction. This Commission of 100 members, led by Chen Yun, was established by election at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Chen Yun served as the first secretary, followed by Deng Yingchao and Hu Yaobang. Huang Kecheng was taken on as a permanent secretary, with Wang Heshou as deputy.⁵³ **When Chen Yun took charge of the Commission, his first task was to establish the Party's basic system and to recover the its original ruling system.** In January 1979, Chen chaired the Commission's first plenary session, laying out its basic tasks and⁵⁴ providing eight principles for discipline inspection. *Twelve Principles for Inner-party Political Life* came up for discussion.⁵⁵ Inner-party legislative form was used to conduct the systematization and standardization of the Party's traditions and styles. Important boundaries for conduct were set for inner-party political life, along with principles for dealing with inner-party relations.⁵⁶ Inner-party struggles and strikes were

⁵²Chen Yun: *Establishment of the Secretariat of the Central Committee is an Important Measure of the Party* (February 24, 1980), Chen Yun's Selected Works, Volume III, P. 270, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1995.

⁵³*Communiqué from the Third Plenary Session of the 11th C.P.C. Central Committee* (approved at the 11th Plenary Session of the 11th C.P.C. Central Committee on December 24, 1978), C.P.C. Collected Works Research Office, Important Selected Works Since the Third Plenary Session, Book I, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1982.

⁵⁴At the working conference of the Central Committee on December 13, 1978, Deng Xiaoping remarked that the task of the Party's discipline inspection commissions and its organization departments at all levels was not only to deal with particular cases but, more importantly, to uphold the Party's rules and regulations and make earnest efforts to improve its style of work. Deng Xiaoping: *Emancipate our Minds, Seek Truth from Facts, Unite as One, and Look Ahead*, (December 13, 1978), *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume II, P. 147, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1994.

On January 4, 1979, in the First Plenary Session of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Chen Yun put forward that the basic task of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection was to maintain Party laws and regulations, and rectify the Party's style. Chen Yun: *Address at the First Plenary Session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection* (January 4, 1978), Chen Yun's Selected Works, Volume III, P. 243, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1995.

⁵⁵Norm has 12 articles in total: (1) Uphold the party's political line and ideological line; (2) Uphold the collective leadership, and oppose personal dictatorship; (3) Maintain party unification, and strictly abide by party discipline; (4) Adhere to party spirit and eliminate factionalism; (5) Speak the truth, and practice what you preach; (6) Promote party democracy, and treat different opinions correctly; (7) Guarantee inviolability of party members' rights; (8) Elections must fully reflect the voters' will; (9) Fight wrong leaning, evildoers and wrongdoings; (10) Treat comrades' mistakes correctly; (11) Accept supervision from the party and the masses, and never grant privilege; (12) Study hard; be both socialist-minded and professionally competent.

⁵⁶C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office: Jin Chongji, Chen Qun: *A Biography of Chen Yun* (II), P. 1512–1513, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2005.

prohibited. Adhering to collective leadership and opposing individual arbitrary decision-making became one of the highest principles of Party leadership. Personality cults were expressly forbidden.

The leading members of the State Council (1978–1980) were adjusted. In March, 1978, the First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress decided to appoint Hua Guofeng as the Premier of the State Council, and 13 people (Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Xu Xiangqian, Ji Dengkui, Yu Qiuli, Chen Xilian, Geng Biao, Chen Yonggui, Fang Yi, Wang Zhen, Gu Mu, Kang Shien and Chen Muhua) as Vice Premiers. It also removed Zhang Chunqiao, Wu Guixian and Sun Jian from their posts as Vice Premiers. In August 1980, the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided on the transfer of the leadership members of the State Council, following four principles. On September 14, the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress accepted and approved the proposal from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The session decided to appoint Zhao Ziyang as the Premier of the State Council, and Yang Jingren, Zhang Aiping and Huang Hua as Vice Premiers. Cheng Yonggui was removed from the post of Vice Premier, and a resolution was passed for Hua Guofeng's resignation as Premier and the removal of Vice Premiers Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, Xu Xiangqian, Wang Zhen and Wang Ren.

It was advocated that cadres should be younger, more knowledgeable and more professional (1980.09). Deng Xiaoping saw a problem with aging cadres at various levels, believing that they lacked energy.⁵⁷ The largest, most difficult and most pressing problem for the organizational line was to select the rightful successors.⁵⁸ Other members of the standing committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, including Ye Jianying, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, reached a political consensus: reforming the leading cadre system of the Party and the state, abolishing the system of life tenure, establishing a personnel system with liquidity and systematization, and training successors who support reform and are younger and more knowledgeable. In December, 1978, Ye Jianying put forward at the Central Working Conference that training and instating a large number of revolutionary cause successors were important strategic tasks for the Party and the state.⁵⁹ On August 18, 1980, Deng Xiaoping said at the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China that, as proposed by Chen Yun, the process of choosing cadres should take both ability and political integrity as its basis. This so-called political

⁵⁷Deng Xiaoping: *Realization of the Ideological Line and Political Line Depends on the Guarantee of the Political Line* (July 29, 1979), Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works, Volume II, P. 191–192, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1994.

⁵⁸Deng Xiaoping: *Realization of the Ideological Line and Political Line Depends on the Guarantee of the Political Line* (July 29, 1979), Beijing, Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works, Volume II, P. 192, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1994.

⁵⁹A *Biography of Ye Jianying* preparation group: *A Biography of Ye Jianying*, P. 401–403, Beijing, Contemporary China Publishing House, 2006.

integrity mainly involved adhering to the socialist path and the leadership of the Party. ‘With this as a prerequisite,’ he added, ‘we should see to it that our cadres are younger, better educated, and better qualified professionally. **Chen Yun added that the employment and promotion of such cadres should be institutionalized.**⁶⁰

Recovering and strengthening the socialist legal system

On December 13, 1978, Deng Xiaoping spoke at the Central Working Conference, claiming that in order to ensure democracy, the legal system must be strengthened. On the same day, Ye Jianying reiterated this point. Deng and Ye put forward the principle of democracy and rule of law, obtaining the formal approval of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.⁶¹ *Instructions on the Resolute Guarantee of the Practical Implementation of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedural Law* issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in September 1979 stipulated that every person, from the chair of the Party Central Committee to rank and file members, must firmly abide by the legal system. There would be no special citizens exempt from the law, and no privilege granted outside of it. From February 1979 to December 1982, Ye Jianying released the No. 14 Order of the Committee Chairman and issued 14 laws. He also signed 12 orders from the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, and published a series of laws, regulations and resolutions to be enacted by it.⁶² **As the chairman of the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress, Ye made fundamental political contributions to the construction of the legal system in the early Reform period. His purpose was to use a socialist legal system as a powerful weapon to safeguard production, work and life; to crack down on criminal behavior, and to take down class enemies. This was to prevent a disaster like the Cultural Revolution from happening again.**⁶³

The amendment of the Constitution, reconstruction of the People’s Congress and other leading state organizations. The First Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress was held from February 26 to March 5, 1977.

⁶⁰C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office: *A Chronicle of Chen Yun’s Life (1905–1995) (II)*, P. 259, Central Party Literature Press, 2000.

⁶¹The Communiqué of the 11th Plenary Session of the C.P.C. Central Committee indicated that: ‘in order to guarantee the people’s democracy, we must strengthen the socialist legal system, realize democratic institutionalization and legalization, make the institution and laws stable, continuous and authoritative, have laws to go by, observe and strictly enforce, and prosecute lawbreakers. Prosecution and judicial authority must maintain due independence. We must guarantee that all people are equal before the law. No one shall have the privilege of transcending the law. From now on, we should put legislative work on the agenda of the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committees’. *The Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th C.P.C. Central Committee (December, 1978)*, C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office: *Compilation of Important Literature since the Third Plenary Session, Book I*, Beijing, People’s Publishing House, 1982.

⁶²*A Biography of Ye Jianying* preparation group: *A Biography of Ye Jianying*, P. 401–403, Beijing, Contemporary China Publishing House, 2006.

⁶³*Decisions on Several of the Party’s Historic Issues since the Founding of the P.R.C.* was passed in the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th C.P.C. Central Committee on June 27, 1981.

Ye Jianying made the *Report on Amending the Constitution*, and the session adopted the *Constitution of the People's Republic of China*. The Constitution restored some of the principles and systems of the 1954 Constitution, and reestablished the Supreme People's Procuratorate. After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Party Central Committee decided to make a partial amendment to the 1977 *Constitution* to restore the local people's congress and government system of the 1954 *Constitution*. It was mentioned in the resolution issued by the Party Central Committee in 1981 that the construction of state organs at all levels should be strengthened according to the principle of democratic centralism, allowing people's congresses and their standing bodies to become the authoritative organ of the people's power.⁶⁴

Simplification of Party and government agencies (1980–1982). From October 1980 to the end of 1982, the Party and government took several measures to gradually abolish excessive concentration of power. The measures were mainly designed to implement the separation of power of the Party and government and increase the power of local governments, and to expand grassroots democratic rights, while ensuring that the judicial power and procuratorial power held by judicial and procuratorial organs on the basis of the constitution would implement the democratization of political life of the Party and the state.⁶⁵

After the reform, the number of ministries and commissions under the State Council and departments directly under the State Council and offices was cut down from 100 to 60, and staff was reduced by one third. According to the statistics of 38 ministries and commissions, the number of ministers and vice ministers, directors and vice directors (excluding part-time secretaries and directors) was cut down from 505 to 167—a reduction of 67%. In the newly-established leading group, young and middle-aged cadres accounted for 32%. The average age was reduced from 64 to 58. The leadership system of the State Council was also reformed. The number of vice premiers was reduced from 13 to two, 10 new state councilors were added, and daily leadership organizations under the State Council were improved and strengthened. Units directly under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and bureau-level organizations decreased by 11%; staff was reduced by 17.3%, and the principal and deputy posts at ministries and commissions were decreased by 15.7%. In the newly-established leading group, young and middle-aged cadres accounted for 66%, with the average age reduced from 64 to 60.⁶⁶

Reconstruction of the national political consultative system (1977–1978). In November 1977, 29 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions were represented at the new Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. On December 27, 1977, the Seventh Enlarged Meeting of the Fourth Chinese People's

⁶⁴*Decisions on Several of the Party's Historic Issues since the Founding of the P.R.C.* was passed at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th C.P.C. Central Committee on June 27, 1981.

⁶⁵Wang Hongmo, Su Pinrui: *Journey of Reform and Opening Up*, P. 247–248, Henan People's Publishing House, 2001.

⁶⁶Wang Hongmo, Su Pinrui: *Journey of Reform and Opening Up*, Henan People's Publishing House, 2001, P. 251.

Political Consultative Conference was held. The First Session of the Fifth CPPCC National Committee was held from February 24 to March 8, 1978. The session passed the *Constitution of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference*, and unanimously elected Deng Xiaoping as Chairman of the National Committee of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, as well as 21 people (including Ulanhu, who was serving as a minister at the United Front Work Department of the C.P.C. Central Committee at the time) as Vice Chairmen. The National Committee of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference held a political function, carrying out formal political activities and movements. On June 15, 1979, Deng Xiaoping made an important speech at the Second Session of the Fifth CPPCC National Committee on the *United Front in the New Period, and the Mission of the CPPCC National Committee*, giving a comprehensive description of the United Front in the new period and the nature and tasks of the CPPCC National Committee.

Reconstruction of other social institutions. Mass organizations such as the Labor Union, the Communist Youth League and Women's Federations, and others were restored. National literary and artistic institutions began to recover activities, along with all democratic parties.

This implied that China had begun to enter a new period of order in the wake of the Cultural Revolution; a political situation with real stability and unity started to form.

The Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1982 was a significant symbol of the Communist Party of China's system construction. Deng Xiaoping said in his opening speech at the congress that compared with the Eighth C.P.C. National Congress, the Party now had a more profound understanding and richer experience in the law of socialist construction in China. He understood that copying other countries never resulted in progress. His aim was to build a new brand of socialism with Chinese characteristics.⁶⁷

This was the second round of state system construction and innovation conducted by Deng Xiaoping after Mao Zedong. His reconstruction of the basic Party and state system was reflected in the *Constitution of Communist Party of China* and *Constitution of the People's Republic of China* in 1982, and these tangible and intangible systems provided the most important framework for Reform and Opening. **However, Deng took a gradualist tack (i.e. 'look before you leap') to reform and innovation, aiming to erase the defects of the old economic and political system.** This ensured that China was the first socialist country to launch economic reform, taking the lead among large developing countries in opening to the outside world.

Political system reform in practice. In the early 1980s, Deng's reform and perfection of the Party's leadership system was the fundamental principle of governing the Party and the country, and also the basic outline for reforming China's political system. These reforms did not copy the modes of Western countries, but built on Mao Zedong's successes (such as the *Constitution of the Communist Party*

⁶⁷*Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume 3, P. 2-3, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1993.

of China of 1956, and the *Constitution of the People's Republic of China 1954*), while learning from his mistakes (such as the Cultural Revolution). Deng Xiaoping's political wisdom thus lay in inheriting Mao's achievements, correcting his errors, and changing bad into good, all in the name of Reform and Opening.

System construction of the ruling party: governing the Party in accordance with the constitution

A new *Constitution of the Communist Party of China* was formulated in 1982, and was a significant symbol of systematization. It answered a series of fundamental questions: what is the status of a party in a socialist country after it comes to power? What is its main task? What is its role?

- **System reconstruction after 1982:** learning and absorbing the Party systems formally established at the Eighth C.P.C. National Congress; reflecting and absorbing the historical lessons of Mao Zedong's era; exploring and innovating new systems for effective governance of the Party in the new environment. This was a practical process of political reform in itself.
- **Systematization of the Party's major conferences:** the C.P.C. National Congress was to be held on a regular basis to define its major functions and powers. A five-year tenure system was implemented for the Central Committee of the C.P.C. Plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. would be held for systematization. Leaders of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. were to implement a tenure security system. The party constitution made clear that no one within the party was an exception, and that everyone was equal before the rule, including all leaders.
- **Rebuilding and configuring the power structure of the Party and the state:** the succession of the new from the old was accelerated; collective handover and takeover was implemented, and the highest position of the party, the government and the army was assumed by more than one member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The party constitution abolished the system of life tenure and implemented a retirement system. Party leaders were to be more revolutionary, younger (Table 1.1), more knowledgeable and more professional, with a systematic succession mode (Table 1.2). Inner-party democratic centralism was to be strengthened and improved.
- **Construction of a modern state system construction: rule of law**
Comprehensive amendments to the *Constitution* made it into a fundamental law book for good administration and stability. During the various phases of constitutional amendment since its founding, China has experienced a process of affirmation, negation and reaffirmation. Peng Zhen was directly responsible for constitutional amendment, in his time,⁶⁸ and also presided over the Working

⁶⁸On March 28, 1981, Peng Zhen called Wang Hanbin, Xiang Chunyi, and Gu Angran to study the issues proposed during the modification of the *Constitution*. He said: 'Comrade Deng Xiaoping has assigned me to be responsible for the issue of constitutional modification'. On September 30, Peng Zhen called Liu Fuzhi, Lin Mohan (then Vice Minister of the Ministry of Culture, and Vice

Table 1.1 Average age of C.P.C. central leading organization members (1982–2012). Unit: year

	12th term	13th term	14th term	15th term	16th term	17th term	18th term
Politburo Standing Committee	73.8	63.6	63.4	65.1	62.1	62.1	63.4
Member of the Political Bureau	71.8	64	61.9	62.9	60.7	61.4	61.2
Member secretariat of the C.P.C. Central Committee	63.4	56.2	59.3	62.9	59.7	56.7	61.6

Data source Data about the 12th term to the 15th term are from Zheng Yongnian, 2004, *Will China Become Democratic? Elite, Class and Regime Transition*, Eastern Universities Press; data about the 16th and 17th term were calculated by the author using information about the 16th and 17th C.P.C. central leading organization members

Table 1.2 Number and proportion of newly-elected members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. and its Standing Committee (1982–2012). Unit: %

	12th term	13th term	14th term	15th term	16th term	17th term	18th term
<i>The Politburo Standing Committee</i>							
Number of newly-elected members	3	4	5	2	8	4	5
Total number	6	5	7	7	9	9	7
Proportion (%)	50	80	71.1	22.2	88.9	44.4	71.1
<i>Members of the Political Bureau</i>							
Number of newly-elected members	14	13	14	8	17	10	15
Total number	25	17	20	22	24	25	25
Proportion of newly-elected members	56	76.5	70	36.4	70.8	40	60

Notes Newly-elected members were compared with electors from the last plenary session, excluding other new successful candidates

Data source Jiang Huaxuan et al.: *Important Conference Chronicle of the Communist Party of China (1921–2006)*, revised and enlarged, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2006; Xinhuanet: *Images of Xi Jinping and other Leading Comrades*, November 15, 2012

(Footnote 68 continued)

President of the CFLAC), Liu Baiyu (then Minister of the Cultural Department of the People's Liberation Army's General Political Department) to discuss the same topic. He reminded them that Hu Qiaomu had been responsible for it, but later fell ill, so Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping appointed him to take charge and finish it quickly. 'I started in July. Comrades Hu Sheng, Wang Hanbin and Gu Min were responsible for specific jobs, and Comrade Gu Angran took the post of Secretary'. *A Biography of Peng Zhen* preparation group: *A Chronicle of Peng Zhen's Life*, Volume 5, P. 115, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2012.

Table 1.3 Growth index of major economic indicators in Russia and China (1991–2011). Unit: %

	1991	1998	2011
<i>Russia</i>			
G.D.P.	100	60.5	118.0
Industrial added value	100	48.2	87.7
Resident per capita income	100	52.5	125.1
<i>China</i>			
G.D.P.	100	211.7	731.6
Industrial added value	100	269.1	1030.7
Per capita income of urban residents	100	155.3	492.6
Per capita income of village residents	100	143.7	335.0

Notes calculating at comparable price

Source Data on Russia: Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2012; Data on China: China Statistical Abstract (2013), *China Statistical Publishing House, 2013*

Group Meeting of the Constitutional Amendment Committee Secretariat, taking charge of drafting.⁶⁹ When drawing up the amended draft, Peng emphasized that the general guiding ideology would be the Four Fundamental Principles. He personally wrote the preamble to the constitution, and summarized the experiences gained and lessons learned since the founding of China. He also conducted in-depth research and discussions on specific political systems and reforms, and made a long-term plan.

In those days, China was at once an ancient civilized state, and a young, contemporary nation. It made full use of its late-development advantage and absorbed the experience of other countries, in order to develop a modern constitution and state system in line with its national conditions.

The historic significance of the *Constitution* also lay in the fact that it set a framework and foundation for China's Reform and Opening, thus avoiding a chaotic and anarchic political situation like the Cultural Revolution. It guaranteed political and social stability, and ensured that Reform and Opening followed a democratic and legal path. The *Constitution* is also integrated the new experiences and achievements made in the process of development.

- **Strengthening the role of the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee.** After the *Constitution* was rewritten in 1982, the National People's Congress became an organ of supreme power. The *Constitution* decided major events, conducted the election and appointment of state organ leaders, expanded the functions and powers of the Standing Committee of the National People's

⁶⁹The members of the Secretary Working Group of the Constitution Modification Committee include Hu Sheng, Gu Ming, Wang Hanbin, Xing Yimin, Xiang Chunyi, Gong Yuzhi, Gu Angran, Lu Zhichao, Wang Shuwen, Xu Chongde, Xiao Weiyun, Sun Li, and Xu Kongrang. Hu Sheng took the post of Deputy Secretary of the Constitutional Modification Committee. *A Biography of Peng Zhen* preparation group: *A Chronicle of Peng Zhen's Life*, Volume 5, P. 116, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2012.

Congress, and strengthened the organizational structure, giving it core status among Chinese political systems. The Party's remit for leading and governing all national affairs was gradually limited to simple political leadership (namely leadership in political principles, political direction, and major decisions at home and abroad). National governance was conducted through the state agency (including the National People's Congress and the State Council).

On March 18, 1981, Deng Xiaoping formally reinstated the role of State President for the good of the country, and established the post of Chair of the Central Military Commission.⁷⁰ **In November, 1982, Peng Zhen remarked that having a State President was necessary for improving the state system, and appeasing the wishes of the people of all ethnic groups in China.**⁷¹ Peng also pointed out that the Central Military Commission had implemented a responsibility system for chairmen. The Chairman of the Central Military Commission was elected by the National People's Congress, and was responsible for the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee. The People's Liberation Army was founded and led by the Communist Party of China after the founding of the People's Republic, and formed part of the state system.⁷²

- **Strengthening the political consultation system.** Since 1954, Peng Zhen had questioned the status of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. **At that time, Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi said that the conference was not part of the 'upper house'. 'We are not dualistic but unitary, and power is concentrated in the National People's Congress. Division of the people's rights, diversification, discussion without decisions, decisions without execution—what benefits do these bring to us? For unification, the National People's Congress makes the decisions, and the decisions are executed separately, simply and clearly.** The bicameral system divides the people's rights in two and asks for trouble, bringing only harm without any benefit. **If, like the capitalist countries, parties come to power by turns, you come to power and I, as the opposition party, oppose you; when I come to power, you, as the opposition party, oppose me. What will our country become? How would the state keep stable? How could we maintain continuity in our policies?** Only with a People's Congress, and unification and leadership of the

⁷⁰A *Biography of Peng Zhen* preparation group: *A Chronicle of Peng Zhen's Life*, Volume V, P. 92, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2012.

⁷¹Peng Zhen: *Report on the Draft Amendment of the Constitution of the P.R.C.* (November 26, 1982), *Peng Zhen's Selected Works*, P. 453, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1991.

⁷²Peng Zhen: *Report on the Draft Amendment of the Constitution of the P.R.C.* (November 26, 1982), *Peng Zhen's Selected Works*, P. 453, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1991.

Communist Party of China can we maintain national unity and stability.⁷³ Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi stridently opposed the establishment of a bicameral system, as did Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, et al.

- **Reform of government agencies.** Thirteen vice premiers of the State Council were reduced to two, and the role of state councilor was established. The number of ministries and commissions, affiliated departments and offices was cut down from 98 to 52. Among them, 52 ministries and commissions were reduced to 39, 41 affiliated departments to 10, and five offices to three.
- **Establishing a retirement system.** In February 1982, the Party Central Committee made the *Decision on Establishing a Retirement System for Veteran Cadres*, which stipulated that deputy provincial-level and ministerial-level cadres should retire at the age of 60, and principal provincial-level and ministerial-level cadres at the age of 65.⁷⁴

In the first half of the 1980s, the first reform was the reorganization of the ruling party based on the *Constitution*; the second was a reconstruction of the modern state system, also based on the *Constitution*. These two aspects of system reconstruction were complementary. Rather than referring to Western political parties and national political models, they inherited the experience the 1950s. Their modifications were aimed more towards the defects of Mao Zedong's years, rather than making a new start. They were based more on internal political consensus than on artificial expansion of political differences.

The reform of the first half of the 1980s had the adaptability of national conditions, the feasibility of practice, and the flexibility of adjustment. It prevented the political system from falling into a historical vacuum. It may not necessarily have been the best model, but it was certainly the most suitable. It was not radical reform but gradual, promoting China's political transformation, and guaranteeing its political stability.

⁷³A *Biography of Peng Zhen* preparation group: *A Chronicle of Peng Zhen's Life*, Volume 5, P. 199–200, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2012.

⁷⁴On February 20, 1982, the C.P.C. Central Committee made the *Decision on Establishing a Retirement System for Veteran Cadres*. The *Decision* covered central and state organ ministers, vice ministers, first secretaries, secretaries, provincial governors, vice provincial governors of provinces, cities and autonomous regions, major cadres responsible for discipline inspection committees, courts and procuratorates. None could be older than 65, and deputy cadres could not be older than 60. Heads of bureaux could not be older than 60. Moreover, the *Decision* indicated that among party and national leaders, a few old revolutionists could be retained beyond the retirement age, to maintain domestic security, unity, and correct treatment of international relations in the fundamental interest of the party and people. Working as counselors and taking honorary roles were forbidden in retirement. The C.P.C.'s *Decision on Establishing a Retirement System for Veteran Cadres* (February 20, 1982), C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office: Compilation of Important Works Since the Third Plenary Session (Book II), P. 1161, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1982.

1.5 Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao: Consolidating and Improving the Basic Socialist System

Jiang Zemin was the defender and successor of the ‘China path’ initiated by Deng Xiaoping. On coming to power, it fell to Jiang to redress the legacy of large-scale unrest and somehow restore order. In the face of acid tests such as socialism’s decline, the fall of Communism, Yugoslavia’s division, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the US-led Western sanctions against China, Jiang managed to safeguard Deng’s much-vaunted socialism with Chinese characteristics.

During this period, the basic socialist system was strengthened and perfected, including the People’s Congress, multi-party cooperation, national regional autonomy, and political consultation under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. New goals for reform and the basic framework of a socialist market economic system were established and developed. It was a simple economic system with public ownership at its core and diverse forms of ownership developing side by side, as well as a targeted distribution system. A new method of tax distribution between the central and local governments was created and implemented, greatly increasing the state’s financing capacity. The system of macroeconomic regulation and control was strengthened and improved, maintaining macroeconomic stability, while the policy of expanding domestic demand was implemented in response to the Asian financial crisis.

Two fundamental transformations were proposed and implemented for the economic system and growth mode, involving two grand strategies: invigorating the nation through science and education, and pushing for sustainable development. According to Deng Xiaoping’s ideas of considering both inland situation and coastal areas situation, the grand western development program was designed. Infrastructure and ecological protection were ramped up. It was decided that the army, the armed police force and the political-legal organs would no longer be engaged in business activities. The Party and government organs unhooked their connections with profit-making enterprises, enforcing a separation between revenue and expenditure. Project bidding and a government procurement system were installed, preventing corruption at the source.⁷⁵ Another major decision was made to access to the World Trade Organization, opening even further to the outside world and integrating into the global economy. The second strategic target of modernization was achieved on schedule, with a steady rise in living standards.

During this period, the Party Central Committee remained circumspect, resisting liberal and bourgeois thinking, and preventing hostile international forces from Westernizing and dividing the country and fomenting large-scale unrest like the

⁷⁵Jiang Zemin: *Address in Reporting the Situation of the ‘Three Preaches’ to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee*, January 20, 2000, Jiang Zemin’s Selected Works, Volume II, P. 550, Beijing, People’s Publishing House, 2006.

political turmoil of 1989.⁷⁶ The guiding ideology was not to diversify, but to uphold Marxist ideologies. A public ownership economy was to be maintained, and privatization discouraged. Wrongful political views were to be resisted, such as non-party affiliation of domestic and foreign military forces, and de-politicization and nationalization of the armed forces. Falungong was handled decisively, and Tibetan and Xinjiang separatist forces were held down. Relationships with Western countries were transformed from struggles to cooperation.⁷⁷

Hu Jintao as the upholder and innovator of the ‘China path’

Innovations in ideologies, systems, practices and theories were continued, including the *Scientific Outlook on Development*, which became the guiding policy. The overall ‘five in one’ layout of socialist modernization in the 21st century was completed, making China the country with the world’s second-largest economy. It also possessed vast scientific and technological strength, and comprehensive national heft to rival the U.S.A. The *Report to the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China* was a landmark summary of China’s theory, practice, view and strategy in the new era.

Continuing on the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics meant taking economic development as the central task, adhering to the ‘Four Cardinal Principles’ in Reform and Opening, and developing productive forces. It also involved consolidating and improving the socialist system, developing a socialist market economy, and forging an advanced culture and smooth-running society for China (Jintao 2007, 2012).

Exploring China’s path

For a large country with a billion-plus population, there is no precedent for building socialism and modernization, and there is no successful experience for reference. What can be relied on is only China’s independent practice and creative exploration. The construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics is essentially an exploration of modernization, transcending the Western mode. It is the process of persistently selecting the essence and discarding the dross—of constantly correcting errors, risks and crises, and of striving for superiority.

Different paths lead to different results

Other socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and the nations of the Eastern Bloc were also influenced by the international climate, namely, the Western-led

⁷⁶According to Jiang Zemin, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee believed that as long as they persisted in the C.P.C.’s leadership and implemented the right route, targets and policies, the national economy would develop consistently, and the standard of living would improve. Moreover, large-scale unrest similar to that in 1989 could be avoided. Jiang Zemin: *Address in Reporting the Situation of ‘Three Preaches’ to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee*, January 20, 2000, Jiang Zemin’s Selected Works, Volume II, P. 553, Beijing, People’s Publishing House, 2006.

⁷⁷Jiang Zemin: *Address in Reporting the Situation of ‘Three Preaches’ to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee*, January 20, 2000, Jiang Zemin’s Selected Works, Volume II, P. 546, Beijing, People’s Publishing House, 2006.

trend for democratization, comprehensive economic privatization, and liberal ideology and culture. As a result, these countries suffered major transitions, giving up socialism and adopting capitalism instead. This led to decline, dissolution, and eventual collapse.

China and Russia can be compared to assess this matter further. In 1990, Soviet Russia's G.D.P. accounted for 2.4% of the world's total, higher than China's (1.6%), which only amounted to about two-thirds of Russia's. At that time, the Soviet Union was the world's third-largest economy, following America and Japan (Japan overtook the Soviet Union in 1968, becoming the world's second-largest economy). Thereafter, Yeltsin advocated Western-style democracy and withdrew from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.⁷⁸ On becoming president, he⁷⁹ was immediately featured on the cover of *Time* magazine, with the title 'Russian revolution'.⁸⁰ At the end of 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and soon after announced the dissolution of the Communist Party and the collapse of the Soviet Union. During Yeltsin's administration, the proportion of Russia's G.D.P. in the world continued to fall, bottoming out at 0.6% in 1999, while in the same year, China's G.D.P. increased to 3.5%, amounting to 5.8 times that of Russia. By 2011, Russia's G.D.P. accounting for 2.7% of the global figure, only 0.3% higher than that of 1990, while China's reached 10.4%, amounting to 3.9 times that of Russia. According to Sorokin, the Deputy Director of the Institute of Economics at the Russian Academy of Sciences (see Table 1.3), when calculated at a comparable price, the data from 1991 totaled 100, and G.D.P. was only 60.5 by 1998, decreasing by nearly 40%—far greater than the economic losses under which the Soviet Union's G.D.P. fell by 20% during World War II. By 2011, Russia's G.D.P. growth index reached 118.0; its G.D.P. growth rate from 1998 to 2008 was 6.8%, of which half depended on the sharp rise of international energy prices. By 2011, calculated at a comparable price, G.D.P. grew by 18% compared with that of 1991. Citizens' per capita income grew by 25.1%, and industrial added value was less than that of 1991.

This suggests that Russia's reform, both economic and political, is typical of the process of switching from the old way to a new, uncharted road. The first step was political openness and democratization, followed by complete privatization, with the result that Russia fell from its position as the world's third-largest economy to a second-class country with the lowest proportion of economic aggregate in the world's total. It implies that a lack of progress simply means regression in the fierce international competition that is economic globalization, and that any regression will be major. Choosing the wrong path for any country will augur disastrous consequences.

⁷⁸In January 1990, Boris Yeltsin (then alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the first secretary of the Moscow Municipal Committee) formed a 'democratic programme group' inside the Party.

⁷⁹On June 12, 1991, the Russian presidential election was held, and Boris Yeltsin won.

⁸⁰American *Time*, August 1, 1991, Cover of The Russian Revolution.

On the contrary, China's main economic indicators continue to increase substantially (see Table 1.3) suggesting that it selected the path of most benefit.⁸¹

1.6 Summary: China's Path Versus the Western Way

This chapter has mainly discussed the historical process of constructing a modern ruling party and modern state system since the founding of New China. China has experienced several general stages of development. The first was the innovation of a basic system by the Chinese communists with Mao Zedong at the helm. Its first task was to reunify the Chinese Mainland, and then innovate a modern ruling party system based on the *Constitution of the Communist Party of China* (1956) and modern state system based on the *Common Programme* (1949) and the *Constitution of the People's Republic of China* (1954), laying the foundations for contemporary China. Unfortunately, these systems have not been maintained.

In the second stage, Chinese communists represented by Deng Xiaoping promulgated Reform and Opening, involving a conscious reconstructing of these systems. This was reflected in the redrafts of the *Constitution of the Communist Party of China* (1982) and *Constitution of the People's Republic of China* (1982), with a focus on democratic centralism. At the same time, they conducted a pragmatic reform of the political system, and eliminated a wide range of defects, making significant contributions to the construction of China's state system.

The third stage saw Chinese communists under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao consolidate and perfect the basic socialist system, establishing and perfecting the socialist market economy, the basic economic system, and the distribution system. Specific guidance was designed based on these systems.

After more than 60 years of state system construction, and marked by the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the C.P.C., China is entering a new stage of modernization of its national governance system and governance ability. The governance systematics, standardization and routinization of all kinds of affairs of the Party, the state and the society are being realized. Throughout its history, Chinese socialism has been innovated, constructed, corrected and improved, forming a unique 'China path'.

Now, what is required is faster development of productive forces through reform, maintaining socialism and demonstrating its superiority over capitalism as a system. This goal needs to be achieved in at least four generations.⁸² This can be viewed as 'Deng Xiaoping's prediction'.

⁸¹Hu Angang, Wang Shaoguang, Zhou Jianming, Han Yuhai: *Man's World*, Beijing, China Renmin University Press, 2011.

⁸²Deng Xiaoping: in 1987, when talking with foreign visitors, Deng proposed the development of productivity. *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume 3, People's Publishing House, 1993, P. 256.

The 'China path', namely socialism with Chinese characteristics, is the only way to realize the Chinese dream, and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The adaptability of the Chinese political system to its national conditions, and its superiority to the Western system, guarantees the steady progress of modernization and keeps China in step with the rest of the world.

The 'China path' is unique both in history and in the world. China has not copied Western ways, but has opened up a new road, catching up with developed countries (particularly the United States), and even overtaking them.

Modern China is a living, working embodiment of Deng Xiaoping's prediction. As Xi Jinping said, "We take our own road, meaning that we have a very broad stage, a very profound historical background, and a very strong motivation for going forward".⁸³

⁸³Xi Jinping: *Address in the Forum Commemorating the 120th Anniversary After Mao Zedong's Birth* (December 26, 2013), Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, news on December 26, 2013.

Chapter 2

The Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the C.P.C.—A New Milestone in China’s Reform

The Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the C.P.C. was held in Beijing from November 9 to November 12, 2013. A communiqué was released on the night of the closing meeting. The *Decision of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. on Comprehensively Deepening Reform for Several Major Issues* (hereinafter referred to as the *Decision*) was adopted after deliberation, and the *Instructions on the Decision of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. on Comprehensively Deepening Reform for Several Major Issues* (hereinafter referred to as the *Instructions*) were made by Xi Jinping on behalf of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. The *Decision* received extensive attention both within China and around the world.

The Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the C.P.C. was held at a very important stage for China, when livelihoods were improving and reform was deepening. The session answered a series of major theoretical and practical questions about reform, defining its future direction. It designed the ‘Five in One’ overall layout for intensifying reform, and opened a new window of opportunity, with milestone significance in China’s modern history.

Hereafter, the author makes a brief analysis of the *Decision*, and talks about his insights and experiences based background research and monographic study. He covers the following aspects:

1. First, the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the C.P.C. was a milestone in China’s reform. Reform and Opening lasted 35 years

This paper is Hu Angang’s *Interpretation of the Spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th C.P.C. Central Committee*, presented on the invitation of Guangming Online in the evening of November 12, 2013; November 16, the manuscript of a lecture at the Gansu Provincial Committee Theory Center Group Learning Conference and Gansu Provincial Leaders and Cadres: ‘Enriching People and Strengthening Gansu’; organized by Tang Xiao, Yang Zhusong, and modified by the author; Report on the National Situation, Issue 21 in 2013, November 17, 2013.

in China. The Third Plenary Session became an important symbol of staged reform, reflecting the development and historical logic of Chinese reform itself. Xi Jinping said that since Reform and Opening, all topics discussed, all decisions made, all measures taken, and all signals released in previous third plenary sessions are the basis for judging the administrative policy and focus of the new leading group. They are great significant to completing the work of the next five or even 10 years.¹

2. The second aspect is a basic evaluation of China's reform over the past 35 years. The author's university think-tank conducted an objective and scientific post-assessment on improving reform of the socialist market economic system in the past decade (2003–2013) from the perspective of a third party, and also carried out an evaluation of the basic experience summarized in the *Decision on successful Reform and Opening*.
3. The third aspect is a commentary and detailed interpretation of the guiding ideology of the *Decision*, and the general goal of comprehensively deepening reform until 2020.
4. The fourth aspect includes the major deployment of the 'Five in One' system and reform, as well as their main goals, which the author calls the 'big planning, great layout and grand strategy' of the Party Central Committee for Chinese socialist modernization in the first half of the 21st century.

2.1 The Third Plenary Session—A Milestone in China's Reform (11th–18th)

Reform was a new cause in China. In 1987, Deng Xiaoping said 'what we are doing now is a cause that Marx never espoused, that our predecessors never did, and that other socialist countries have not taken up'.²

On a global scale, China's reform was something of a miracle. Firstly, contemporary China is the only reformed country in the world; its reform has lasted for 35 years,³ and is not yet complete. Second, the Communist Party of China is the only reformed ruling party in the world, relying on constant improvement and innovation. It is different from the two-party system in the United States, which practices alternate ruling without reform. It handles affairs according to old laws (particularly the *Constitution of the United States*) and rules (such as the *Amendment to the United States Constitution*), which are not only rigid, but also

¹Xi Jinping: Explanation of the *Decision of the C.P.C. on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform*, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, November 15, 2013.

²Deng Xiaoping: *Two Characteristics of the 13th C.P.C. National Congress* (November 16, 1987), *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume 3, P. 258.

³In 1986, Vietnam launched economic reform, and the Sixth People's Congress of Vietnam established a reform and development route for a 'commodity economy based on market mechanisms, managed by the state, with a socialist direction and multiple parts.'

inadequate. Thirdly, China's is the largest reformed society in the world. More than a billion people have become the beneficiaries of the dividends of reform, and sharers of innovation—something that is without precedent in human history. Reform and Opening is the most outstanding characteristic of contemporary China, is also the most distinctive brand of Chinese innovation.

Where did this reform come from? What have been the landmark milestones of the process? What is the status of China's reform today? Where will it go in the future? What information did the Third Plenary Sessions offer to China and the world? What impact did have?

In fact, once China's reform had started, it changed and evolved in accordance with its own development and institutional shifts, to produce cumulative and revolutionary achievements. It can be viewed as revolutionary social change obtained by gradual evolution.

The Third Plenary Session set forth five decisions in five stages:

1. The first *Decision* was made at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the C.P.C. in 1978. It stated that realization of socialist modernization relied on reforming the economic system. The Third Plenary Session and Fourth Plenary Session formulated the *Decision on Several Issues in Speeding up Agricultural Development*, consisting of 25 policies to launch rural reform and comprehensively implement the household contract responsibility system. This was the initiating stage of China's economic reform. It was during the closing meeting of the Central Working Conference before the Plenary Session that Deng Xiaoping put forward his famous theory that some would get rich first.⁴
2. The second *Decision* was made at the Third Plenary Session of the Twelfth Central Committee of the C.P.C. in 1984. According to the task proposed at the 12th C.P.C. National Congress for systematically conducting economic reform, the *Decision on Economic System Reform* was made, developing the comprehensive reform blueprint. It called for a planned commodity economy on the basis of public ownership, and aimed to build a vibrant socialist economic system. This formed the beginning stage of China's economic reform. On the basis of preliminary successes in rural reform, wider economic reform began, with an emphasis on cities. State administration of enterprises gradually changed from direct to indirect control, greatly narrowing the scope of the planned economy. Mandatory plans, guiding plans, and market regulation were conducted. A two-track pricing system was implemented. Various economic forms

⁴Deng Xiaoping said: 'In economic policies, I believe that we should allow regions, enterprises, workers and peasants to gain more income and live a better life through hard work. 'If some people's standard of living is raised first, this will inevitably be an impressive example to their "neighbors", and people in other regions and units will want to learn from them. In this way, the entire national economy will develop continuously under the new wave, and the nation's people will soon be better off. Deng Xiaoping: *Emancipate our Minds, Seek Truth from Facts, Unite as one and Look Ahead*, *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume II, P. 152, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1993.

(such as national, collective and individual) were developed. Domestic and foreign resources were leveraged to develop both markets, marking a transition period for the creation of a socialist market economy. The decision also clearly encouraged some people to get rich first, which fell in line with socialist progression inasmuch as it was the only way for the whole of society to become rich. At the same time, the Party Central Committee launched scientific, technical and educational reform.

3. A third *Decision* was made at the Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee of the C.P.C. in 1993. According to the goal and basic principle of economic reform defined in the 14th C.P.C. National Congress, the *Decision on Several Issues in Establishing a Socialist Market Economy* was made, with 50 articles in total. It marked the beginning of a new stage, namely establishing a socialist market economy, after the reform, repair and improvement of the original socialist planning system that had already taken place. This was the first overall design and blueprint of the socialist market economy. It proposed many important tasks, such as establishing a modern enterprise system and a national unified and open market, as well as improving the system of macroeconomic regulation and control. Establishing an income distribution and social security system became the basic framework and an important pillar of the new system, and was inherited by later waves of reform. The plenary session also put forth the principle of efficiency and balance equity, as well as the requirements and targets of the newly rich in setting an example for achieving common prosperity.
4. The fourth *Decision* was made at the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the C.P.C. in 2003. According to the strategic deployment put forward at the 16th C.P.C. National Congress for building a perfect socialist market economy and a more vigorous and open economic system, the *Decision on Several Issues in Perfecting the Socialist Market Economic System* was published with a total of 42 articles. Its main innovation was to put forward a people-oriented scientific outlook for development and reform. For this reason it became the major guidebook for China's reform in the first decade of the 21st century. The plenary session reiterated the principle of efficiency and balance equity, and took common prosperity as its goal.
5. The fifth *Decision* was made in the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the C.P.C., with 16 parts and 60 articles (see Table 2.1). It put forward the guiding ideology and major principle for comprehensively deepening reform, establishing an overall goal for 2020. It pushed for the deployment of 'Five in One' reform, along with reform of the national defense and military system, and Party construction. It made a layout for strategic focus, priorities, main direction, working mechanism, propulsion mode, schedule—a road map of reform.

The Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the C.P.C. had far-reaching ramifications. As well as functioning as an important meeting that served as a link between past and future, it was a new milestone for China's reform.

Table 2.1 Top-level design of China's reform (1978–2012)

	First occasion	Second occasion	Third occasion	Fourth occasion	Fifth occasion
Plenary session of the central committee of the C.P.C.	Third plenary session of the eleventh central committee of the C.P.C.	Third plenary session of the twelfth central committee of the C.P.C.	Third plenary session of the fourteenth central committee of the C.P.C.	Third plenary session of the sixteenth central committee of the C.P.C.	Third plenary session of the eighteenth central committee of the C.P.C.
Time	December 12–22, 1978	1984 October 20	November 11–14, 1993	October 14, 2003	November 9–12, 2013
Decision name	Decision on several issues in speeding up agricultural development (draft)	Decision on reform of the economic structure	Decision on several issues in establishing a socialist market economic system	Decision on several issues in establishing a socialist market economic system	Decision on several major issues in comprehensively deepening reform
Framework and content		10 parts	10 parts, 50 articles	12 parts, 42 articles	12 parts, 60 articles
Fundamental basis		Part II of the report to the 12th C.P.C. National Congress: Planned commodity economy on the basis of public ownership	Part II of the report to the 14th C.P.C. National Congress: Socialist market economic system	Part IV of the report to the 16th C.P.C. National Congress	Report to the 18th C.P.C. National Congress: 'Five in One' overall layout of socialist modernization
Stage	Initial stage	Overall development stage	Establishing a new system	Perfecting the new system	Comprehensively deepening reform

As General Secretary Xi Jinping said, ‘it is new, because it describes the new blueprint, new vision and new goal of comprehensively deepening reform, and collecting new thinking, new assertions, and new measures.’⁵ It can be viewed as reform version 2.0, if previous iterations had been 1.5 and 1.0.⁶

2.2 High Praise for China’s Reform, and a Summary of Important Experiences

The *Decision* spoke highly of the great achievements and successful practices of China’s Reform and Opening over 35 years since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the C.P.C. Research was conducted on major issues facing the comprehensive deepening of reform, and it was decided that Reform and Opening had been a new revolution conducted by all ethnic groups led by the Party—the most outstanding characteristic of contemporary China in deciding its fate, and an invincible weapon for a party and a people who were making major strides in catching up with the rest of the world.

In January 1956, Mao Zedong claimed that the purpose of the socialist revolution was to emancipate the nation’s productive forces.⁷ He was referring to the ‘Three Great Transformations’, which can be viewed as his own brand of social reform and innovation. He adopted a radical approach, completing the revolution in just three years instead of the expected fifteen. In 1958, the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Commune Movement were launched. Although they reflected a common desire to do away with the backwardness of economy and culture, they flew in the face of objective economic laws. They were also too socialist, too fast, too public (in terms of ownership) and too big. At the time, China was one of the poorest countries in the world, and transcended the development stage with extremely low income. As reflected in the report to the 13th C.P.C. National Congress, the nation suffered many setbacks, and paid a huge price. This kind of situation proves the importance of clearly understanding China’s national conditions and history.⁸ However, the mistakes of Mao Zedong’s later formed the basis of Deng Xiaoping’s successful reform. The 13th C.P.C. National Congress made the basic judgment that China was still in the primary stage of socialism, which became the practical and theoretical basis of Reform and Opening. Deng launched reform in poor, over-populated rural areas first, turning small successes into larger

⁵Xi Jinping: *Explanation of the Decision of the C.P.C. on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform*, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, November 15, 2013.

⁶Hu Angang: *China Needs Version 2.0 Reform*, Guangming Daily, May 15, 2013.

⁷Mao Zedong: *The Objective of the Socialist Revolution is the Emancipation of Productivity*, January 25, 1956, *Mao Zedong’s Collected Works*, Volume 7, People’s Publishing House, P. 1, 1999.

⁸Zhao Ziyang’s *March Forward Along the Socialist Road with Chinese Characteristics—Report of the 13th National People’s Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee*, October 25, 1987.

ones, making revolutionary achievements, and finding a way to emancipate the productive forces of more than a billion people.

As early as 1992, Deng pointed out in his South Tour Speech that in the past, China had only developed productive forces under socialist conditions, failing to emancipate productive forces through reform, rendering the process incomplete. Emancipating and developing productive forces was the way forward.⁹

Throughout modern Chinese history, the various eras have displayed different outstanding characteristics. First was the revolutionary period, then the founding of New China, and then the time of socialist revolution and construction, followed by Reform and Opening. **The latter not only changed contemporary China beyond measure, but also lasted for the longest amount time and accrued the greatest achievements. During this period, China caught up with the rest of the world in terms of industrialization, modernization and globalization.** Calculated according to the exchange rate, China's G.D.P. accounted for 1.75% of the global total in 1978, ranking tenth place in the world, increasing to 3.75% in 2000, holding sixth place in the world. It further rose to 11.5% in 2012, taking second place. Calculated according to purchasing power parity (against the international dollar in 1990), China's G.D.P. (international dollar price) accounted for 4.9% of the global total in 1978, ranking fourth place in the world. It increased to 11.8% in 2000, taking third place in the world, and further rose to 20.7% in 2012, reaching first place internationally.¹⁰

According to historical data provided by Angus Maddison, the proportion of American exports accounting for the world's total was as much as 16.8% by 1950, while Chinese exports only accounted for 0.9% of the world's total, amounting to 5.3% of American exports. Germany surpassed America in the 1990s.¹¹ According to data provided by the World Bank Database, China surpassed America in 2007, and overtook Germany in 2009, becoming the world's most prominent exporter. Chinese exports amounted to 140.0% of America's in 2013.

China's national territorial area is basically equal to America's. Using the modernization factor of measuring by generating capacity,¹² it can be understood that China's level amounted to that of America, rising from 12.1% in 1980 to 97.2% in 2010, and even surpassing America's in 2013, reaching 126.5%.

⁹Deng Xiaoping's *Selected Works*, Volume 3, P. 370.

¹⁰Data from 1978 and 2000, Angus Maddison, *World Population, G.D.P. and Per Capita G.D.P., 1-2008 AD, 2010*, <http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/>, data of 2012 are calculated by the author.

¹¹Angus Maddison: *Review of the World Economy of Two Hundred Years*, Chinese version, PP. 162–163, Beijing, Reform Press, 1997.

¹²Generated energy includes thermal power, hydraulic power, nuclear power and other power (such as geothermal power, solar power, wind power, tidal power and bioenergy power) of all electric power industries, owned power plants, and small rural power plants. The measurement unit of generated electricity is kilowatt/hour. The author assumes 'no modernization without power generation' and 'modernization exists with power generation', because the modernization factor of one state is based on power generation, meaning that various modernization factors will diffuse, spread and be applied. This indicator better represents one state's relative degree to the most developed modernized states (such as the U.S.A.) than other indicators (including G.D.P.).

Table 2.2 China's major indicator level relative to America's (1950–2013). Unit: %

Year	G.D. P. (PPP, Dollar in 1990) ^a	G.D. P. (PPP, current dollars) ^b	G.D. P. (exchange rate method, current dollars) ^c	Exports (exchange rate method, current dollars) ^f	Generating capacity ^d	Number of invention patent application ^e
1950	16.8			5.3	1.2	
1960	21.6				6.8	
1970	20.7			8.2 (1973)	6.7	
1980	24.6		6.6		12.1	
1990	36.6	19.1	6.0	18.0 (1992)	19.5	5.9
2000	53.8	35.1	11.6	31.9	34.0	17.5
2010	114.1	81.0	39.6	123.4	97.2	79.8
2012	129.3	91.0	50.7	132.4	116.0	120.3
2013	137.0	96.2	55.0	140.0	126.5	

Data source

^a1950–2008 data: Angus Maddison: Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1–2008 AD

^b1990–2013 data: World Bank database, 2014

^c1980–2012 data: World Bank database, 2014

^dData source Data on generating capacity before 1985 are from *New Palgrave World Historical Statistics*, and after 1985, from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2013

^eData source The World Intellectual Property Organization database, 2013

^fData on merchandise exports: 1950–1992 Angus Maddison, *The World Economy, A Two-hundred Year Perspective*, Chinese version, PP. 162–163, Beijing, Reform Publishing House, 1997; Data from 2000–2013: WTO

Viewing the technological innovation of both China and America, the invention patent application quantity can be used to represent technological innovation ability. China's level was zero in 1980, because it did not formally implement the Patent Law until April 1, 1985. By 2012, China's invention patent application quantity had exceeded that of America, amounting to 120.3% (see Table 2.2). Impoverished China developed into a world power with a high level of modernization. **It was a time of major development, in which China made great strides towards catching up with the rest of the world.**

China's accelerated economic reform raised questions both domestically and abroad. Western media outlets and scholars promulgated a distorted view of it, pegging it variously as a free market economy with one-party autocracy, state capitalism,¹³ capitalism with Chinese characteristics,¹⁴ new Confucian capitalism,¹⁵ and

¹³*The Winners And Losers In Chinese Capitalism*, by Gady Epstein, forbes.com, Aug. 31 2010. Dyer, Geoff (13 September 2010). 'State capitalism: China's 'market-Leninism' has yet to face its biggest test'. Financial Times.

¹⁴Huang, Yasheng, 2008a, *Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State*, Cambridge University Press.

¹⁵Bell, Daniel A., 2010, *China's New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society* (New in Paper), Princeton University Press.

politicized capitalism.¹⁶ In addition to international controversy, theories abounded about stagnation, reform regression, reform reversion, a non-market economy, a strong government and weak market, and state-owned enterprises going private. Also rife was the suspicion of crony capitalism inciting the masses to fight against people's government. These arguments intentionally magnified the problems and contradictions that had inevitably cropped up in the process of reform. These included comprehensiveness versus one-sidedness, and pluralism versus individualism. Mao Zedong had warned against a fuzzy view of essential and mainstream aspects, fearing a loss of socialist direction.¹⁷ In light of these contradictions, it is difficult to know how to evaluate China's economic reform of the past ten years.

With a view to establishing a successful socialist market economy and a more vigorous and open system, a report was proposed at the 16th C.P.C. National Congress during the Third Plenary Session of the 16th of the Eleventh Central Committee of the C.P.C. in 2003. The *Decision of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. on Several Issues in Perfecting Socialist Market Economy System* was set out as the overall action plan for China's economic reform, calling for a systematic, specific and operational economy, and effectively guiding Reform and Opening between 2003 and 2012.

A research group at the Institute of National Conditions of Tsinghua University took the *Decision* as a blueprint for the following ten years of Reform and Opening. It used the methods of goal congruence and comprehensive scoring to convert the classification of qualitative objectives into quantitative indexes. This involved six major categories, 36 items and 227 indexes. Checks were conducted on the contents mentioned in 12 parts and 42 articles of the *Decision*, and scientific, objective and comprehensive assessments and quantitative evaluations were made on ten years (2003–2012) of China's economic reform. The aim of this was to ensure scientific, professional and comprehensive assessment and evaluation. The main conclusion of the research group's study was as follows.¹⁸

Significant progress has been obtained in establishing the successful and open socialist market economy proposed by the 16th C.P.C. National Congress and planned by the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the C.P.C. The main tasks were basically completed, with a completion rate of 89.7%, and an incompleteness rate of only 10.3%. The six categories of reform evaluation are shown in Table 2.3.

Our quantitative evaluation of ten years of Chinese economic reform has a ninety-ten ratio, with at least 10% incompleteness. This is mainly reflected as follows: **firstly**, some reform goals were not achieved, such as the perfecting of the modern property rights circulation. Important laws and regulations were discussed but not issued, illustrating

¹⁶Nee, Victor and Sonja Oppen, 2007, 'On Politicized Capitalism,' in Victor Nee and Richard Swedberg (eds.), *On Capitalism*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

¹⁷*Mao Zedong's Selected Works*, Volume 6, P. 430, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1999.

¹⁸See detailed analysis in Hu Angang, Tang Xiao and Yan Yilong's *Progress and Evaluation of China's Decade of Economic System Reform (2003–2012)*, Journal of Chinese Academy of Governance, Issue 5 of 2013.

Table 2.3 Comprehensive evaluation of China's economic reform (2003–2012)

Project	Score	Reform dividend	Relative lagging and inadequate aspects
Totality ^a	89.7		
1. A basic economic system, keeping public ownership as the mainstay of the economy and allowing diverse forms of ownership to develop side by side ^b	80.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A basic structure for modern corporate governance of state-owned enterprise is established • A basic non-public economy having equal participation in the market economy competition is established • A preliminary system framework for modern property rights is established 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The supervision of state-owned financial assets, non-operating assets and natural resources assets needs to be strengthened • The corporate system and joint-stock reform of parent companies of central enterprises needs further development • Legislation of the property rights circulation system needs further development • Reform of the market access mechanism in monopolized industries needs further development. • Natural monopolized industry supervision is weak
2. Establishing a system that will gradually change the urban-rural dual economic structure ^c	93.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reform of the agricultural tax system is realized • The rural land system is further improved • Further improvements to socialized agricultural services, the agricultural product market, and the agricultural support protection system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The state's goal of adding funding to public utilities like education, health and culture in rural areas is unfulfilled • Reform of the household registration system (in which labor forces conduct registration in accordance with the place of employment or residence) is unfulfilled
3. Establishing a unified, open and orderly modern market system ^d	92.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A basic national unified market system is established • Basic multi-level capital and other factor markets are established 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The product quality supervision mechanism is not sound • A credit supervision and disciplinary system has not yet been established

(continued)

Table 2.3 (continued)

Project	Score	Reform dividend	Relative lagging and inadequate aspects
4. Improving the macroeconomic regulation and control system, the system of administrative control, and the system of economic law ^e	88.9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The capability of governmental macroeconomic regulation and control is further enhanced • The government's role in economic management can be further changed • Reform of the administrative management system and construction of economic laws have achieved rapid progress • The investment system is further market-oriented and standardized, and enterprise investment enjoys a dominant position 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An interest rate formation mechanism determined by market supply and demand has not yet been fully realized • A supervision and control system for foreign trade operations and an early warning mechanism for balance of international payments have not been established • Reform of the consumption tax system is not fully implemented • Reform of local tax administration authorities progresses slowly • A unified and standardized property tax system has not been established • The urban and rural tax system has not been unified • The current tax system has limitations in carrying out the government's macroeconomic regulation and control
5. Improving employment, income distribution, and the social security system ^f	93.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The intensity of tax system reform is strengthened • Reform of the labor employment system was further deepened • Construction of a social security system progressed rapidly • Financial enterprise reform is deepened, the financial regulatory mechanism is 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The personal income monitoring method is imperfect • Position-related consumption is standardized, and reform of social benefits monetization needs to be strengthened • Monetization reform needs to be enhanced

(continued)

Table 2.3 (continued)

Project	Score	Reform dividend improved, and the financial supervision mechanism is perfected	Relative lagging and inadequate aspects
6. Establishing a mechanism to promote sustainable social and economic development ^g	93.5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The system for talent introduction, management, and incentives is improved • A basic institutional guarantee of opening to the outside world is established • System reform of science and technology, education and culture is gradually deepened • Health and medical system reform achieves rapid progress, and a health and medical system that adapts to the socialist market economy is established 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Talent distribution between eastern and western areas is not balanced • International cultural influence needs to be strengthened

^aCalculation indexes are divided into 6 categories, 36 items and 227 indicators

^b6 items in total and 33 indicators

^c4 items in total and 24 indicators

^d9 items in total and 53 indicators

^e9 items in total and 54 indicators

^f3 items in total and 25 indicators

^g5 items in total and 38 indicators

Notes: Base year of data in this paper is 2002 or 2003

the difficulty reforming the property rights system at this level. **Secondly**, the intensity of reform in monopolized industries needs to be strengthened, and there are still few effective measures to relax restrictions in market access to monopolized industries and strengthening the effective regulation of natural monopolization.

Again, the overall tax bearing continues to rise, the reform of specific tax categories is slow, and the unification of the urban and rural tax system, property tax reform, and local tax administration authority reform need to be accelerated. **Also**, the order of income distribution is not standard, and there are problems in invisible and illegal income. Progress in position-related consumption and benefit monetization is relatively slow, and a method for personal income monitoring has not yet been established. **Finally**, there are institutional barriers restricting scientific development; transformation of government functions is insufficient, and some fields are prone to corruption.

The area of reform is relatively narrow, lacking integrity and systematization. Reform mechanism design is fragmented and short term, without a fundamental solution and a long-term mechanism. The implementation of reform processes lacks specific measures by which can be inspected, assessed and evaluated.

This needs to be solved within the next decade. New breakthroughs in key areas can be obtained through comprehensive and deepened reform. **We stand today at a new historical starting point, at which 'Five in One' reform is possible only with political resolution.**

The *Decision* made a historical summary of the important experiences gained in Reform and Opening over 35 years, across four aspects:

1. The political orientation of Reform and Opening, most importantly, to adhere to the leadership of the Party, carry out the basic Party line, avoid a closed and rigid path, avoid slipping back into old ways,¹⁹ embrace socialism with Chinese characteristics, and ensure the correct direction of reform. Since the beginning of the reform era, there have been three different political orientations, or roads. In 1982, the report to the 12th C.P.C. National Congress clearly pointed out that the Party, especially party committees at all levels, was to adhere to the Four Fundamental Principles, **following the path laid out at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the C.P.C. The idea was not only to oppose the 'leftward' deviation of attempting to go back to the 'error theory and policy' of the Cultural Revolution period, but also object to the 'rightward' deviation of doubting and denying bourgeois liberalization of the Four Fundamental Principles.**²⁰ The *Decision* made at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the C.P.C. in 1984 also explicitly put forward that the goal of economic reform was to infuse new vitality into socialism with Chinese characteristics. This was not only distinct from the rigid

¹⁹The part in bold has been added into the final manuscript.

²⁰Hu Yaobang: *Comprehensively Initiating the New Pattern of Socialist Modernization Construction—Report at the 12th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee*, September 1, 1982.

model of the past, but also completely different from capitalism.²¹ In 1992, Deng Xiaoping remarked in his South Tour Speech that in just ten years, China had obtained rapid development, raising living standards and receiving attention from the rest of the world. **In his view, this proved that the principles and policies espoused at the Third Plenary Session had been correct, and should not be changed.**²² In fact, in Reform and Opening, China faced one fundamental question: how to determine which political orientation to choose and which road to take. To this end, the Party Central Committee was conscientious in eliminating distractions, sticking to a single political line since the Third Plenary Session. It created a path unique to China, avoiding both the closed and rigid road, and the capitalist way. Mao Zedong said, **‘Whether the ideological and political lines are correct or not decides everything.** The correct Party line can obtain everything, including people, military strength, and political power. If the line is incorrect, it should be discarded. The line is a key link, and once it is grasped, everything else falls into place.’²³ Only by selecting the correct political orientation can Reform and Opening be achieved. Disruptive decision-making errors must be avoided, to prevent consequences such as collapse of the Soviet Union and,²⁴ and the²⁵ fall of Communism. Xi Jinping

²¹The C.P.C.’s *Decision on Economic System Reform* was approved at the Third Plenary Session of the 12th C.P.C. Central Committee on October 20, 1984.

²²*Deng Xiaoping’s Selected Works*, Volume 3, P. 371.

²³Mao Zedong: *Summary of the Conversation with Local Responsible People During the Inspection Tour* (August-September, 1971), *Mao Zedong’s Manuscript Since the Founding of the P.R.C.*, Book 13, P. 242, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 1998.

²⁴The USSR was founded on December 20, 1922 with 15 republics, and was dissolved on December 25, 1991. On March 11, 1991, the Republic of Lithuania was first to announce independence, with other republics following suit. Fifteen countries exited (including two eastern Slavic nations, three Baltic countries, five countries in Central Asia, three countries in Transcaucasia, and Moldova) On December 25, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev signed his last presidential decree, resigning from the highest post of Commander in Chief of armed forces, and transferring the armed forces and nuclear power to the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin. That same night, Mikhail Gorbachev delivered his resignation address. On December 26, the Supreme Soviet Republic of the USSR convened its last conference, and representatives approved a declaration by vote. The declaration stated that the **Soviet Union would cease existing as a country and subject of international law**, along with the establishment of a commonwealth of independent states.

²⁵In 1945, the Social Democratic Alliance of Yugoslavia was rebuilt after the war. In 1946, it was renamed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It implemented federal system consisting of six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH), Macedonia and Montenegro. In 1991, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia declared independence. In 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina followed. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was dissolved, and two allied countries Serbia and Montenegro composed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In 2003, it was renamed Serbia and Montenegro (Serbia-Montenegro for short), and dropped the name ‘Yugoslavia’. In 2008, Kosovo separated from Serbia and became independent.

The former Yugoslavian territory is now divided into the following independent sovereign countries: the Republic of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Serbia, Republic of Montenegro, Republic of Macedonia, and Republic of Kosovo.

remarked that all Third Plenary Sessions since Reform and Opening discussed the problem of deepening reform. This sends an important message, namely that the Party will maintain the **theories, guidelines and policies it has upheld since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the C.P.C.**²⁶

2. The ideological line of China's reform and opening up, namely, emancipating the mind, seeking the truth from facts, keeping pace with the times, being realistic and pragmatic, and proceeding from reality to summarize China's successes,²⁷ drawing lessons from foreign experience, and having the courage to promote innovation both in theory and in practice. An ideological line can only be developed gradually, first through emancipating the mind and seeking the truth from facts put forward by Deng Xiaoping,²⁸ then through keeping pace with the times as prescribed by Jiang Zemin,²⁹ and finally through being realistic and pragmatic like Hu Jintao.³⁰ By adhering to the correct ideological line, the nation can be more successful going forward. Even if unavoidable problems occur, immediate, timely and flexible adjustments can be made.

Two points must be emphasized. One is that reform itself is a process of practice, and there will always be problems and deviations, as well as mistakes and shortcomings, and conflicting views and opinions. They shall not be mistaken for political disorder. The *Decision* made in the Third Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the C.P.C. explicitly stated that a political label should not be given. Different views and theoretical perspectives on reform could be discussed, but it was forbidden to divide cadres and the masses into 'innovationist' and 'conservative' camps. Comrades who were unable to keep up with the situation were forced to raise their awareness of the practice of reform.³¹ It could be said that there are too many labels now, including 'conservative' and 'self-styled reformer'. Marketization and privatization is the work of 'innovationist', while the opposite is espoused by the 'conservative'. Further complicating the issue is the fact of China's political situation being simplified and popularized, in a Marxist paradigm.³² Also, reform is the social practice of innovation. On the one hand, lessons must still be drawn from foreign countries, particularly developing

²⁶Xi Jinping: *Explanation of the Decision of the C.P.C. on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform*, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, November 15, 2013.

²⁷The part in bold has been added into the final manuscript.

²⁸Deng Xiaoping: *Emancipate our Minds, Seek Truth from Facts, Unite as one and Look Ahead*, (December 13, 1978), *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume II, P. 140.

²⁹*Constitution of the Communist Party of China* (Amended and adopted at the 16th C.P.C. National Congress), November 14, 2002.

³⁰*Constitution of the Communist Party of China* (Amended and adopted at the 18th C.P.C. National Congress), November 14, 2012.

³¹The *C.P.C.'s Decision on Economic System Reform* was approved at the Third Plenary Session of the 12th C.P.C. Central Committee on October 20, 1984.

³²Mao Zedong indicated that the essence and living soul of Marxism is concrete analysis of concrete issues. Mao Zedong: *On Contradiction* (August, 1937), *Mao Zedong's Selected Works*, Volume 1, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1991.

countries that copy Western political systems, leading to environmental inadaptability and state failure. On the other hand, **it is necessary to learn from China's Reform and Opening in a practical sense, and combine learning with innovation. Learning from others is the lynchpin of innovation.**

3. The guiding ideology of Reform and Opening, namely, adhering to a people-oriented paradigm, respecting the principal position of the people, giving play to a pioneering spirit, and relying on the people to promote reform and facilitate the human development.³³ **The core viewpoint of this guiding ideology is to return to a subjective theory of the people. The people are both the subject and the beneficiary of China's Reform and Opening. Whether reform can succeed or not depends on whether the people participate democratically, whether the reform gains their endorsement and support, and whether it benefits and is shared by the masses. Thus, the rightful lines of reform belong to the people and the masses. What was once the people's war became the people's reform. The people's war brought victory over the Japanese and liberated the nation.**³⁴ Consequently, the people's reform brought large-scale opening-up. It provided a basic principle for comprehensively deepening reform in the next decade or longer.
4. The methodology of Reform and Opening, namely, deciding whether a bridge or a boat is better for crossing a river, metaphorically speaking. First, the relationship between reform, development and stability must be considered. In February and March, 1989, Deng Xiaoping presented the core idea that stability was the top priority,³⁵ and the bottom line of reform. However, Zhao Ziyang failed to implement this policy, leading to the political turmoil of 1989. The Party Central Committee headed by Jiang Zemin finally put the policy into practice after the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee of the C.P.C. By this time, China had withstood aftermath of 1989, and had borne the

³³The part in bold was added into the final manuscript.

³⁴During the eight years of the War Against Japanese Aggression, the People's Army led by the C. P.C. fought 125,000 battles with its adversaries, wiping out over 1.7 million people. During the three years of war of liberation, the People's Army defeated 38 million Kuomintang soldiers, and won victory. Lin Biao: *People's War Victories of 10,000 Years—Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War*, September 3, 1965, C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office: *Important Selected Literature Since the Founding of the P.R.C.*, Book 20, P. 415, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2011.

³⁵On February 26, 1989, when meeting US President Bush, Deng Xiaoping claimed that 'stability trumps everything'. *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume 3, People's Publishing House, 1993, PP. 284–285, March 4. From a conversation with Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping: 'The key point of four-fold modernization, reform, and opening up is stability. 'I have discussed China's issue with Bush, and the demand for stability trumps everything. We must counter any forces that threaten stability, not yielding to them or even making any concessions. China cannot fall into chaos. We must talk about it repeatedly and openly. Or, it will be as if we had no reason. We have to send out a signal that China will tolerate no disturbances.' *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume 3, People's Publishing House, 1993, PP. 286–287.

impact and influence of the Fall of Communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Jiang Zemin conducted a discussion on the ‘Twelve Major Relationships’ at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee of the C.P.C. in 1995. The most important was the First Major Relationship, namely the correct handling of the relationship between reform, development and stability. Reform was power, development was the goal, and stability was the prerequisite. Jiang pointed out **that practice had showed how proper handling of the relationships between the three could improve the overall situation and ensure smooth economic and social development, while improper handling would not.**³⁶

The Second Major Relationship called for great courage and a stable pace. The latter called for overall consideration, comprehensive arguments, and scientific decision-making.³⁷ This points to the fact that China’s reform has been a process of gradualism—from ease to difficulty, from partial to whole, from economic system reform to political system reform, and finally to other forms of system reform. At the same time, for the onward march of Reform and Opening, major milestones include the fiscal and taxation system reform of 1994, China’s access to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001,³⁸ and the medical system reform of 2009. These are all successful examples of long-term dividends.

‘Strengthening the top-level design and looking before you leap shall be combined’.³⁹ So said Mao Zedong. In 1941, he pointed out that if a Chinese Marxist fails to know this, he or she is not a good Chinese Marxist. **Marx said that the difference between a bee and the people is that people have to have a design in mind before building a house. So, to build the house of Chinese revolution, we must first make a design—incorporating both large and small details.**⁴⁰ According to the top-level designs for reform in all previous Third Plenary Sessions, China’s reform has been accomplished using a series of 10-year blueprints and roadmaps in the form of the various *Decisions*. ‘Looking before you leap’ is trial-and-error method, which was first suggested by Chen Yun. In 1980, Chen said that reform was necessary, but at a stable pace. The situation was complicated, meaning that a hasty approach would not work. There has never been any doubt that reform depends on theoretical research, financial statistics, and economic forecasts, **but the most important thing is to begin with a trial, namely, looking before you leap. At the beginning, the pace should be slow.**

³⁶Jiang Zemin: *Correct Handling of Several Important Issues in the Socialist Modernization Drive*, September 28, 1995, *Jiang Zemin’s Selected Works*, Volume 1, People’s Publishing House, 2006, PP. 460–461.

³⁷Xi Jinping: *Explanation of the Decision of the C.P.C. on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform*, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, November 15, 2013.

³⁸In December, 2001, China entered WTO. *Over the past 12 years, China’s foreign trade scale jumped to second place from seventh in the world.*

³⁹The part in bold was added into the final manuscript.

⁴⁰*Mao Zedong’s Collected Works, Volume 2, People’s Publishing House, 1999, P. 344.*

Reform should allow for adjustment, as well as success.⁴¹ Looking before you leap thus became the most important philosophical methodology of the reform process.⁴² Combined with strengthening the top-level design, it created a complete reform methodology.⁴³

Wholesale advancement and key breakthroughs helped to⁴⁴ increase the scientific nature of reform. In 1993, the *Decision* made at the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee of the C.P.C. put forward a method of combining wholesale advancement and key breakthroughs. Some major reform measures needed the plan first, and were carried out in aspects related to the economic system; some conducted local tests first, and then were popularized after being trialed. Global reform was achieved this way.⁴⁵ For a basic idea of how to solve the problem of reform, **it can be viewed as an arrow (or numerous arrows) hitting a target. This can be explained further by one of Mao Zedong's 'Ten Great Military Principles': if the powers of all parties are concentrated, reform problems will be solved one by one.**⁴⁶ This was an important principle for comprehensively deepening reform. **'We shall not fight an unprepared and uncertain battle. We must be prepared', Mao said.**⁴⁷ It is a case of building consensus to form a resultant force of reform. The dialectics and the methodology of Reform and Opening came directly from China's inherent wisdom.

Experience engenders knowledge. Knowledge starts with practice, and knowledge of reform must therefor start with practice of reform. Knowledge is power, and as such, reform knowledge is reform power. Profound lessons must be kept in mind.

⁴¹Chen Yun: *Economic Trends and Lessons* (December 16, 1980), *Chen Yun's Selected Works*, Volume III, P. 279, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1995.

⁴²'Step by step' is a method of dealing with an uncertain matter. Based on feedback, it is necessary to make adjustments, and eliminate the possibility of radical and abrupt changes at any point. Advancing step by step is considered to have included the philosophical methodologies of the reform of the entire economic system. Wang Hui: *Progress Revolution: China's Reform Shakes the World*, Chinese Version, P. 31, Beijing, China Planning Press, 1998.

⁴³Hu Angang: *Top Design and Advancing Step by Step*, *People's Forum*, Issue 9 of 2012.

⁴⁴The part in bold was added into the final manuscript.

⁴⁵The C.P.C.'s *Decision on Several Issues about Building Socialist Market Economic System* was approved in the Third Plenary Session of the 14th C.P.C. Central Committee on November 14, 1993.

⁴⁶This refers to the military principles proposed by Mao Zedong: concentrating advantageous military forces, and destroying the enemy. Mao Zedong: *Concentrating Advantageous Military Forces, Destroying the Enemy*, September 16, 1946, *Mao Zedong's Selected Works*, Volume 4, People's Publishing House, 1991, P. 1197.

⁴⁷Mao Zedong: *Current Trends, and Our Tasks*, December 25, 1947, *Mao Zedong's Selected Works*, Volume 4, People's Publishing House, 1991, P. 1247.

2.3 The Guiding Ideology of the Decision and the Overall Goal of Comprehensively Deepening Reform

The *Decision* put forward the guiding ideology for comprehensively deepening reform, which could be viewed in modern terms as ‘version 2.0’. It adhered to the direction of a socialist market economy, and emphasized the promotion of social justice and the improvement of people’s livelihoods. It set the goal benefiting more people more fairly (e.g., Part XII in the *Decision*). This was different from the ‘1.0 version’, which encouraged some people to get rich first, and called for a principle of efficiency and ‘balance equity’. It was ‘people oriented’, based on the well-being of more than a billion Chinese citizens. **This was the value orientation of China’s reform, as well as its ultimate goal, and a benchmark of successful deepening.** More efficient development was required, along with fairer and more sustainable methods. It was not merely a case of emancipating and developing productive forces, but also enhancing social mobility.

It is possible to take a more generalized view of the productive social forces at play. They not only included material, scientific and technological forces, but also education, culture, ecology, and national defense. Social mobility could also be seen as more generalized, covering enterprises, markets, science and technology, as well as social order (as mentioned in article 48 of the *Decision*), education, and culture. It fixed defects in the economic system and mechanism, and augured a new era thereof.

The *Decision* put forward the overall goal of comprehensively deepening reform, namely improving and developing the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, promoting the modernization of state governance and strengthening its power. General Secretary Xi Jinping believed that this was the inevitable requirement of upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics, and a necessary principle in realizing socialist modernization.⁴⁸

Both capitalism and socialism are historical products of development and progress of human civilization. Compared with feudal and traditional agricultural societies, a capitalist society represents a tremendous advance. It relies on a major development of productive forces, and progress in production relations and superstructure. The emergence and development of socialism hangs on the same principles. The ideology of utopian socialism came first, followed by the scientific socialism of Marx and Engels after the 1840s. However, it wasn’t until the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia that a real socialist society came into being, when the first socialist country in the world was founded. In modern times, both capitalism and socialism have changed the face of the world, including China. China was invaded by capitalist forces for the first time in 1840, offering major challenges to the Qing Dynasty. The relationships between China, the West, and Japan have always been complex, taking the various forms of strong and weak, and thief and

⁴⁸Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, February 17, 2014.

victim. With modernization, the relationships shifted towards student and teacher, and lagger and precursor. Mao Zedong claimed that establishing a capitalist society under dictatorship of the bourgeoisie in China would not meet the approval of foreign capitalism, i.e. imperialism. Imperialists invaded China, opposed its independence, and objected to the development of capitalism.⁴⁹ On the one hand, growth of modern local capitalist factors caused monopolistic exclusion from Western and Japanese capitalism; on the other hand, the powerful bullied the weak. By 1949, China was the most impoverished it had ever been, and lagged behind the rest of the world. It ultimately chose socialism, bidding farewell to a century of suffering and decline, and opening a new chapter of prosperity and rejuvenation.

Of course, China's socialist era is merely a short phase in its long history.⁵⁰ Mao Zedong remarked at the Congress of Seven Thousand People in 1962 that the development of capitalism took hundreds of years. Excluding the 16th century, it began in the Middle Ages. From the 17th century until today, there have been more than 360 years. With this in mind, it isn't so much of a stretch to imagine that building a powerful socialist economy may take more than a century. **Mao pointed out that since socialism was superior to capitalism, the development of China's state would be much faster than that of capitalist countries.**⁵¹

Mao's strategic assumption can be seen as the 'Chinese dream'—a vision of empowering China. His forecast can be called the 'Mao Zedong prediction'—building a powerful socialist country.

At the same Congress, Mao also spoke of a blindness towards socialist construction. He saw many unrecognized realms of necessity in the socialist economy. 'I know little about the productive forces. Knowledge within the Party is not enough for socialist construction.'⁵² Things remained unclear until the report to the 13th C.P.C. National Congress in 1987, which showed that China's basic national conditions were typical of a large population and a weak economic foundation. Per capita gross national product (GNP) ranked fairly low in the world, which was not uncommon for a nation in the early days of socialist development.⁵³

In 1992, Deng Xiaoping pointed out in his South Tour Speech that the consolidation and development of a socialist system would take time and effort.⁵⁴ Since the 1950s, there have only been a handful of generations. Unsurprisingly, Deng's socialist society was not perfect. However, with continuous reform, progress and improvement, things began to look up. Deng made it clear that developing and

⁴⁹*Mao Zedong's Selected Works*, Volume 2, P. 679.

⁵⁰Mao Zedong Re-ascending Jinggangshan—to the tune of *Shui Diao Ge Tou* (May, 1965). Therein, he wrote: 'Thirty-eight years fled, with a mere snap of the fingers.'

⁵¹*Mao Zedong's Selected Works*, Volume 8, PP. 301–302, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1999.

⁵²*Mao Zedong's Selected Works*, Volume 8, PP. 302–303, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1999.

⁵³Zhao Ziyang's *March Forward Along the Socialist Road with Chinese Characteristics*—Report at the 13th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee, October 25, 1987.

⁵⁴*Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume 3, PP. 379–380.

improving socialism with Chinese characteristics would take much longer than actually establishing the system. **Deepening reform was the key.**

A highlight of the *Decision* was the idea of modernizing the state governance system and governance ability. Ten years ago, I edited *State System Construction* (Tsinghua University Press 2003) alongside Wang Shaoguang, and Zhou Jianming, and conducted research into this matter. We concluded that a country's modernization must include at least two important aspects. One is economic modernization, such as the modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense. The other is system modernization. Good governance of national security and territorial integrity must also be achieved to ensure the maximization of national fundamental interests and the well-being of the people. Also essential are economic development and economic stability; social justice and human security; political probity and social stability; and ecological balance and environmental protection. State system construction is the basic system and infrastructure of a modern state, and is strongly related to the economic construction of the modernization of the state. Achieving modernization of the state system is the most important goal of a modern state, for the benefit of the nation. If modernization has no state system, modernization of the state economy will not be achieved. System construction is not an economic construction in itself, but is the basic condition for promoting economic construction and ensuring its sustainable development. The basic system of the state includes at least eight mechanisms: enforcement; absorption; consensus; supervision; coordination; expression; integration; and redistribution. In order to build a socialist democracy, four major political reforms must be implemented, namely, reform of the Party, reform of the National People's Congress, reform of the government, and reform of the judicial system. We also believe that system construction is the most significant transformation of the ruling method of the Communist Party of China. The system of Party and state reform is the core of China's political system, is also the root of modernization (both economic and systemic) in China. It must thus be a priority for the Party. Due to theoretical limitations on the understanding of modernization, we have not yet realized the 'Five in One' model for modernizing Chinese socialism. However, the basic tenets of 'Four in One', 'Five in One'⁵⁵ and 'Six in One' modernization (including the modernization of national defense and the army)⁵⁶ have gained traction in during the Eleventh Five-year Plan, the Twelfth Five-year Plan and the 2020 China study.

Today, the modernization of the state has two different aspects. One is tangible modernization, including economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological civilization construction. The other is intangible modernization, namely, the construction of a state system.

⁵⁵Hu Angang, Yan Yilong: *China: Entering 2015*, Zhejiang People's Publishing House, 2010.

⁵⁶Hu Angang: *2020 China: Comprehensively Building A Moderately Prosperous Society*, Tsinghua University Press, 2012.

From the theoretical basis of the reform, the basic principle of Marxism asks how production relations adapt to the development of productive forces, and how superstructure adapts to the development of the economic foundation. This constitutes the two-dimensional modernization of a state. One dimension is tangible, and the other is intangible. I call China's optimal path a '45 degree angle', consisting of mutual effect, mutual promotion and mutual adaptation. Intangible modernization is seen in public welfare. It is different from visible public products, such as education, health and other public services. The converse case is what we see today: state failure in Libya and Egypt. Neither can provide national public welfare, and are unable to provide national public products.

China's modern state governance began with the principle of Marxism, and developed along the lines of production relations and productive forces, adapting its superstructure and economic foundation. To this end, Mao Zedong made major efforts, which were reflected in his speech entitled *Problem on the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People* in 1957.⁵⁷ However, he failed to solve this problem, leading to a profound historical legacy from which important lessons have been learned.

The Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the C.P.C. in 1978 stated that a realization of the four modernizations (agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology) necessitated a change in production relations. The superstructure had to adapt to the development of productive force in many aspects. Management, activity and thought had to be adapted

⁵⁷Mao Zedong's address at the 11th (expansion) Conference of the Supreme State pointed that **'in a socialist society, there is still a basic contradiction between production relation and productivity, and between superstructure and economic base. However, such contradictions in a socialist society essentially have different essences and conditions with the contradiction between production relation and productivity, and the contradiction between superstructure and economic base.** Our social institution at present is so superior to that of the old times. If it was not superior, the old institution would not have been overturned, and the new institution would not have been built. **So-called socialist production relations are more suitable for productivity development than for the production relations of the old times, which means allowing productivity to develop rapidly at a speed not known by the former society. Thus, productivity can develop continuously, and the people's increasing demands will be gradually met.** Under the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism, the productive forces in old China grew very slowly. Over 50 years before the liberation, except in the north-east, the national steel production capacity was only tens of thousands tons, and the maximum annual production capacity was only over 900,000 tons. In 1949, the national steel production capacity was only hundreds of thousands tons. However, no more than seven years after national liberation, the steel production capacity shot up to over four million tons. In old China, there was almost no machine manufacturing industry, let alone auto manufacturing and aircraft manufacturing, but now such industries have been built. When the people overturn the governance of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism, where will China go? **Will it turn to capitalism or socialism? It was difficult to predict, but reality has answered the issue: only socialism can save China. The socialist system has promoted the rapid development of China's productivity,** a fact that has even been acknowledged by foreign adversaries'. *Mao Zedong's Collected Works*, Volume 7, People's Publishing House, 1999, P. 214.

in order for any revolution to take place. **The theory of Marxism is the theoretical basis of China's Reform and Opening.** However, the Party had very little experience and knowledge initially about how to adjust the productive forces, production relations, superstructure and economic foundation, not to mention how to reform the economic system. Yet after much success and failure, a new understanding was gained of China's national conditions. The trial-and-error method of 'looking before you leap' was used for exploration, practice and summary. **It is possible to state with confidence that China has settled on a 'five in one' path to comprehensively deepening reform and modernizing the state system.**

The 35-year journey of Reform and Opening seems to offer proof that the Communist Party of China has the ability to conduct effective governance of the country with a billion-plus people from 56 ethnic groups. It has developed an understanding that involves consciousness, initiative and creativity. This was created during the great 'social practice' under the guidance of innovative theory. Modernization of the state system and comprehensively deepening reform will speed up the development of the socialist market economy, develop a socialist democracy, promote an advanced socialist culture, and build smooth-running society, while constructing a socially-sound civilization.

From this perspective, the *Decision's* ideas about the general goal of comprehensively deepening reform **can offer a new understanding of what modernization is (specifically in China), how to realize it under China's national conditions with outside knowledge and theory. It has been a long-term historical process of learning and exploration.** So in essence, **the goal may guide China for at least half a century, and make a forward-looking and strategic general plan, as well as an entire layout and overall design for the first half of the 21st century.**

The Party Central Committee not only put forward the general goal of comprehensively deepening reform, but also proposes goals for 2020. According to main goal of the report to the 18th C.P.C. National Congress, the *Decision* stated that decisive achievements will be made by 2020 in the reform of key areas and key links. A system that is complete, scientific, and standardized, fully operational would be established, making the overall system more mature and stable. This was Deng Xiaoping's strategic conception. He said in his South Tour Speech in 1992: 'I think I still need another thirty years to establish a more mature and stable system in all aspects. The principles and policies to be applied under each system will be more firmly established'.⁵⁸

This reflects the fact that China's state system construction and system reform is a process of combining 'looking before you leap' with top-level design. **It must experience its own development logic and developmental stage, from low to intermediate, then to more advanced, and finally to the most advanced stage. Continuous innovation, trial and error, and adjustment must be made in the**

⁵⁸Deng Xiaoping's *Selected Works*, Volume 3, P. 372.

process of evolution. China determined its strategic conception in 1992, has been maintaining development ever since, towards the goal of 2020. This is an ambitious target, but one that can be reached with effort.

2.4 Construction and Reform of a ‘Five in One’ System

The key word for this type of reform is ‘comprehensiveness’, as reflected in the top-level design of the *Decision* made in the plenary session. It includes construction and reform of the economic system, political, cultural, and social, systems.

‘Comprehensiveness’ is reflected in two aspects of system construction and reform. Everything has two sides. They are both contradictory and unified, and conduct mutual transformation under certain conditions. This provides an understanding of what the socialist system is, and what modernization is. **The aim of system construction is to make, perfect and develop various systems. The so-called system reform is to break and get rid of defects in various systems. During the era of Reform and Opening, the primary ideology was first to make, and then to break.** This is very different from the opinion of ‘breaking shall be first, with making among breaking’ advocated in the *May 16th Notice* during the Cultural Revolution.⁵⁹ In March, 1949, Mao Zedong said in the Second Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the C.P.C. that ‘we shall not only be good at breaking the old world (old China), but also be able to build a new world (New China).’⁶⁰ More than 60 years later, the road towards building a New China is still being hoed. Such a development trajectory is unprecedented both in Chinese history, and in the wider world.

The ‘Five in One’ system design was the highlight of the *Decision* made in the plenary session. It established a relationship of mutual support with the overall layout of ‘Five in One’ socialist modernization including the construction of economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological systems put forward in the report to the 18th C.P.C. National Congress. Objectively speaking, **system construction and reform provide an institution guarantee—security and safeguarding for achieving the overall goal of ‘Five in One’.** It can be seen as the Party Central Committee’s large-scale planning, grand strategy and great layout.

What exactly did the strategy involve? In 1936, Mao Zedong pointed out in the *Strategic Issues of China’s Revolutionary War* that with war comes an overall situation of war. **Strategic issues are used to study the law of the overall situation of the war.**⁶¹ Development is like war. As long as there is practical

⁵⁹The *Notice* claimed that Mao Zedong often said: ‘*There is no making without breaking.*’ *Breaking refers to criticism, namely, revolution. Making refers to reasoning. With breaking, making is realized.* Notice of the C.P.C. Central Committee, May 16, 1966.

⁶⁰*Mao Zedong’s Selected Works*, Volume 4, P1439, Beijing, People’s Publishing House.

⁶¹Mao Zedong: *Strategic Issues of China’s Revolutionary War*, December, 1936, *Mao Zedong’s Selected Works*, Volume 1, People’s Publishing House, 1991, P. 175.

development, there is an overall situation of development. A development strategy is like a war strategy. It must consider the overall situation and the law of the development. Correctly developing a national development strategy leads to developmental achievements.

What is the strategy behind Socialist modernization in China? It is used to study the overall situation and the law of socialist modernization in China. The Party's understanding is constantly enriched, expanded and enhanced with the practice and progress of China's modernization, moving from the realm of necessity towards freedom.

From the 1950s to the 1970s, Mao Zedong put forward the strategic conception of realizing 'four modernizations' by the end of the 20th century, which took strengthening the state as the core goal. In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping revealed the 'two-step' and 'three-step' strategic conceptions of socialist modernization, which took raising wealth as the core goal, as well as strengthening the state. On entering the 21st century, the 16th C.P.C. National Congress settled on a 'Three in One' layout for socialist modernization, for the construction and reform of the economic, political, and cultural systems. The 17th C.P.C. National Congress moved towards a 'Four in One' layout, adding construction and reform of the social system.

In 2012, the 18th C.P.C. National Congress redefined the general goal of 'Two Centenaries' in the first half of the 21st century. It put forward a more complete 'Five in One' overall layout for socialist modernization, namely the construction of economic, political, cultural, social and ecological construction.

In 2013, according to the deployment of the 18th National Congress of the C.P.C., the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the C.P.C. made 'Five in One' the overall layout of socialist system modernization and system reform in all aspects.

The *Decision* made at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the C.P.C. put forward the general goal of comprehensively deepening reform, and set a specific goal for reform in several areas, requiring the comprehensive promotion of 'Five in One' reform in the economic, political, cultural and social systems. The goals for specific areas were to perfect and reform the systems of socialist economy, socialist democracy, socialist culture, social management, and ecology. It reflected a new view on Mao's 'making and breaking, breaking for making'.

It held that modernizing China's state system would not only respect the law of the market economy, but also heed the rules of social development cultural inheritance, and nature; it would motivate and inspire market innovation and innovation of property rights, as well as education (as in Article 42 of the *Decision*), science and technology (as in Part XIII of the *Decision*), ecological civilization (as in Part XIV of the *Decision*), cultural innovation and social innovation; it would emancipate economic, scientific and technical productive forces, as well as those of social management, culture, education, and ecology. Another aim was to break down the old economic system and mechanism defects, as well as problems within the political, cultural, social and ecological systems. It would develop the socialist market economy and democracy, promote an advanced socialist culture, build a

smooth-running socialist society and construct an ecological civilization. In addition, it would create monetary, cultural, spiritual, ideological and ecological wealth. **This went against the Western free market economic system, material modernization and political democratization. It did not merely involve cultural, social and ecological construction, but expanded the innovation of the socialist market economic system, coordinating with other systems than just socialism with Chinese characteristics.**

In addition to the ‘Five in One’ system for construction and reform, the Third Plenary Session covered reform of national defense, bringing it into its overall plan and top-level design. Although there were only three aspects, each was critically important for reform. Xu Qiliang said⁶²: ‘I think this is an important characteristic of the *Decision*. Of course, when determining to conduct economic system reform in the 1980s, military reform was mentioned. It was researched and discussed at the Central Military Commission, but was not included in the decision of the Party Central Committee.’

The plenary session called for comprehensive deepening of reform. It involved many aspects, and gave clear answers to questions about what would be reformed and how. The written arrangement of the *Decision* contained 16 parts and 60 articles, involving 15 areas. Among them were five parts on economic system reform, three parts on political system reform and two parts on social system reform. There were 55 articles about major reform tasks, and more than 330 reform measures. Compared to the *Decision* made at the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the C.P.C. in 2003, there were an additional 19 major reform tasks and more than 100 reform measures. **It was a grand blueprint for comprehensively deepening reform with the largest scope, comprehensiveness and effort**, viewed by the international community as an ‘**ambitious and deliberate plan**’ for China’s reform.

In order to comprehensively deepening reform, the plenary session set up a leading group that was responsible for the general design, overall coordination, advancement, supervision and implementation of the reform.

A review of the reform process over the past 35 years looks first to the economic reform of the early 1980s. In May 1982, the State Commission for Economic Restructuring was established out of the former System Reform Office of the State Council, first with the premiers of the State Council (Zhao Ziyang and Li Peng) serving as directors, followed by Li Tieying. During the institutional reform of 1998, the State Commission for Economic Restructuring was officially revoked, and changed to the Economic System Reform Office of the State Council. In March 2003, during the institutional reform of the State Council, the Economic System Reform Office of the State Council and the State Development Planning Commission were merged to form the National Development and Reform Commission, which exists to this day.

⁶²See Xu Qiliang: *Unswervingly Promote National Defense and Army Reform*, People’s Daily, November 21, 2013.

The Party Central Committee set up a leading group for comprehensively deepening reform under the leadership of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. and its Standing Committee. The group’s main responsibilities were to make unified deployments of major national reform measures, promote reform in all areas, coordinate personnel from all parties to form a force for reform, strengthen supervision and inspection, and promote the full implementation of the target tasks.⁶³ This was to prepare China to enter a new era of comprehensive reform—‘Five in One’. As General Secretary Xi Jinping said, comprehensively deepening reform involves complicated system engineering, and cannot be completed only by relying on one or a few departments; it is necessary to establish a higher-level leadership system in order to give better play to the core leadership role of the Party, and to ensure that reform is implemented smoothly and universally.⁶⁴ Only by such an arrangement can the *Decision* of the plenary session be implemented article by article from within the organization.

The *Decision* also ruled that party committees at all levels should take responsibility for reform at the leadership level. Since the Party Central Committee established a leading group for comprehensively deepening reform, local party committees at all levels established similar group to promote ‘Five in One’ reform. It can be claimed that China’s great reform innovation sprang from local, intermediate and grass-roots innovation. It required that the Party Central Committee acknowledged, supported and protected local innovation. System innovation brings high risk and cost, and may not be unsuccessful, but it is integral to the future of the nation.

As well as setting out the guidelines for the ‘Five in One’, the plenary session called for checking and evaluation. Now, the score obtained from the evaluation of the *Decision* made 10 years ago is 89.7 points, and it is likely to exceed 90 points in another ten years.

2.5 Summary: Raising Confidence in the System and Comprehensively Deepening Reform

China’s reform and modernization has moved from quantitative to partial qualitative change, and then to quantitative and partial qualitative change. The partial qualitative change eventually became qualitative change, perfecting and strengthening the socialist system through comprehensively deepening reform.

⁶³Xi Jinping: *Explanation of the Decision of the C.P.C. on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform*, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, November 15, 2013.

⁶⁴Xi Jinping: *Explanation of the Decision of the C.P.C. on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform*, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, November 15, 2013.

To conduct Reform and Opening and realize modernization in China, there was no ready-made model or past experience. Understanding socialist modernization in China is a process of noting the social practices over a long period of time, and assessing⁶⁵ its continuing success.

The process of drafting and formulating the *Decision* of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the C.P.C. led to an understanding of the overall situation and law of socialist modernization in China. It was the development of a strategy for comprehensively deepening reform, and of concentrating the democratic and scientific decision-making of the Party and the country as a whole.

Xi Jinping's *Instructions* publicly introduced the process of drafting and formulating the *Decision* of the Third Plenary Session for the first time.⁶⁶ The process included the following important links and stages: soliciting opinions from all sides; carrying out special demonstrations; conducting investigations, including investigations of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. and committee members; drawing up first draft of the *Decision*; circulating the draft within the Party (within limits); listening to the opinions of the democratic parties; repeated discussion and modification; deliberation under the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C.; and deliberation under the plenary session of the Central Committee.

Starting from the establishment of the drafting group, the *Decision* took seven months to complete, but if the time of drafting the report to the 18th C.P.C. National Congress since the Sixth Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee of the C.P.C. is included (because the report is a detailed outline of the *Decision*) the actual time period was two years. Although the *Decision* was only twenty thousand words long, **it contained the desires, opinions, advice and wisdom of the Party and the people.** It can be viewed as **a successful case of decision-making with Chinese characteristics.**

To accommodate its billion-strong populace, China has more than 30 provincial levels, more than 330 prefecture levels, and more than 2800 county levels, with vast differences in development and socio-economic conditions. It is the country with the largest such gaps between regions in the world. To solve this difficult issue, China must work on decision-making, and form new political views, consensus,

⁶⁵In Mao Zedong's address to the Expanded Working Conference of the C.P.C. Central Committee, after recalling China's arduous journey to revolution, he emphasized: 'When I talk about the Communist Party members' success in understanding the law of China's revolution in spite of difficulties during the democratic revolution period, my purpose is to guide comrades to an understanding: the understanding of the law of socialist construction must go through a process. We must start from practice, from no experience to experience, from little experience to rich experience, from the unrecognized realm of the necessity of building socialism to the realm of freedom through gaining freedom, and realize a leap in understanding by overcoming blindness and understanding objective laws'. *Mao Zedong's Collected Works*, Volume 8, People's Publishing House, 1999, P. 300.

⁶⁶Xi Jinping: *Explanation of the Decision of the C.P.C. on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform*, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, November 15, 2013.

and action plans for further deepening reform. Xi Jinping's *Instructions* on the process of drafting the *Decision* of the Third Plenary Session **provide a more detailed answer, along with suggestions on how China's major decision-making mechanism and process can be democratized, institutionalized, and made scientific.** It is not the first time, in fact. The Resolution on *Several Historical Issues of the Party Since the Founding* adopted in the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the C.P.C. (1981) pioneered the democratization, institutionalization, and making scientific of the major *Decision* of the Party Central Committee, but there was no official drafting process. Xi Jinping's *Instructions at the Central Plenary Session* were groundbreaking, **laying bare the mystery of the central decision-making process, and showing great political transparency.**

The Institute of National Conditions at Tsinghua University's think-tank is actively involved in this, and provides many National Condition Reports related to the topic of the *Decision* as well as monographs for relevant authorities at different stages of decision-making. It deals with related central departments as well as grassroots units. I, as a representative of the 18th C.P.C. National Congress, have participated in meetings to solicit opinions on the *Decision*, and have written about my findings. It seems clear that **China is achieving democratization, institutionalization, and scientific viewing of the major decision of the Party Central Committee, enabling it to make an important decision on how to remain popular, reaching a political consensus in the Party and the wider nation, and pushing for deeper reform.**

In contrast, the U.S.A.'s recent Obamacare reform has not been so successful. As early as October 2007, Barack Obama proposed a reform of the healthcare system as part of his national campaign, helping secure his election as President. The corresponding bill was adopted in March 2010, two years after the election. It has not been without its difficulties. The healthcare bill was obtained as a result of political compromise; the Republican Party firmly opposes it, so major concessions have been made, compromising the original idea of realizing universal healthcare.

A political consensus has not yet been reached. After the bill was adopted, it received litigation from 26 states for violating of the Constitution, meaning that it will not be implemented in over half of country. The Supreme Court finally ruled that the bill was constitutional in June 2012, but the House of Representatives voted to abolish it in July 2012.

Neither has there been social consensus. The United States is a differentiated and divided society, and the reform would stand to benefit the impoverished echelons of the population. If more than 30 million uninsured American people were provided with medical insurance, the burden would be lifted from more than three million citizens. However, this has been opposed by the majority. A survey shows that more than 50% of the public are dissatisfied with the healthcare reform bill, with employers and the rich expressing the strongest dissatisfaction. As long as Obamacare fails to receive widespread support, Barack Obama's policy will not come into fruition. This suggests that **any major reform in the United States will**

fail if it does not stand to benefit the entire populace. A research fellow from the Brookings Institution in the United States claims that **President Obama wants reform, but the system of the United States does not provide any help. Conversely, when President Hu Jintao wants reform, China's system always steps up to the plate.** It is surely not lost on Barack Obama that China's reformed healthcare system was able to cover a population of 1 billion in 2009.

In this way, comparing the systems and methods of reform in the United States of America and China can offer valuable lessons in how best to innovate and implement policies for the good of each nation, under current conditions.

Chapter 3

Modernization of State Governance

On February 17, 2014, Xi Jinping delivered a speech (hereinafter referred to as the *Speech*) at the opening ceremony of a seminar at which provincial and ministerial-level leading cadres **discussed the deepening of reform laid out in the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the C.P.C.**¹ He made a comprehensive and in-depth case for pursuing the general goal. Although the full text of the speech has not been published, its core idea was reported by the Xinhua News Agency. Xi said that **‘we must adapt to the process of state modernization, and improve the Party’s scientific, democratic and legal leadership. We must enable the state agency to fulfill its responsibility, and improve the ability of the masses to administer state, economic, cultural, and personal affairs. We must achieve the systematization, standardization and routinization of the governance of the Party, the state and society, and constantly improve the effectiveness of state governance through socialism with Chinese characteristics.’**

This speech was a milestone in further implementing the policies laid out at Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the C.P.C. It became the ruling programme of Xi’s Party Central Committee, and is an important document for promoting modernization in the state governance system. A detailed analysis and objective commentary of the *Speech* is worthwhile for academic exploration.

This paper is my manuscript from a lecture at a rotational training class for leading Beijing cadres at municipal and county levels to consider General Secretary Xi Jinping’s series address on February 19, 2014; Issue 5 of 2014 *Report on the National Situation* on February 25; it was modified again on March 15.

¹*People’s Daily*, Beijing, February 17, 2014.

3.1 Modernization of the State

The core goals of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the C. P.C. were to deepen comprehensive reform and to expand socialism with Chinese characteristics, as Xi's speech reiterated.²

One basic evaluation is that **the general goal was a summary and sublimation of the practices espoused since the Party's founding for more than 60 years ago, especially the 30 years of Reform and Opening. It was the ruling programme of the Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping as general secretary, and proof that China's socialist modernization had entered a new stage, with a fresh goal and task.**

Modernization is a trend in contemporary human development, and the long-term task of the development of contemporary China. **Since the founding of New China, leaders have faced several basic problems.**

1. What is modernization?
2. What form will Chinese modernization take?
3. How can we design a long-term goal and grand strategy for modernization in China?
4. How can we implement the strategies of modernization in stages?
5. Can we innovate and modernize with Chinese characteristics?
6. Is there a theoretical basis for the concept of state modernization?

In a broader sense, modernization can be understood from the perspective of transcending Western modes, so as to provide an academic foundation and theoretical basis for assessing China's modernization in terms of state governance and governance ability.

Professor Zhang Peigang's definition of industrialization can be used for reference.³ 'I define modernization as **the process of a series of modern elements and combination modes in society, displaying ground-breaking change or reform from a low to a high level.**'⁴ Our theoretical understanding of modernization can be said to be based on Zhang's theory, and not on Western ideas.

China's modernization has been the largest-scale and most successful in the world. How can it be understood, and what is its significance? It can be interpreted in five aspects:

²*People's Daily*, Beijing, February 17, 2014.

³Zhang Peigang defines 'industrialization' as 'the continuous changing process of a series of strategic production functions'. Zhang Peigang: *Agriculture and Industrialization: Primary Investigation of Industrialization Issues in Agricultural Countries*, Chinese version, Huazhong University of Science and Technology Press, 1984, P. 70. Later, Zhang Peigang defines 'industrialization' as 'the breakthrough changes (or revolution) from low levels to high levels of a series of strategic production functions (or combination of production elements) in a national economy'. Zhang Peigang: *General Theory of Development Economics*, Volume 1, *Industrialization Issues of Agricultural Countries*, Hunan Publishing House, 1991, P. 190.

⁴Hu Angang: *Chinese Road and Chinese Dream*, Zhejiang People's Publishing House, 2013.

1. **Modernization must be a concept of history and development.** In other words, modernization is not a fixed and unchanging concept, but is constantly enriched, perfected and invigorated with practice and understanding. This also means that **modernization** has no fixed pattern or path, and **is not equal to Westernization. Different countries have different paths to modernization.** China's was not an imitation of Western ways, but an innovation.
2. **Modernization falls within the scope of the whole society.** This includes two aspects. One involves economic, social, political, cultural, human, ecological, and military modernization. The second includes modernization of urban and rural areas, coasts, central and western regions, ethnic minority areas, and the entire population. In this sense, China's modernization must be socialist—shared by all people.
3. **Modernization combines modern elements,** such as land, resources, energy, capital, labor, education, science, technology, culture, information, knowledge and **systems, ad law.** It also involves various modern combination modes. Different elements have different combination modes, some of which need to use the market mechanism for configuration, some are provided by the government, and some are provided jointly by two mechanisms. **Modernization is a process of continuous and accumulated development and construction, from low to intermediate then to advanced, from quantitative to partial qualitative change, from repeated quantitative change to repeated partial qualitative change, and finally causing qualitative change.** For example, China has gone from absolute poverty to having adequate food and clothing, then to reaching a well-off level, and finally building a prosperous society after 30 years.⁵ Meanwhile, modernization is a process of accumulation,⁶ preventing damage and disruption. The enemy is not slowness, but stopping. In this sense, the degree of modernization is about time function.
4. **Modernization is a process of comprehensive change,** including ideas, economic situations, social mores, and cultural landscape.

As long as the above five aspects are met, modernization will occur under the Communist Party of China, and will develop, evolve, change, and accumulate.

⁵In 1992, the report from the 14th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee pointed that 1.1 billion people's lack of food and clothing is basically resolved, and we are moving towards a moderately prosperous society. Jiang Zemin: *Quicken the Pace of Reform and Opening and Drive Modernization, Achieve More Victories in the Socialist Cause with Chinese Characteristics*—Report from the 14th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee, October 12, 1992.

⁶The report from the 16th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee in 2002 indicated that the people's overall living standard had reached the well-off level, but this was not all-inclusive and was very uneven. Therefore it required sustained and unremitting efforts to transform the country and make life better for the people. Jiang Zemin: *Comprehensively Build a Moderately Prosperous Society, Initiate a New Pattern for Socialist Causes with Chinese Characteristics*—Report at the 16th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee, November 18, 2002.

It is important to consider how Chinese leaders have understood China's modernization, and how it was designed.

In the early stage, it economic modernization was the core. In 1956, the Eighth C.P.C. National Congress put forward the 'four modernizations', namely industry, agriculture, transport, and national defense.⁷ In 1964, four new modernizations were laid out: agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology.⁸ The four modernizations were reasserted again in 1975, allowing China's economy to assume a world-leading position.⁹ During this period, modernization was understood by leaders as being economic.

After Reform and Opening, the meaning of modernization was gradually extended, with a 'Five in One' layout of. The report to the 12th C.P.C. National Congress in 1982 put forward three constructions: economic, ideological, and political. It also called for a 'two-step' strategy.

In 1986, the Sixth Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the C.P.C. put forward a new overall layout for socialism: taking economic construction as the central task, conducting economic and political reform, and strengthening the construction of an ideologically sound civilization.

The report to the 16th C.P.C. National Congress in 2002 put forward a 'Three in One' overall layout, concentrating on economic, political, and cultural construction and reform.¹⁰

The report to the 17th C.P.C. National Congress in 2007 suggested a 'Four in One' overall layout for economic, political, cultural and social construction.

The report to the 18th C.P.C. National Congress in 2012 pushed for a 'Five in One' overall layout, for economic, political, cultural, social and ecological construction.¹¹

In this way, the Party Central Committee basically established the overall layout for the first half of the 21st century (2000–2050).

Overall modernization cannot be completed in one go. It requires repeated understanding, and is only formed after practice, exploration and innovation. China has transitioned from economic modernization to comprehensive

⁷The *Constitution of the Communist Party of China* passed at the 16th C.P.C. National Congress indicated that 'the C.P.C.'s task is to develop a national economy according to the stated plan, realize rapid national industrialization, implement systematic technical reform of the national economy, and develop strong modernized industry, agriculture, transport and national defense.

⁸Zhou Enlai: *Primary Task of Developing the National Economy, December 21, 1964*, Zhou Enlai's *Selected Works, Volume II*, P. 439, Beijing, People's Publishing House, November, 1984.

⁹Zhou Enlai: *Marching Towards the Grand Objective of Four Modernizations*, January 13, 1975, Zhou Enlai's *Selected Works, Volume II*, P. 479, Beijing, People's Publishing House, November 1984.

¹⁰Jiang Zemin: *Comprehensively Build a Moderately Prosperous Society, and Initiate a New Pattern of Socialist Causes with Chinese Characteristics—Report from the 16th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee*, November 8, 2002.

¹¹Hu Jintao: *Making Progress along Socialist Road with Chinese Characteristics and Striving For Comprehensive Achievement of a Well-off Society—Report from the 18th C.P.C. National Congress*, November 8, 2012.

modernization, and then to various other kinds with comprehensive coordination. From this perspective, **China's 'Five in One' modernization has surpassed its Western equivalent, marked by economic and material modernization. It provides an important basis for national innovation and all-round modernization.**¹²

3.2 Modernization of State Governance

In his speech about *The Spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the C.P.C.* Xi Jinping claimed that **'state governance is the system of governing the state under the leadership of the Party, including the systems, mechanisms, laws and regulations in various fields such as economy, politics, culture, society, ecological civilization and Party construction. It is a set of state systems that are closely linked and coordinated'**.¹³

The leadership of the party is the most important feature of state governance, but has been variously regarded by Western political scholars as a party-state system, a dictatorship and a one-party ruling. For example, the Economist Intelligence Unit in Britain compiles a 'democracy index', with scores ranging between 0 and 10. China ranks 142nd among 167 countries in the world, with a score of three points, making it a 'dictatorship'. There are two reasons for this, namely that China has a socialist system, which is in its turn a one-party system. However, the leadership of the Communist Party of China is the key to China's system innovation. The state governance system was established on the occasion of the founding of New China and on the basis of China's staying at the very low development level typical of a traditional agricultural society. National coverage was quickly realized, followed by the gradual formation of a unique and very efficient system of modern state governance. This was strongly related to the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and greatly accelerated the modernization of China's state governance system. The Communist Party of China has always been a study-oriented party, focusing on innovation.

In *China's State Capacity Report* of 1993, Wang Shaoguang and I **defined state capacity as the power of the state (central government) to translate its own will and goals into reality**. State capacity includes four categories: financing, macroeconomic regulation and control, legalization, and coercion.¹⁴ **It is the actual capacity of achieving the goals of state governance**. The following points must be emphasized:

¹²Hu Angang: *Chinese Road and Chinese Dream*, PP. 89–90, Hangzhou, Zhejiang People's Publishing House, 2013.

¹³*People's Daily*, January 1, 2014.

¹⁴Wang Shaoguang, Hu Angang: *A Study of China's State Capacity*, P. 2, Liaoning People's Publishing House, 1993.

1. **Diversification of state governance goals.** Different countries have differing goals, and a single country can have differing governance goals in specific stages or periods. This means that state governance ability is state goal orientation. **No clear state goal means disorderly governance, and an incorrect state goal means wrong governance.** China has a ‘three-step’ strategy for socialist modernization, and a ‘five-year planning’ for the national economy and social development. It also conducts special planning for national medium- and long-term development, so even if there is a succession of a new leading group from the old, the continuity of governance goals can be maintained. It is not about the president’s personal goals and political commitments. In America, by contrast, the inaugural address and the state of the union address will change with every president.
2. **Actual capacity of state governance, i.e. achievement of state goals as scheduled.** This relies on the method of goal congruence to conduct quantitative inspection of state governance performance. China has achieved the first and second steps of its ‘three-step’ strategy in the last 20 years of the 20th century, and met the goal of first-decade planning after entering the 21st century. The successful completion of the Tenth Five-year Plan and the Eleventh Five-year Plan proved that China’s state governance capacity is high.
3. **Governance capacity to use the state system.** Xi Jinping said that ‘**state governance capacity is the ability to use the state system to govern affairs in various aspects of society.**¹⁵ **No state system means that there is no basis for state governance. Effective governance of the state does not rely on the President’s personal ability, but on a large number of leaders and collectives in the governance of the state, the Party and the army in China, and using a set of state systems to govern various affairs of the state jointly.’**

Xi also believes that **the state governance system and governance capacity are a concentrated reflection of the system and performance of a state, as a complement to each other.** Thus, how can an objective and overall evaluation of China’s state governance system and governance capacity be made? Xi claims that **the state governance system and governance capacity are generally good, possessing a unique advantage, and adapting to China’s national conditions and development requirements. At the same time, there is room for improvement in the state governance system and governance capacity.** Focus must be placed on enhancing the Party’s governing capacity, improving ideology, policy, and cultural potency of cadres at various levels, and on administrating various aspects as soon as possible. We must improve the capacity of the Party, state organs, enterprises and public institutions, as well as people’s organizations and social groups.¹⁶ This evaluation seeks to glean the truth from facts, not only

¹⁵*People’s Daily*, January 1, 2014.

¹⁶*People’s Daily*, Beijing, February 17, 2014.

conforming to the theory of dividing one into two,¹⁷ but also meeting the theory of main and minor aspects. Everything has two sides, so any system will have both advantages and disadvantages, strengths and weaknesses, and benefits and costs. The two poles are not always opposite; they can be unified, and can conduct mutual conversion under certain conditions. Everything has two different aspects, but they are not equal. As long as the benefits outweigh the costs, the main aspects are more significant than the minor ones, and progress is better than regression, making the system feasible, effective and practical. Such a system must be home-grown, rooted in its own history, and must conduct trial and error and adaptability. This is the reason why the Western democratic system introduced by many late developing countries collapsed.

Modernization of the state governance system and governance capacity is the modernization of the state system, i.e. the process of changing the system and the law as modern political. The state system must be better, more mature and more stable, across a set of political, economic, social, cultural, ecological environment systems. Under this system, performance can be more effective, more transparent and more fair, covering a variety of political, economic, social, cultural, ecological, scientific and technological means. Each complements the other, and together constitute an organic whole. **If there is a system but no capacity, the system is nominal; if there is capacity but no system, then the capacity will be abused. Execution capacity is constantly enhanced under the system, and the system is improved during the execution.**

From the perspective of market economy, there are transaction expenses and costs, necessitating various transaction rules, contracts, organizations and system arrangements. An effective market economy seeks to reduce transaction expenses. This is why various forms of ownership enterprises will arise. As an effective microeconomic organization, the modern enterprise system will survive and develop in a fully competitive market environment. Also, from the perspective of the state governance, there are governance expenses and governance costs, and **an effective state system arrangement seeks to continuously reduce them.** Therefore, **state system modernization is essentially designed to reduce governance costs and increase benefits.** Modernization of the state economy system will greatly decrease the transaction costs of various economic activities, and break down the barriers formed in a unified national market. The scale effect will promote economic growth. **From the perspective of international competition, state competition occurs between state governance and governance capacity.**

¹⁷**Mao Zedong pointed out that to divide one into two is a common phenomenon, known as a 'dialectic'.** Mao Zedong: *Dialectics of Party Unity, Mao Zedong's Selected Works*, Volume 5, P. 498. On November 8, 1963, when revising and modifying Zhou Yang's address to the Fourth Expansion Conference of the Committee of the Academic Division of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Mao Zedong pointed out that **everything in the world is divided into two.** This is true of theories. Science and scientific history explain such opposition and unification. *A Chronicle of Mao Zedong's Life (1949-1976)*, Volume 5, P. 278, Central Party Literature Press, 2013.

State governance and market governance are also relevant. Effective market governance will promote state governance, and vice versa, especially when establishing a unified, competitive and efficient market system. Therefore, China must not only establish a modern enterprise system, market system and contract system from the microeconomic angle, but also establish a state governance system and means of governance from the macroeconomic perspective. That is why both an efficient invisible market and government are needed, to reduce market transaction costs and state governance cost. This would maximize the microeconomic and macroeconomic benefits alike.

The goal of state governance is the same as social governance, namely to reduce both the social governance costs of the state and the social management costs at the grassroots, while maximizing both the microeconomic and macroeconomic benefits.

As for the measuring of state governance performance, the think-tank at Tsinghua University has been exploring a method of research and practice using independent third-party evaluation and professional assessment. We were commissioned by the Ministry of Finance in 2003 to conduct a third-party assessment on a project in which the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and other international financial organizations had made loans to China. We later published *Aid and Development—Performance Evaluation on International Financial Organizations Loaning to China (1981–2002)* through Tsinghua University Press in 2005, in which we praised the assessment. From the point of international comparison, the amount of international aid and loan per capita accepted by China are the lowest among developing countries, but China's development and poverty reduction is the strongest.

In 2005, we took the role of the third party and conducted an assessment on the implementation of the goals of the Tenth Five-year Plan. This received attention from leading figures in the State Council. The *Program Planning of the State's Eleventh Five-year Plan* stipulated that mid-stage assessment on the implementation of the plan should be conducted in the intermediate stage. A mid-stage assessment report was to be submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for deliberation.

In 2008, we paired up with the Development Research Center of the State Council and the World Bank Office, Beijing to work on a project for the National Development and Reform Commission, conducting the mid-stage assessment for the Eleventh Five-year Plan.

In February 2011, I made a special assessment of the Eleventh Five-year Plan. Among 22 major indicators for national economy and social development, 19 achieved their planning goals on schedule, with a score of 86 points.

In July 2013, we conducted a mid-stage assessment of the Twelfth Five-year Plan. We concluded that the method of economic development had changed quickly, creating a new situation for scientific development. The overall implementation of the *Outline* was progressing smoothly, with six goals out of seven achieved, and three-quarters of the 28 main indicators completed, many ahead of schedule.

In September 2013, we conducted a retrospective assessment of ten years (2003–2012) of China’s economic reform. We acknowledged the significant progress obtained in the overall goal of establishing a perfect socialist market economy and a vigorous and open economic system proposed by the 16th C.P.C. National Congress and planned by the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the C.P.C. The main tasks were basically completed, with a completion rate of 89.7%, and an incompleteness rate of only 10.3%.

Therefore, the actual performance of the state governance is quantifiable and measurable, and can be assessed and improved. **This presents a learning curve along the path of goal setting: implementation of plans, mid-stage assessment, strengthening implementation, retrospective assessment, moving in circles, and making continuous improvement and progress. In this sense, state governance is both a theoretical and a practical problem, which provides specific guidance on how to improve performance.**

3.3 Modernization of the State Governance’s Capacities

Xi Jinping’s *Speech* focused on the modernization of the state governance system and governance capacity. The latter has three aspects. **The first is the capacity of the state agency to fulfill its responsibilities.** It is well known that China’s state agency is something of a special case. Unlike the three-level structure of most of the great powers in the world, it has five levels.¹⁸ The function of the organization at the various levels was divided and conducted according to China’s specific conditions.

The second is the capacity of the masses to administer state, economic, social, cultural and personal affairs according to the law. This includes how the deputy to the National People’s Congress participates in state affairs, and the effective provision of national public goods all the way down to the grass roots. In a country with more than a billion people, governance on this scale is unprecedented anywhere in the world.

The third is the capacity to use socialism with Chinese characteristics to govern the state effectively. The basic economic, political and social systems of a socialist country provide a good platform for state governance, and offer the possibility of prioritizing socialism. Changing this possibility into reality may require an improvement of the capacity of state governance.

Xi Jinping spoke of **three governances** with Chinese characteristics. While other countries have state governance and social management, China benefits from the addition of a ruling Party to its arsenal.

¹⁸China’s administrative regions and management are divided into central, provincial (34), city (333), prefecture (2852) and township levels (40, 446). Prepared by NBS: *China Statistical Abstract 2013*, PP. 1–2, Beijing, China Statistics Press, 2013.

The first is the governance of the Party. The Communist Party of China conducts the governance of the ruling party (hereinafter referred to as the Party's governance), which is different from other countries. The Communist Party of China was established in 1921. After 28 years of civil war, it established a complete organizational system. With the establishment of New China in 1949, it also developed a complete management system. This has been regarded as a one-party dictatorship by Western countries, ignoring the essential characteristics of system innovation and greatly underestimating the unique advantages.

The second is governance of a socialist state, which is distinct from capitalist state governance in that the basic system of the state, the state governance system, and the means of state governance are all different. It is possible to make a detailed comparison between the governances of China and the European Union (27 countries), and between China and the United States in the past decade (2000–2012) to further explain why China's method can be viewed as superior to both,¹⁹ especially in tackling major issues like the global financial crisis.

The third is governance of a socialist society. China is a modern civil society in general sense (based on various rights conferred by the *Constitution*), as well as a typical people's society in the Chinese sense. Thus, its social governance stretches beyond the Western meaning of the term. It is social governance with the people as the main body. People are the masters of society and of their own affairs, participating in governance of the community, grassroots, local matters (such as the local National People's Congress), and the state (such as the National People's Congress) according to the law.

China also participates in both regional and global governance. As early as 2004, China overtook Japan to become the major Asian trading entity, dominating the trade and economic integration of the region. In 2010, it replaced Japan as Asia's most prominent economic entity, becoming the locus of East Asian rejuvenation. It has played a leading role in regional governance, providing significant public products for the region. China is one of the five permanent member states of the United Nations, the world's second largest economic entity; it is the world's largest trading entity in terms of goods, the world's largest energy producer and consumer, and the country with the highest greenhouse gas and carbon dioxide emissions in the world. China plays an important role in global governance. In fact, since 1978, China's opening to the outside world has engendered regionalization, internationalization and globalization. The 21st century started with 'Sinicization'. China has actively participated in global governance worldwide, and provided the world with an increasing number of global public goods. It ranks third in its share of

¹⁹See Chap. VIII of *Comparison and Analysis of China's and Europe's Governance Performance*.

the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), representing the emerging economies of the south, and playing an important role in global macroeconomic stability.²⁰

The status of China's state governance has had a direct impact on the governance of the Asian region and the world at large. A recent example is China's role (i.e., positive energy and externality) in solving the global financial crisis after 2008. The world economy experienced negative growth in 2009. China responded by issuing a policy that stimulated domestic demand and boosting trade with a view to saving the global economy.

Xi Jinping strives to achieve institutionalization, standardization and routinization of various affairs in the governance of the Party, the state and society,²¹ which can be viewed as the 'three evolutions'. Herein, the innovation of China's state governance has transcended the concept and practice of democracy and state governance espoused by the Western.

In a report on the national conditions of the *16th C.P.C. National Congress and Trend of China* in June, 2002, I put forward the proposition of institutionalization, standardization and routinization of the socialist democracy and the leadership system of the Party and the state. This included an explanation of two of 'three evolutions'. It is a method based on the current situation. The evolution of the Party's leadership system is based on the *Constitution of the Communist Party of China*, as is the evolution of the state's leadership system, bringing both the inner-party and the state democratic system in line with its tenets, and playing an active role in the political life of the Party and the state.

The second 'evolution' is the statutory modification and supplementation of the current game rule based on legal procedures, conferring advantages onto the realization of an evolved leadership system of the Party and the state. It is consistent with the consideration of the Party Central Committee, and was introduced by Jiang Zemin in the *Letter to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C.* on September 1, 2004, before the 16th C.P.C. National Congress. It was designed to promote lasting political stability in the Party and state, and create a workable

²⁰Based on the voting right reform scheme passed at the IMF/World Bank Spring Meetings on April 25, 2010, the voting rights of developing countries in World Bank increased by 3.13% to reach 47.19%. The newly adjusted voting right is mainly transferred to emerging and transition economies, and China saw the most significant increase in voting right from 2.77 to 4.42%, becoming the third largest shareholder of the World Bank after the U.S.A. and Japan. On November 6, 2010, the executive director of the IMF implemented the reform scheme, and China's share was planned to rise from 4 to 6.39%.

After the global financial crisis, a joke spread in Beijing international institutes: in 1949, only socialism could save China; in 1979, only capitalism could save it; in 1989, only China could save socialism; in 2009, only China could save capitalism. Jonathan Watts, 2010. *When a Billion Chinese Jump: How China Will Save Mankind—Or Destroy It*, Faber and Faber Limited, Bloomsbury House, PP. 383.

²¹*People's Daily*, Beijing, February 17, 2014.

succession for new senior leaders.²² Later, after the Fourth Plenary Session of the *16th Central Committee of the C.P.C.* and the *Second Session of 10th National People's Congress of the C.P.C.*, Jiang resigned as chairman of the Central Military Commission.

Over the past decade or more, the 'three evolutions' in the succession of new leaders of the Party and the state saw major progress, which was marked by the 18th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Xi Jinping took the roles of General Secretary of the C.P.C. Central Committee and Chair of the Central Military Commission,²³ auguring a new stage for the 'three evolutions'.

China needs these 'three evolutions' of its three governances primarily to reduce costs and increase benefits. Because China is a continental country with a vast landmass and population (1.35–1 billion more than that of the United States at 310 million, and 800 million more than the 27 countries of the E.U., at 500 million), as well as a huge state system (China has a five-level government, while the United States has three levels, and the E.U. four), and a large ruling party (the Communist Party of China has 85 million members, while the Democratic Party of the United States has more than 43 million members and the Republican Party more than 30 million party). Thus, in making innovations within the unique state governance system and means, China can create efficient governance, with order, sustainable development, social progress, cultural prosperity, and lasting political stability.

The key aspect of the 'three evolutions' is '-ization', which implies a lengthy process of development, evolution, and constant adaptation. This must be synchronized with an evolution in the modernization of the 'Five in One' overall layout of Chinese socialism if it is to move with the times.

3.4 Modernization of the State Governance System

China has lagged behind in the process of worldwide modernization, lacking the many centuries of Western capitalist countries. It would be impossible simply to transplant a modern Western state system. China required a state system all of its own, creating the prerequisite for industrialization, urbanization and modernization from an extremely low starting point. Mao Zedong said in March 1949 that 'We are good at destroying the old world, and also at building a new world'.²⁴ This 'new world' was New China.

Under Mao's leadership, China realized the transition from old to new, from traditional to modern, and from disintegration to unification, with a centralization of

²²Jiang Zemin: *A Letter to the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee*, September 1, 2004, *Jiang Zemin's Selected Works*, Volume 3, P. 600, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 2006.

²³Hu Angang: *Chinese Road and Chinese Dream*, Version III, *How to Realize the Succession of New Leaders to Old Leaders*, Zhejiang People's Publishing House, 2013.

²⁴Mao Zedong: *Report on the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh C.P.C. Central Committee*, *Mao Zedong's Selected Works*, Volume 4, P. 1439, People's Publishing House, 1991.

power. This was something that neither the Beiyang Government (1912–1928) nor Chiang Kai-shek’s Government (1928–1949) had been able to achieve, leading to the sharp decline of the first half of the 20th century. Mao Zedong created a new system for the ruling party, laid out in the *Constitution of the Communist Party of China* made at the *Eighth C.P.C. National Congress*. This established the Party’s leadership system, and strengthened inner-party democratic centralism, as laid out in the *Common Programme* in 1949 and the *Constitution of the People’s Republic of China* in 1954. It called for a ‘people’s dictatorship’ based on the philosophy of a people’s democracy, a people’s congress system, a political consultation system with multi-party participation and cooperation based on deliberative democracy, a unitary state structure based on diversity in unity, and a system of national regional autonomy under this system framework, as well as centralization and unification, and local level-to-level administration based on initiatives coming from two sources.

Under the leadership of the Communist Party, China has become a driving force in industrialization, urbanization and modernization. Relying on its highly-centralized planned economy, it has mobilized and deployed limited social resources. With help from the Soviet Union, its first Five-Year Plan was successfully completed, ending many centuries of decline and auguring an era of economic takeoff. The annual average growth rate of the G.D.P. (purchasing power parity, dollar price in 1990) reached 9.2%, and the industrial output growth rate approached 20%. The proportion of China’s economic aggregate (G.D.P., purchasing power parity, dollar price in 1990) accounting for the world total increased from 4.6% in 1950 to 5.5%; during the same period, the average annual growth rate of India’s G.D.P. was 3.2%, and the proportion accounting for the world total fell from 4.2% in 1950 to 3.7%.²⁵ China’s growth has trumped India—a nation that adopted Western (mainly British) capitalism. India won independence in 1947 and became a modern nation state, but its basic political system was not created independently. It was imposed by Britain after the fall of colonialism. India has a British-style parliament, defining its regime as parliamentary democracy. It is a federal state that implements a political system governed by the ‘separation of three powers’—namely legislative, administrative and judicial. Its presidential system is only nominal and pro forma. It is a symbol of national unity, but the actual running of the prime cabinet system is very similar to Britain’s political model. However, unlike Britain’s multi-party system, India’s is split into more than 700 across the country. The Congress Party at the central level conducts long-term ruling, while diversified form is adopted at the local level.²⁶

After a set of state systems was established during the Mao years, Mao himself met a paradox wherein the state agency and state functionaries (so-called party and government cadres) were the mouthpiece of service personnel and civil servants—

²⁵Angus Maddison, *Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD*.

²⁶Li Yunxia: *A Comparative Study of Modernization Between China and India*, Social Sciences Academic Press (China), PP. 243–251.

variously dubbed the ‘plundering hand’ and ‘the people’s master’. In order to prevent the latter from rising up and breaking away from the masses in terms of bureaucracy and officialdom, Mao launched a series of political campaigns to restrict and purge. He failed to solve the problem, so personally initiated and led the Cultural Revolution. He mobilized students and Red Guards to criticize powerful groups within the party that wanted to embrace capitalism. Rightism was the enemy. Mao’s aim was to avoid all-out civil war, resulting instead in a decade-long purge that ended the ‘old ways’ once and for all.²⁷ This serves as a cautionary lesson for later generations in exploring modernization of the state system.

Xi Jinping claims that since Reform and Opening, **the Party has viewed state governance from a fresh perspective. He emphasizes that the stability of the leadership and organizational systems are therefore a fundamental issue.**²⁸ In exploring this matter, it is useful to look back at Deng Xiaoping’s rationale in pushing for Reform and Opening.

Deng made a speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. in 1980, in which he spoke of the *Reform of the Leadership System of the Party and the State*. A good system can allow a bad man to run amok, but a bad system can render a good man unable to do good deed, and even turn bad himself. Deng believed that many Party and state systems were still defective, jeopardizing the success of the socialist system.²⁹ Based on the profound lessons of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping began to reestablish the basic leadership and organizational systems of the Party and the state. He conducted a reform of the political system to eliminate defects, shoring up the structure of the socialist system.

Deng was highly politically conscious. He warned against copying Western political systems from the beginning, based on China’s national conditions. He learned from the successes of the Mao years (such as the compiling of the *Constitution of the Communist Party of China* in 1956, and the *Constitution of the People’s Republic of China* in 1954), as well as from his mistakes (such as the ‘Cultural Revolution’) in order to forge a new system. With these positive and negative examples as a guide, modernization of the state system began with system reconstruction and reform.

First, a ruling party system was constructed. The revision of the Party constitution in 1982 was a symbol of the institutionalization of the Communist Party of China, beginning an era of constitutional governance. Major meetings focused on institutionalization, and important decisions were made. The rules governing the leaders of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. were perfected, collective work and decision-making were continued, and central leaders

²⁷See details in Hu Angang’s *Theory on China’s Political and Economic History (1949–1976)*, Tsinghua University Press, 2007.

²⁸*People’s Daily*, Beijing, February 17, 2014.

²⁹Deng Xiaoping: *Reform of the Party and State Leading Systems, Deng Xiaoping’s Selected Works*, Volume 23, PP. 327, 333, Beijing, People’s Publishing House, 1994.

had to be more revolutionary, younger and more knowledgeable. The succession of new from old was accelerated, and collective handover and takeover was achieved.

Second, a modern state system was constructed. The *Constitution* revised in 1982 called for a rule of law. The role of the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee was strengthened to become the core of the Chinese political system.

The political consultation system was likewise strengthened. The *Constitution of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference* compiled in 1982 augured the institutionalization of a deliberative democracy. A system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the Communist Party of China will exist and develop for a long time in accordance with the Constitution; the *Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference* forms a patriotic united front—an important locus for multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, carries forward the ideals of a socialist democracy in China's political life. It is not a 'bicameral system', but a framework of political consultation; it is not a one-party state, but a multi-party cooperation system. A party is not chosen out of power and opposition, but out of participation. There is no freedom to express an opinion, only to conduct investigations and offer advice and suggestions.

A system of national regional autonomy was constructed, and has been in place since the founding of New China. The *Law on National Regional Autonomy of the People's Republic of China* was formulated in 1984 in accordance with the *Constitution*, and is the basic law of implementing the system of ethnic regional autonomy stipulated therein. National regional autonomy is an important political system for ethnic minority areas. Autonomous organizations were established in national autonomous areas, to exercise the function, power and regional right of autonomy of local state organs in accordance with the provisions of the constitutional law. This is autonomous local government with Chinese characteristics, and with dual nature. It is supreme authority of minority autonomy, with its location as the capital government, and is local administrative authority under the leadership of the central government. It accepts the unified leadership of the central government while maintaining the higher right of autonomy.

Finally, primary-level self-governance was implemented. Village and neighborhood committees were written into the *Constitution* in 1982, with specific provisions for their status, tasks and organizational principles. This is the most effective and extensive way for people to exercise their democratic rights. It is a good method of managing grassroots public affairs and public welfare undertakings, conducting self-management, self-service, self-education and self-supervision, all while allowing people to be the masters of their own affairs according to the law.

During Deng Xiaoping's years, China has built a relatively complete system for its ruling party, as well as a relatively complete modern state system, including one fundamental political system and three basic political systems. In a speech he made on July 1, 2011, Hu Jintao said that the people's congress system was the fundamental political system of the Communist Party of China, as well as a multi-party cooperation and political consultation system under its leadership. The systems of

national regional autonomy and primary-level self-governance are the basic political system.³⁰

If Mao Zedong was the father of the Chinese state system, then Deng Xiaoping was his successor. The creation of China's modern state system has been a long process, with many stages.

In the light of democratization, liberalization and privatization promoted by the West, socialist countries face two different possibilities for reform. One is adhering to socialism—the choice of Deng Xiaoping. When Deng considered the relationship between China's political system reform and the socialist system in 1987, he settled on the general goal of political reform. His task was first to consolidate the socialist system, then to develop productive socialist forces, and finally to convince the people to enter a socialist democracy.³¹ **This shows that political system reform requires overall reform of the socialist system, as well as developing productive socialist forces and creating a socialist democracy. This enabled China to overcome the political turmoil of 1989.**

Gorbachev chose differently. In the name of political reform, he moved away from Marxism, socialism, and the fundamental interests of the Soviet people under the guise of new thinking. He announced the dissolution of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the name of the general secretary, leading to the collapse of the USSR.

In 1992, Deng predicted that in 30 years, a complete set of more mature and more stable comprehensive systems would be established.³² This was a visionary strategy of state system construction. Based on this idea, the *Decisions* of the Third Plenary Sessions of the 14th, 16th and 18th Central Committees of the C.P.C. specified a new top-level design for China's state system construction and reform. His goal was achieved, and it looks likely that his target for 2022 will also be reached.

China's Reform and Opening relied on constant reconstruction of the state system. Figuratively speaking, it was a process of modernization. If there is no modernization of the state system, there will be no national economic modernization, and the great achievements of socialist modernization will not be obtained.

Why does a state system need modernization? How can it be explained from a political and economic angle? What is the theoretical basis of system modernization?

In 1949, Zhang Peigang discussed the effect of the system on industrialization in the book *Agriculture and Industrialization*. He pointed out that a social system is actually the ownership distribution of factors related to production of people and

³⁰Hu Jintao: *Address at the Conference Celebrating the 90th Anniversary of the Founding of the C.P.C.*, July 1, 2011.

³¹Deng Xiaoping: *Conversation with Wojciech Jaruzelski, the First Secretary of the Polish United Worker's Party Central Committee and President of the Council of the State*, September 29, 1986, *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume 3, P. 178, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1993.

³²Deng Xiaoping remarked 'after thirty years, we will have a complete set of more mature and shaped systems in all aspects. The principles and policies to be applied under each system will also be more firmly established'. *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume 3, P. 372, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1993.

things. It is both a motivating and limiting factor.³³ Later, he divided the motivating factors into three aspects: entrepreneurial spirit of innovation, technological progress, and system innovation. He believed that the easiest way to change and impact social and economic development was system arrangement involved in various rules of economic operation, such as the market, enterprise, and credit systems. The constitutional order and normative code of conduct provide the environment for general system arrangement. Constitutional order forms the demand attraction for the innovation of a new system arrangement, and also provides new system supply; its transition or innovation will fundamentally change the economic and social development and the industrialization process.³⁴

The system can be regarded as an important intangible modern element, making it an important motivating factor and driving force for modernization. System construction and reform are innovations in themselves, which can explain why reform is the strongest force in economic development and social progress. If there is no innovation, there will be no modernization; the process of modernization reflects system innovation. The players in a microcosmic market and enterprise systems are entrepreneurs and investors, and the subjects of macroscopic state and economic systems are the government and politicians. Since both the microcosmic and macroscopic systems have relevance, complementarity and mutual dependence, success requires cooperation between enterprises and the government, and between entrepreneurs and politicians. Thus, China's reform must adopt a mode and methodology combining bottom-up and top-down innovation.

3.5 Non-western Modernization of China's State Governance

Many people believe that the concept of state governance comes from the West, and see the process of modernization as one of Westernization. However, modernization is not the same as Westernization, nor is **modernization of state governance**. Moreover, the Westernization of non-Western does not automatically make them into Western countries, as proven by the Arab Spring. Any attempts to Westernize China's state governance may plunge the nation back into the turmoil of the early 20th century.

Xi Jinping stressed that **the kind of governance system a country chooses is decided by its historical inheritance, cultural traditions, and the level of economic and social development. It is the decision of the people.** The state governance system in China today is the result of long-term development, gradual

³³Zhang Peigang: *Agriculture and Industrialization*, English version, 1949; Chinese version, Huazhong University of Science and Technology Press, 1984.

³⁴Zhang Peigang: *New Development Economics*, (revised and enlarged edition), PP. 127, 145, Henan Peoples' Publishing House, 2001.

improvement and endogenous evolution on the basis of its legacy and current status.³⁵

Compared with capitalist countries and regions like the United States and the European Union, state governance means something different in China.

Firstly, the historical origin of state governance is not the same, especially in terms of modernization. China's attempts to imitate Western systems, such as British constitutional monarchy, the American presidential system, and the European parliamentary system all failed, leading to the rise of the Kuomintang. The Communist Party of China chose what has variously been known as a 'people's democratic dictatorship', a 'people's democratic society', a 'people's republic' and a 'people's government'—i.e. socialism.

China today is a result of the endogenous evolution of Old China (1840–1949) and New China (after 1949), but not exogenous transplantation. This determines that its governance system is much more Chinese, based on historical inheritance, cultural tradition, and the lessons of history.

Secondly, the basic system of state governance is different. The United States and European Union are typical capitalist systems, while China is an innovative socialist system. This is determined by the various levels of economic and social development. Of course, the time of establishment is a consideration. China was a latecomer of modernization. Latecomers usually have two choices, one of which is blind copying—following the example of their forerunners. The Chinese saying goes: 'An orange grown in Huainan (south of the Huai River) is called a tangerine, while an orange grown in Huaibei (north of the Huai River) is called a trifoliolate orange. Despite having the same leaves, the two oranges taste different'. The other is the self-conscious learning and reference, and independent innovation. On the one hand, a nation can make use of the advantages of being a late developer, learning from the experience of leading countries and avoiding detours. This is known as the 'system learning'. On the other hand, new system arrangements must be innovated. To this end, the American economist Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) pointed out that one of the six features of economically backward countries is that the further behind a country's economy lags, the greater the effect is of special system factors on increasing capital supply of the new industrial departments.³⁶ However, Gerschenkron does not say which kind of arrangement the special system belongs to.

Mao Zedong and others chose a new kind of system—one that was democratic and socialist at heart. Deng Xiaoping and others were more self-conscious, conducting Reform and Opening, and seeking to improve the socialist system. This meant that China, as a late-developing country, was able quickly and successfully to catch up with leading nations and regions

³⁵*People's Daily*, Beijing, February 17, 2014.

³⁶This indicates that economically backward countries need to make special institutional arrangements to address their backwardness, and must find a way to realize this objective. See detailed analysis in Alexander Gerschenkron's *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*, Chinese version, The Commercial Press, 2009.

(particularly the United States and the European Union). China's system is younger, more dynamic and more revolutionary than America's, which is older, more stable and more conservative. Comparing constitutions, America's was ratified more than a hundred years earlier than China's, but the latter has been amended more frequently, showing its flexibility, adaptability and innovation. This suggests that **only a good system needs constant reform, adjustment, and flexibility in the face of moderate system transition. China conforms to the historical logic of such transition.**

Also different are the state governance agency and governance patterns. The United States adopts the typical governance pattern of separating and counterbalancing the three powers, but it also has veto mechanisms. The President's bill can be vetoed by Congress; in Congress, a Democratic Party bill can be vetoed by the Republican Party, and vice versa. All agencies and parties confront, attack, and counteract each other. As described by President Obama, if Washington is divided, it will accomplish nothing.³⁷ China makes governmental innovations with the super state agency (the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C.) and multiple state agencies (the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the State President, the State Council, the National People's Congress, the National Political Consultative Conference, and the Central Military Commission). The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. plays the core leadership role of grasping the overall situation and coordinating all parties; it adheres to the principle of democratic centralism in collective leadership, as well as democratic centralism, individual consultations, and decision by meetings.

Deng Xiaoping proposed a major policy for the State Council and the National People's Congress, calling for the responsible party member to submit issues to the Party Central Committee for discussion, then consult with numerous parties after discussion and decision, and carry out the principle of collective leadership.³⁸ **This creates a very particular and effective mechanism for decision-making within state governance. It is a mechanism of shared governance,** in which the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. represents different state agencies, and makes decisions according to the principle of democratic centralism. **It is also a mechanism of divided governance.** According to the decision of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C., each state agency conducts governance separately according to the division of labor. **It is a mechanism of coordinated governance,** inasmuch as the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. coordinates all state agencies, and conducts coordinated governance. **Lastly it is a mechanism of joint governance** among various state

³⁷Obama's *State of the Union* address, January 24, 2012, White House Office of the Press Secretary.

³⁸Hu Angang: *China's Collective Leadership System*, China Renmin University Press, Beijing, 2013.

agencies. Similarly, party committees and organizations at all levels conduct local governance in accordance with the above-mentioned governance patterns and mechanisms, thus forming common and effective local governance.

The main mechanism and basic means of state governance are different. The United States and the European Union are capitalist market economies based on private ownership, while China is a socialist market economy based on the basic system of public and non-public ownership. China has adopted a governance mechanism with dual tactics instead of just one. Both tactics are solid, allowing the market play a decisive role in the allocation of resources, and in the government. China has a strong national defense and military strategy, as well as a comprehensive strategy for economic and social development. The United States has the former but not the latter. It focuses only on the cannon, with military expenditure accounting for 40% of the world's total. It conducts the excessive military expansion around the world, which is an important factor in global decline.³⁹ China has adopted the Soviet model of five-year planning for development and reform, and has a special national development plan. The United States focuses more energy on national defense and military.⁴⁰ International comparison can offer important lessons on how best to move ahead.

The basic goals of the state governance systems are also different. Those of the United States and the European Union have no clear long-term goal, neither for their constitution nor their administrative program. China is very different. Firstly, the *Constitution of the Communist Party of China* clearly presents a long-term goal. The 2012 version claims that one hundred years after the founding the Party, a high-level prosperous society benefiting more than one billion people will have been built. A century on from the founding of New China, the per capita gross domestic product will reach the level of moderately developed countries, with modernization basically realized. China's national *Constitution* also presents a long-term goal. The 2004 version calls for a gradual modernization of industry, agriculture, national defense, and science and technology, and promotes the coordinated development of a material, political and spiritual civilization with a view to creating a prosperous, strong, democratic and civilized socialist country. Again, Xi Jinping's speech expressed the basic goal of establishing a state governance system, **for the development of the Party and the state, for the people's benefit, for social harmony and stability, and for the state's lasting political stability.** Therefore, both the state governance system and the means of governance are crucial to achieving the above goal.

³⁹See details in *Why does the U.S.A. Descend? Report on the National Situation*, Issue 21 of 2013, May 16.

⁴⁰Hu Angang: *Chinese Contribution is a Blessing for the World*, *People's Daily* (Overseas Edition), March 8, 2013.

China's unique history, cultural traditions, national conditions paved the way for the formation of the Communist Party and the selection of socialism as the guiding ideology.⁴¹

3.6 Summary: Major Tasks for the Future

China is the world's largest developing country. Over the course of 60 years, it has created a unique modern state governance system and means of governance, quickly narrowing its economical gap with developed countries, and achieving remarkable social change and progress. However, this does not mean that China's state governance system and means of governance are perfect. Xi Jinping believes that the state governance system needs to be improved and perfected, with a firm view of how to change and improve.⁴²

Understanding this requires a basic knowledge of what is known as system consciousness and system confidence. The former is established based on the latter. **An example of confidence in a system is when people believe that socialism is superior capitalism, or vice versa.** Mao Zedong believed that the establishment of a socialist system would open the path to an ideal state.⁴³ This was a form of system confidence. **System consciousness is when people see China's state governance system and means of governance as imperfect. Indeed, the socialist system is not perfect and has many defects, and man unsatisfactory aspects will appear in the development process.** Socialist society has never been a pure and perfect utopia. In fact, as early as 1956, Mao Zedong pointed out that **'we shall not blindly believe that everything in socialist country is good'**. Any society contains a mix of positive and negative attributes. The point of development is to emphasize the good and dispense with the bad. Mao admitted: 'we can't do everything well, or our offspring will have no work to do'.⁴⁴ Therefore, **system consciousness paves the way for system confidence with constant reform and improvement. It leads to a belief that under the conditions of a socialist society and system, the positives outweigh the negatives.**

As for how to constantly reform and improve the system of state governance, Xi Jinping advised that the **Chinese nation must incorporate elements of a diverse**

⁴¹Hu Angang, Wang Shaoguang, Zhou Jianming, Han Yuhai: *Man's World*, Beijing, China Renmin University Press, 2011.

⁴²*People's Daily*, Beijing, February 17, 2014.

⁴³Mao Zedong: *On Correctly Handling the Issue of Contradictions Among the People*, (February 27, 1957), *Mao Zedong's Collected Works*, Volume 7, P. 226, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1999.

⁴⁴*Mao Zedong's Selected Works*, Volume 7, P. 69, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1999.

nature, learning from other nations to form its own national characteristics. Without firm system confidence, there will be no impetus to comprehensively deepen reform. Likewise, without constant reform, system confidence will be short-lived and incomplete. A comprehensive deepening of reform is necessary to improve the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. System confidence does not mean a halt in progress, but a continued removal of the defects in systems and mechanisms.

After the founding of New China and the process of leading socialist modernization, Chinese communists established a basic system for a modern socialist country with Chinese characteristics. Along the way, serious mistakes were made. Mao Zedong's error was not in the system but in policy.⁴⁵ His ruling party system and socialist state structure conformed to China's national conditions, but the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution did not fit its economic and political conditions.

In 1991, it was publically announced at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the C.P.C. that the Party had to acknowledge and correct its mistakes, to prevent repeating the errors of the past. In the long term, the Party's mistakes and setbacks are only a temporary phenomenon, leading to a stronger and more successful state going forward.⁴⁶

After Reform and Opening, Deng Xiaoping reestablished the state system, and conducted bold reforms to eradicate defects. He created a forward-looking vision of thirty years of system construction, creating a foundation for later generations. Today, Xi Jinping's **task is to mature and stabilize the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and to provide a set of more complete, more stable and more effective systems for the development of the Party and the state.** The goals and directions of China's system construction and modernization are summed up by the 'four fors', which are the nation's core, fundamental, and long-term interests. This also defines the basic features and requirements of the system: to be more complete, more stable and more effective. Therefore, an overall effect can be formed in the modernization of the state governance system and its abilities.⁴⁷ It reflects the innovation and purpose of Chinese state governance both in theory and in practice.

In short, Xi's goals for China's state governance and administrative program has landmark significance, and is a symbol of China's entry into an era of modernization. Specifically, his *Speech* **highlights the wisdom of the Party and the country, and innovates a new concept of administering a nation. Socialism with**

⁴⁵Liu Zongyuan of the Tang Dynasty said in *Feudal Theory* that 'the Western Zhou Dynasty's failure lay in its patriarchal clan system, while the Qin Dynasty's failure lay in tyranny and not in the system of prefectures and counties'.

⁴⁶*Decisions on Several of the Party's Historic Issues Since the Founding of the P.R.C.* was passed in the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th C.P.C. Central Committee on June 27, 1981.

⁴⁷*People's Daily*, Beijing, February 17, 2014.

Chinese characteristics will continue apace. The originality of the theory transcends any Western equivalent, establishing a theoretical framework for Chinese state governance. The guidelines of the practice come from China's Reform and Opening, perfect and strengthening the system from its core.

Chapter 4

The Relationship Between the Government and the Market

4.1 A Significant Relationship and a Prominent Contradiction

The *Decision of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. on Comprehensively Deepening Reform of Several Major Issues* (hereinafter referred to as the *Decision*) made at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the C.P.C. put forward a series of major theoretical perspectives and practical guidelines for deepening economic reform, based around the decisive role of the market in the allocation of resources. This augured a new era in China's economic reform. Economic reform formed the basis of wider reforms. As Xi Jinping stated in the *Instructions on the Decision of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. on Comprehensively Deepening Reform of Several Major Issues* (hereinafter referred to as the *Instructions*), the core problem of economic reform was how to handle the relationship between the government and the market.¹ This was because the government and the market were two core means for China's development at the time. Both played their roles in various areas and levels. The visible hand of the government and the invisible hand of the market came to be known as the 'two hand' system. The relationship between them has had a major effect on China's economic development.

Their significance lies in understanding and giving play to the role of the government, and in building a benign interactive relationship between the government and the market in concrete practices and specific policies. It should be noted that the

This paper is the second manuscript of Hu Angang's *Interpretation of the C.P.C.'s Decision on Several Important Issues in Comprehensively Deepening Reform; Report on the National Situation*, Issue 1 of 2014.

¹Xi Jinping: *Explanation of the Decision of the C.P.C. on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform*, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, November 15, 2013.

relationship and the boundary between the government and the market is not rigid and unchangeable. It depends on the positioning of government function and market effect, and relies on the stage of national development. China's territory is vast, with great regional difference in terms of development, so any measures must suit the local conditions in considering the relationship between the government and the market.

In fact, since the founding of China, the government and the market have had a significant relationship based on a prominent contradiction. This has presented a problem for leaders in how to understand and how to handle a lengthy process using repeated trial and error. There have been major changes since Reform and Opening. During the exploration and practice of top-level design and 'looking before you leap', continuous innovations and improvements have been made to the socialist market economy.

4.2 Understanding the History

The first stage was to establish and plan the economy, and implement the first five-year plan from the founding of New China until 1978. Leaders were aware of the defects inherent in this system in practical terms. They reformed the planned economic system many times, and constantly adjusted the relationship between the plan and the market. The boundary between them was in a state of flux.

Before and after the founding of New China, Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and others stated that a new democratic economy would be a planned economy.² Mao objected to free trade and free competition.³ From October to December, 1948, Liu Shaoqi claimed that the new democratic economy was different from an ordinary capitalist economy, because a new democratic national economy had to be organized and planned to some extent. He believed that the entire national economic lifeline (industry, transport, large businesses and banks, credit agencies and foreign trade) ought to be grasped by the state in order to organize and plan the national economy. He also suggested limiting the scope of the plan.⁴ His vision was a mixed economic model with big plan and small market, in which great industry would spring from a planned economy, while small industry would comprise a market

²Dong Fureng (editor in chief), *Economic History of the P.R.C.* (I), PP. 228–229, Beijing, Economic Science Press, 1999.

³In a conference for the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee in January, 1949, Mao Zedong said: 'on the one hand, don't think that the new-democratic economy is not a planned economy, deviating from socialist development, nor free trade and free competition, and a march towards capitalism, which is extremely wrong...' On the other hand, we must be careful, prudent, and patient for socialization'. See Bo Yibo: *Review of Several Important Decisions and Events*, Volume I, P. 24, Beijing, Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C. Press, 1991.

⁴Liu Shaoqi's *Discussion about New Economic Construction in China*, P. 30, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 1993.

economy. The great and the small would complement each other. This economic model seemed suitable for China's national condition. Liu Shaoqi's opinion was reviewed and modified by Mao.⁵

The *Common Programme* called for China to carry out its economic plans. Article 33 stipulated that: 'The Central People's Government will strive to restore the overall plan restore and develop the national public or private economy and important sectors. It will determine the scope of the division and cooperation of labor of central and local economic construction, and conduct unified adjustments of the interrelation between the central departments and various local economic sectors.'⁶ At that time, China was still a free market economy. Even with the new plan in place, this situation lasted until 1953.

In fact, since the founding of New China, the government has faced problems in handling the relationship between the government and market. Essentially, the issue is how to determine the position, means and scope of plan management. Wu Li and others think that China took plan management as a way of conducting economic management before 1953. Planning as a means of economic management can be divided into two specific methods—mandatory and guiding.⁷

The 'dual-track approach' implements mandatory plan management for state-owned large- and medium-sized enterprises and national basic construction. It implements a guiding plan for the individual, private and cooperative economies.⁸ A case can be made for an ownership structure that features the coexisting development of various economic elements under the leadership of a state operated economy and an economic operation mechanism on the basis of market regulation; strengthening the government's plan management can promote the rapid recovery of the national economy.⁹

In 1952, with national economy on an upswing, the Central Committee of the C.P.C. set out to form a State Planning Commission, which was formally established in November the same year. In December, the Central Committee of the C.P.C. issued the *Instructions on the Compilation of the Plan and Long-term Plan Outline of 1953*. Then, with the help of the State Development Planning Commission and economic experts from the Soviet Union, the 'First Five-Year Plan' was modified. In

⁵Dong Fureng (editor in chief): *Economic History of the P.R.C.* (I), P. 229, Beijing, Economic Science Press, 1999.

⁶*The Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference* (September 29, 1949, the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference was passed), C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office: *Selected Works of Important Literature Since the Founding of the P.R.C.*, Book 1, P. 8, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 1992.

⁷Wu Li (editor in chief): *China's Development Path* (II), P. 821, Hunan People's Publishing House, 2012.

⁸Wu Li (editor in chief): *China's Development Path* (II), P. 851, Hunan People's Publishing House, 2012.

⁹Wu Li (editor in chief): *China's Development Path* (II), PP. 843–844, Hunan People's Publishing House, 2012.

July 1955, the Second Session of the First C.P.C. National Congress officially approved the Plan.¹⁰

After 1953, China formally established a planned economic system. It expanded the scope of plan management, and greatly reduced the breadth of market regulation. The financial industry was brought into the scope of the state-planned economy at the end of 1952; state monopoly of the purchase and marketing of grain and oilseed was established in October and November 1953, and state monopoly of the purchase and marketing of cotton was set in 1954. The state implemented the unified distribution of important goods and materials in 1953.¹¹

The first *Constitution* made in 1954 officially stipulated the implementation of a planned economy. Article 15 stated that the state should use economic plans to guide the development and transformation of the national economy with a view to enhancing productive forces, improving people's material and cultural life, and consolidating national independence and security.¹² Liu Shaoqi wrote in the *Report on the Draft Constitution*: 'In 1953, our country entered a period of planned economic construction to pursue the goals of socialism.'^{13,14} An economy based on single public ownership aided the process. The period between 1949 and 1956 can be seen as the transition from a new democratic economy to a socialist planned economy.¹⁵

However, Chinese leaders did not copy the Soviet Union's planned economy completely. They acknowledged the problems in the system, so put forward the idea of a mixed economy according to their own practice. In September 1956, Chen Yun suggested a 'big plan and small freedom' in his speech at the Eighth C.P.C. National Congress, based on the famous 'three subjects and three supplements'.¹⁶

¹⁰Wu Li (editor in chief): *China's Development Path* (II), P. 851, 912–914, Hunan People's Publishing House, 2012.

¹¹Wu Li (editor in chief): *China's Development Path* (II), P. 851, 922, Hunan People's Publishing House, 2012.

¹²*Constitution of the People's Republic of China* (approved at the First Session of the First C.P.C. National Congress on September 20, 1954), C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office, *Selected Important Literature Since the Founding of the P.R.C.*, Book 5, P. 524, Central Party Literature Press, 1993.

¹³Liu Shaoqi: *Report on the Draft of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, September 15, 1954, *Liu Shaoqi's Selected Works*, Volume II, P. 144, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1985.

¹⁴Dong Fureng (editor in chief), *Economic History of the P.R.C.* (I), PP. 230–245, Beijing, Economic Science Press, 1999.

¹⁵Wu Li (editor in chief): *China's Development Path* (II), P. 821, Hunan People's Publishing House, 2012.

¹⁶Chen Yun described China's economic situation as follows: 'in industrial and commercial operations, **state operations and collective operations are subjects of the industrial and commercial industries**, and a certain number of individual operations are attached. **These individual operations are supplementary to state operation and collective operation**. A major portion of national industrial and agricultural products is produced as planned, but some products are freely produced within the permitted scope of the national plan based on market changes. **Planned production is the subject of industry and agriculture**, and **free production** within the

The Resolution on the Political Report of the Eighth C.P.C. National Congress accepted this idea, and stated that the socialist uniform market should take the national market as its base, and should be accompanied by the free market under the leadership of the state within a certain range as a supplement to the national market.¹⁷ Li Fuchun put forward three indexes during the Eighth C.P.C. National Congress. He said that all the indexes brought into the state plan could be divided into three categories: mandatory, adjustable, and reference.¹⁸ This was a major correction to the highly centralized planned economic system.

In May, 1957, Liu Shaoqi further refined the idea that the socialist economic plan should be more diverse and flexible than a capitalist economy. With only mechanical planning, socialism would not be superior. **He believed that China must ensure that the diversity and flexibility of the socialist economy surpassed that of its capitalist equivalent, for the benefit of the people.**¹⁹ This was a bold idea for Chinese leaders, and one that bore fruit down the line.

(Footnote 16 continued)

permitted scope of the national plan based on market changes **is supplementary to planned production**. Thus, our market is absolutely not a capitalist free market, but a unified socialist market. In a unified socialist market, **the state market is the subject**, but there is also a range of free markets led by the state. **Under national leadership, this free market is supplementary to the national market**, and thus constitutes a part of the unified socialist market'. Chen Yun: *New Issues After the Basic Completion of Socialist Reform*, Chen Yun's Selected Works, Volume III, P. 13, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1995.

¹⁷The *Decision* indicated that with socialist transformation, major national industrial and agricultural products would be listed in the national plan, and would be produced by production units as planned. However, in order to meet multiple social needs, some parts would not be listed in the national plan. They would be produced by units based on raw materials and markets, supplementing planned production. For this aspect of production, the state only regulated its supply-marketing relationship or stipulated referential indicators for the formal plan. If unnecessary restrictions were imposed on the production of such products, it would not conform to economic development and the people's needs. Similarly, the subject of a socialist economy is centralized operations, supplemented by decentralized operations within a certain scope. *Resolution of the Political Report of the Eighth National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee*, approved at the Eighth National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee on September 27, 1956, C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office, Selected Important Literature Since the Founding of the P.R.C., Book 9, P. 524, Central Party Literature Press, 2011.

¹⁸Wu Li (editor in chief): *China's Development Path* (II), PP. 982–981, Hunan People's Publishing House, 2012.

¹⁹Liu Shaoqi stated that in the study of a socialist economy, particular attention must be paid to planning the socialist economy while maintaining diversity and flexibility. The Soviet Union's lessons in this aspect are worth attention, because its economy was only planned as a socialist economy. It strove to be a planned economy, but was rigid, non-diverse and inflexible. Prepared by the Party Literature Research Center of the C.P.C. Central Committee: *Anthology of Important Literature Since the Founding of the P.R.C.*, Book 10, PP. 224–225, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2011.

The years between 1949 and 1957 saw the mixed economic system with plan management morphing into a planned economy system,²⁰ and was the first ‘golden period’ in the development of New China. Between 1952 and 1957, the average annual G.D.P. growth rate reached 9.2%; the average annual growth rate of industrial added value reached 19.8%, but that of agricultural added value was much lower, at 3.8%.²¹ The proportion of China’s G.D.P. (international dollar price in 1990) accounting for the world’s total rose from 4.6% in 1950 to 5.5% in 1957.²² This proved that the use of the planned economy system had been successfully adapted for China’s development stage, despite many defects and historical limitations. Chinese leaders set about reforming the system pragmatically.

In 1958, Mao Zedong put forward a new concept of socialist commodity production. He noted that China was underdeveloped in commodity production, falling behind India and Brazil. He saw commodity production, commodity exchange and value rule as a useful tool to serve socialism. Commodity production is often confused with capitalism, and feared. Mao said: ‘Don’t be afraid. Commodity production depends on its association with an economic system. If it is associated with the capitalist system, it is capitalist commodity production; if it is associated with the socialist system, it is socialist commodity production’.²³ This was the origin of an important line of thinking in socialist commodity economics at the Third Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the C.P.C. and the 14th C.P.C. National Congress.

Due to the influence of the Soviet model and real national conditions (especially from the left-leaning trend of thought responsible for the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution) the dialectical understanding and reformist idea of the relationship between the plan and the market failed to be effectively implemented. On the contrary, China maintained a very effective ‘peddlers’ market’ for a long time, from restricting the market economy to basically abolishing it. However, during the adjustment of the national economy in the 1960s, China rapidly improved effective supply by taking emergency measures. It allowed the existence of underground factories, carried out private schemes for a free market, and took full responsibility for its own profits and losses. Farm output quotas were fixed for each household, and individuals were given the freedom to rent land, loan money, hire farm hands, and do trade. To a limited extent, this was a process of introducing market forces into a highly centralized planned economy.²⁴ It was also an extremely short-term market economy operating under very special conditions. Although rural

²⁰Wu Li (editor in chief): *China’s Development Path* (II), PP. 820–821, Changsha, Hunan People’s Publishing House, 2012.

²¹Department of Comprehensive Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China: *China Compendium of Statistics*, P. 12, Beijing, China Statistics Press, 2010.

²²Maddison, Angus: *Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD*.

²³Mao Zedong: *Issues about Socialist Commodity Production*, *Mao Zedong’s Collected Works*, Volume 7, PP. 435, 439, Beijing, People’s Publishing House, 1999.

²⁴Wu Li (editor in chief): *China’s Development Path* (II), P. 823, Hunan People’s Publishing House, 2012.

reform was killed off, it left an indelible mark on farmer and leaders alike, and became an important impetus for rural reform after 1978.

Between 1961 and 1964, the State Development Planning Commission proposed diverse plan management in three aspects: mandatory, guiding and reference. Direct planning was conducted for enterprises and causes owned by the people, and indirect planning was conducted for agriculture and the handicraft industries with collective ownership.²⁵

The second stage was to adjust the relationship between the plan and the market under the planned economic system framework. The basic trend was to introduce market factors and use the law of value, to greatly narrow the scope of the plan.

The period spanning 1978–1992 saw China's Reform and Opening,²⁶ and was a transition from the planned economy system to the market economic system, kicking off the second 'golden development' period for New China. Understand the plan and the market was a major theoretical and practical problem.

On March 8, 1979, Chen Yun criticized the defects of the planned economy. He claimed that over the preceding 60 years of planning work in both the Soviet Union and China, there had been a focus on planned-proportional development, but not on market adjustment under the socialist system. He proposed that a socialist economy must have two parts, one for planning and the other for market regulation. And, in future economic reform, the planned economy and market economy must rise at the same time.²⁷ This would place the emphasis mainly on the planned economy, with market regulation as a subsidiary.

On November 26 of the same year, Deng Xiaoping stated that socialism could also implement a market economy. He said that market economies did not only exist in capitalist societies. They could be developed under socialism as well. While maintaining a planned economy is the mainstay of any economic system, a market economy can also be introduced. However, it will be a socialist market economy. Socialism can use this method to develop productive social forces.²⁸ Deng Xiaoping's idea had the same effect as Mao Zedong's in 1958, but was more advanced, moving from a socialist commodity economy to a socialist market economy. Deng believed that socialism could aid rather than repel the market economy. His purpose was to use the market economy to develop China's productive social forces and to eradicate poverty.

²⁵Wu Li (editor in chief): *China's Development Path* (II), P. 823, Hunan People's Publishing House, 2012.

²⁶Wu Li et al. 'Think of 1978–1992 as the transitional phase from a planned economy to a market economy. Until 1992 China regarded the market as a basic economic system, so planned regulation evidently became a method'. Wu Li (editor in chief): *China's Development Path* (II), P. 821, Hunan People's Publishing House, 2012.

²⁷C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office: Jin Chongji, Chen Qun: *A Biography of Chen Yun* (II), P. 238, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2005.

²⁸Deng Xiaoping: *Socialism Can Also Implement a Market Economy*, (November 26, 1979), *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume 2, P. 236, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1994.

From November 1981 to January 1982, Chen Yun discussed the problem of relying on a planned economy and making market regulation into a subsidiary.²⁹ During the drafting of the *Resolution on Several Historical Issues of the Party since the Founding*, adopted in June, 1981, the article stated that a planned economy should be implemented on the basis of public ownership, and the subsidiary role of market regulation should also be given play. This was added on the advice of Chen Yun. He also pointed out that the development of socialist production relations had no fixed pattern, and required the creation of a corresponding concrete form of production relations for moving on at each stage according to the requirement of productivity development in China.³⁰ This was an example of Chen Yun's foresight and political wisdom. Indeed, Chen Yun was a major figure in designing China's economic reform, and was extremely pragmatic. China's economic system has no fixed pattern. It is flexible and adaptable, and open to innovation.

On January 25, 1982, Chen Yun held talks at the State Development Planning Commission about strengthening the planned economy.³¹ It was his view that industry should mainly rely on planned economy. After the agricultural industry implemented the production responsibility system, it would also mainly rely on the planned economy. The aim was to raise basic living standards and provide food for all, to create a workforce for economic construction.³² Later, Chen Yun would compare the relationship between the planned economy and market regulation as that of a cage and a bird.³³

In September of the same year, the 12th C.P.C. National Congress added Chen Yun's proposal into its report. It was identified as the guiding principle for economic construction and goal setting in the early days of economic reform.³⁴

²⁹C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office: Jin Chongji, Chen Yun: *A Biography of Chen Yun*, P. 1637, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2005.

³⁰C.P.C.'s *Decisions on Several of the Party's Historic Issues Since the Founding of the P.R.C.* (approved in the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th C.P.C. Central Committee on June 27, 1981). C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office: *Compilation of Important Works Since the Third Plenary Session* (II), P. 841, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1982.

³¹Yao Yilin, Song Ping, Zi Shupan, Li Renjun, Fang Weizhong, and Wang Yuqing participated in the discussion.

³²Tan Zongji, Ye Xinyu: *Record of the P.R.C.'s Reform and Major Changes—Initiating a New Pattern of Modernization Drive (1977–1983)*, Volume IV, (I), P. 515, Changchun, Jilin People's Publishing House, 1994.

³³Chen Yun: *Several Issues in Realizing the Strategic Objectives Formulated by the 12th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee* (December 2, 1982), *Chen Yun's Selected Works*, Volume III, P. 320, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1995.

³⁴At the 12th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee, Hu Yaobang indicated that China had basically implemented a planned economy on the basis of public ownership. Planned production and circulation were aspects of China's national economy. In the meantime, it was forbidden to plan the production and circulation of products that would be regulated by the market. This part was supplementary to the planned production and circulation. It was affiliated and minor, but also necessary and beneficial. The socialist state economy dominated the entire national economy. In rural areas and cities, individual workers' economies were encouraged to develop within the scope provided by the state and under industrial and commercial

With the deepening of economic system reform in practice, pragmatically-minded leaders did not stick to the policy laid out by the 12th C.P.C. National Congress. In September 1984, after Zhao Ziyang had served as the premier of the State Council, he wrote to four members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. including Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian and Chen Yun for suggestions on summarizing China's economic system. The replies were as follows:

1. China implements a planned economy, not a market economy.
2. The individual economy plays a subsidiary role in the national economy.
3. A planned economy is not equal to relying mainly on a mandatory plan. For a long time to come, our policy will gradually narrow the mandatory plans and expand the guiding plan.
4. The guiding plan mainly uses economic means to mediate; mandatory plans must also consider economic laws, especially the role of law of value.

The desired socialist economy was a planned commodity economy based on public ownership. Its plans were to be realized by the law of value, which would be used for serving the plan the idea that 'the plan comes first and the law of value comes second' was not exact, and was not suitable for continued use in the future.³⁵ This suggests that the political consensus of senior leaders within the party was still the planned economy, rather than the market economy. However, they were seeking a third road, namely a socialist commodity economy, and this became a transition to the socialist market economy.

The above views were written into the *Decision on Economic System Reform* adopted during the Third Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the C.P.C., which started the transformation from the planned economic system to the market economic system, implementing the dual-track system. The implementation of this double-track system greatly reduced the indicators of the mandatory plan and

(Footnote 34 continued)

administration. This was a necessary and beneficial supplement to the public sectors of the economy. We must carry out the principles of the planned economy, supplemented by market regulation. The right implementation of the principle of planned economy supplemented by market regulation is a fundamental issue of economic reform. We must correctly divide the mandatory plan from the guiding plan and the scope and boundary adjusted by the market; we must gradually implement a price system and price management methods while maintaining the basic stability of commodity prices; we must reform the labor and wage systems, and build an economic management system that meets our national situation, so as to guarantee the sound development of the national economy'. Hu Yaobang: *Comprehensively Initiating a New Pattern of Socialist Modernization—Report at the 12th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee*, C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office, *Selected Important Literature Since the 12th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee* (I), PP. 20–23, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1986.

³⁵ Zhao Ziyang: *Opinions on Three Issues About Economic System Reform* (September 9, 1984), C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office, *Selected Important Literature Since the 12th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee* (II), P. 535, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1986.

increased those of the guiding plan. A double-track price system was also put in place, significantly reducing the range of planned prices, increasing the guiding price, and gradually decontrolling the market price. A double-track ownership system was implemented, which conducted decentralization of power and transfer of profits for enterprises owned by the whole people, and allowed the development of township enterprises, foreign-owned enterprises, and individual businesses based on market mechanisms. In 1987, the report to the 13th C.P.C. National Congress approved the development of township enterprises, bringing the urban and rural market economies to life.

The third stage saw an adjustment of the relationship between the government and the market in building the framework of a socialist market economy.

In 1992, Deng Xiaoping proposed that the schism between the planned economy and the market economy was not the essential distinction between socialism and capitalism. **A planned economy is not equivalent to socialism, because there is planning under capitalism too; a market economy is not capitalism, because there are markets under socialism too. Both plans and markets are economic means.**³⁶ This idea formed the main body of the report to the 14th C.P.C. National Congress. It stated that the socialist market economic system would allow the market to play a fundamental role in the allocation of resources under the macroeconomic regulations and controls of the socialist state. It would ensure that economic activities followed the requirements of the law of value and adapted to the changing supply-demand relationship. At the same time, the weaknesses and negative aspects of market itself were brought to the fore, requiring strengthening of the state's macroeconomic regulation and control of the economy.³⁷

The third *Decision* was made at the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee of the C.P.C. in 1993. According to the goals and basic principles of economic reform defined at the 14th National People's Congress of the C.P.C., the *Decision on Several Issues of Establishing a Socialist Market Economic System* contained 50 articles in total. **This stage involved the establishing of a new system after setting the goals of system innovation**, namely, establishing a socialist market economy, rather than the reform, repair and improvement of the original socialist planning system. This was the first overall design and blueprint of its kind.

The *Decision* put forward the theory of a socialist market economy, making a strong case against capitalism while claiming that socialism could exist alongside a market economy. This was a major step forward for socialism with Chinese characteristics.

³⁶Jiang Zemin: *Quickening the Pace of Reform and Opening and Driving Modernization, Winning More Victories in the Socialist Cause with Chinese Characteristics—Report* at the 14th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee, October 12, 1992.

³⁷Jiang Zemin: *Organizing and Promoting the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economy*, November 14, 1993, *Selected Important Literature Since the 14th National People's Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee*, Book I, P. 555.

Dealing with the relationship between the role of a market mechanism and strengthening macroeconomic regulation and control was not only an abstract theoretical problem, but a specific practical issue highlighted by economic overheating and inflation. With this in mind, Jiang Zemin suggested that the focus of each period could be different. Depending on the actual situation, emphasis could sometimes be placed on market effect, and sometimes on state macroeconomic regulation and control, as long as neither aspect was neglected. Objectively speaking, in the early stages of the socialist market economy, market development was not yet mature. The system was imperfect, and market competition was neither fair nor transparent. This required activation of the micro-economy, to strengthen and improve macroeconomic regulation and control. A soft landing for macroeconomic regulation and control was realized, followed by the external impact of the Asian financial crisis, which was dealt with effectively.

The fourth *Decision* was made at the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the C.P.C. in 2003. Strategic deployment was put forward for building a perfect socialist market system and a more vigorous and open economy. The *Decision on Several Issues of Perfecting the Socialist Market Economic System* had 42 articles in total. The most important innovation was a people-oriented outlook on development and reform, which became the first programmatic guideline for China's reform in the first decade of the 21st century. It augured an era of perfecting the new system. The plenary session reiterated the principles of efficiency and balance equity, placing common prosperity as the goal (an upgrade to 'version 1.0' of the socialist market economy). The inherent defects of the market economy in terms of social fairness, social services and environment protection came out of the traditional 'pure marketization' process of blind decentralization of power and transfer of profits. An adjustment and repositioning of government functions began, with a view to addressing some of the shortcomings and problems of the market. This could be considered as 'version 1.5' of the socialist market economy.

Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the C.P.C., China's economic reform has revolved around the adjustment of the relationship between the plan and the market, and between the government and the market. The Session emphasized the use of a plan to adjust the various proportional relations, presenting a planned economic system. After the Third Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the C.P.C., the situation gradually switched to relying mainly on the plan while making the market subsidiary. By the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee of the C.P.C. in 1993, the direction of reform for the socialist market economy was formally established. At that time, the localization of the relationship between the government and the market was to give the market a fundamental role in the allocation of resources under the state's macroeconomic regulation and control. **The plan changed from being a way of dominating national economic development to a means of government regulation and control—i.e. a historic transformation from a socialist planned economy to a socialist market economy. A socialist political orientation was kept, but the basic means of the resource allocation was fundamentally altered.** The Third

Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the C.P.C. perfected the related system of the socialist market economy, paying more attention to the correction of the failures and shortcomings of the market. From a planned economy to a planned commodity economy, and then to a socialist market economy, the power of the market was released gradually. This deepened understanding allows more attention to be given to the role of the market in practice, effectively promoting the sustained and rapid development of the economy.

4.3 More Respect for Market Rule

Market economy is the most effective method of allocating resources in human history. Experience shows that the market mechanism is the source of economic vitality, and is the best way to improve enterprise efficiency.

The market's decisive role in the allocation of resources has kept pace with the times and remained pertinent. In the time since Reform and Opening, China has not yet set up a sound market system and mechanism. The market has no efficient system for resource allocation, so progressive reform must be implemented. With constant improvement of the socialist market economic system, the function and condition of the market in resource allocation can be formed, and various social aspects will reach corresponding consensus.

At present, China has an imperfect market system. Market rules are not uniform, order is not standard, and competition is not fair. The government has too much power, administrative examination and approval is too complicated, interference in the micro-economy is too much, and regulation does not reach the standard. All of this influences the vitality of economic development and the efficiency of resource allocation. Thus, any chance to intensify reform must be seized, adhering to the direction of a socialist market economy. Respect must be paid to the general law that the market determines the allocation of resources, greatly reduces the government's direct allocation of resources, promotes the following of market rules, price, and competition, changes the pattern of economic development, and makes efforts to achieve optimized efficiency of resource allocation and benefit maximization.

The *Decision* of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the C.P.C. proposed that the market be given a more decisive and governing role in resource allocation. This measure kept pace with the times in the process of Reform and Opening. Specifically, the *Decision* laid out market-oriented reform from the following perspectives:

- (1) **Market subject:** the procedure for examination and approval of enterprise registration was greatly simplified, with negative list management rules clearly put forward. **Negative list management** refers to the government's lists of prohibited and restricted industries, sectors, and businesses. It allowed enterprises to conduct self-inspection, and make rectifications for those failing to

meet the requirements in advance, so as to improve the efficiency of enterprises entering the market. The reform of market access management ruled that as long as the market mechanism could effectively adjust economic activities, examination and approval would be canceled, and enterprises could make independent decisions in accordance with the law. This greatly activated market vitality and avoided unnecessary bottlenecks. It also reflected the government's willingness to provide services for the subjects the market economy, rather than directly intervening in microeconomic activities.

- (2) **Market products and services.** On the basis of determining the dominant position of the market in the adjustment of supply and demand, it is necessary to form a unified national market system. The production and marketing of daily consumer goods and industrial goods has changed from plan control to market regulation, and the degree of market segmentation significantly decreased after the mid-1990s. By 2012, for the total amount of social consumer goods, the total amount of purchase and sales of agricultural and sideline products, and total sales of production goods, their proportions of market-adjusted pricing were all above 98%. Now, government pricing mainly includes resources and energy such as water, electricity, gas, heating and oil; transport considerations, such as the ticketing and pricing system of ground public transport and urban rail transit, tolls for taxis, highways and passengers; social services such as medical services, medicine, education, cable television and park tickets; administrative non-profit-making fees for tuition, examination, and certification. Even though it is government pricing, it includes production or service costs, which is beneficial to promoting energy conservation and emission reduction, improving the quality of public services, and maintaining financial and fiscal sustainability.
- (3) **Market industry.** Resource allocation in competitive industries shall be conducted by the market. Basic industry will break the monopoly with the introduction of a competition mechanism. For the production and supply of some public goods, property rights will also be defined, and a market and competition mechanism will be introduced.

China has become the world's largest enterprise state. Although it is a latecomer to the modern market economy model with only 20 years of experience, it is the world's largest market subject—a state of national commercial enterprise. According to the information provided by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, by the end of November 2013, there were 15.0382 million actual enterprises.³⁸ This is twice the total number of actual enterprises in 2002 (7.34 million), with an average annual growth rate of 6.74%. **China is a fertile ground and a major stage for the growth of modern enterprises. Entrepreneurialism is on the rise, becoming a prominent feature of the socialist market economy.**

³⁸*People's Daily*, December 11, 2013.

China has also become the world's largest state for trademark applications. According to data provided by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (see Table 4.1), the number of Chinese residents applying for trademarks was 43,445 in 1985, but rose to 593,382 by 2005, accounting for 28.8% of the world's total (2,063,071), and reached 1,273,827 in 2011, accounting for 44.6% of the world's total (2,858,280), equivalent to 3.46 times of that of the United States (368,619), and 4.96 times of that of the European Union (256,774). If the number of non-native residents' trademark applications is also included, China's proportion of world's total was 5.2% in 1985, and 8.2% in 2000. It rose to 21.6% in 2005, and further increased to 28.7% in 2010, equivalent to 3.75 times of that of the United States. China's proportion of the world's registered trademarks was 4% in 1985, and 9.6% in 2000, rising to 12.7% in 2005, and further increasing to 41.2% in 2010, equivalent to 7.95 times of that of the United States. China applies for and registers the highest number of trademarks of any country in the world.

As a nation, it spent fewer than 30 years to complete the process that took capitalist countries such as the United States more than a century. A law was enacted for the purposes of improving the administration of trademarks, protecting the exclusive right to use trademarks,³⁹ and encouraging producers and operators to guarantee the quality of their goods and services while maintaining the reputation of their trademarks, with a view to protecting the interests of consumers, producers and operators, and to promoting the development of the socialist market economy.

The purpose of respecting market rule is to arouse creativity and inspire innovation among individuals and enterprises alike. The key to this is the effective allocation of resources, which adopts the means of the market and price to create a new phase of independent innovation with Chinese characteristics. The focus falls on original, integrated innovation and introduction, as well as digestion and absorption leading to re-innovation. Just as important are collaborative and comprehensive innovation, to promote science and technology. A market-oriented system must be established for technological innovation, in which enterprises play the leading role in collaboration with universities and research institutes. Innovation must be further promoted in successful enterprises, moving away from the traditional 'Made in China' to a new era of 'Created in China'.

³⁹On August 28, 1950, China passed its first trademark law since the founding of the nation: *Provisional Regulations of Trademark Registration*. On June 15, 1957, it signed the *Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purpose of the Registration of Marks*. On March 30, 1963, it passed the *Trademark Management Regulation*, and implemented mandatory trademark registrations. On August 23, 1982, the 24th Conference of the Fifth Standing Committee of the National People's Congress passed the *Trademark Law of the P.R.C.*, which was implemented on March 1, 1983. The *Trademark Management Regulation* promulgated by the State Council was abolished on April 10, and modified for the third time in the Fourth Session of the Fifth Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on August 30, 2013. In 1988, China officially adopted the Nice international classification of goods and services, and joined in the agreement on May 5, 1994, which took effect on August 9 of the same year.

Table 4.1 Number of trademark applications and registrations in China, the U.S.A., and the world (1985–2012)

Year	Number of trademark applications				Number of trademark registrations (piece)			
	China	U.S.A.	Global	China's proportion globally (%)	China	U.S.A.	Global	China's proportion globally (%)
1985	49,243	64,677	953,190	5.2	21,668	32,119	547,969	4.0
1990	57,272	127,346	1,345,911	4.3	31,271	61,343	829,254	3.8
1995	172,146	188,850	1,832,769	9.4	91,866	85,557	1,189,662	7.7
2000	212,602	292,964	2,592,666	8.2	150,961	109,544	1,575,096	9.6
2005	659,148	264,510	3,053,753	21.6	253,133	123,160	1,992,042	12.7
2010	1,057,480	281,826	3,686,502	28.7	1,333,097	167,638	3,238,441	41.2
2012	1,619,878	313,641			995,124	180,966		

Data source World Intellectual Property Organization database, 2014

4.4 Accelerating Government Transformation

Understanding the relationship between the government and the market and their various roles has always been difficult. Theories abound in economics circles, but no conclusion has ever been reached. One example is the market-enhancing government. Masahi ko Aoki states that the government must intervene to enhance the market mechanism, setting an interventionist framework. Another example is the theory that the market augments the government. Mancur Olson believed that only this kind of government guarantees the promotion and maintenance of economic prosperity. The developmental state refers to a specific government behavior, policy and system model. It features an elite group with a strong impulse for development, which has the ability to independently develop a forward-looking national development strategy, promoting industrial development and economic growth through industrial policies.⁴⁰ There are many theories and schools of thought regarding this matter. They can be summarized based on the practices of various countries or regions, providing international experiences and lessons for China to understand the general principles of the government and the market.

The relationship between the government and the market can be handled according to the concrete practice with which China established its socialist market economy. This was referenced in the book *Government and Market* (China Planning Press, 2000), which I co-authored with Wang Shaoguang. China's transformation to a market economy was essentially a shift of Chinese government functions. In a report on national conditions in the *Relationship between the Government and the Market* (2000) I expressed the opinion that both the government and the market could play many different and complementary roles. Giving play to the function of the market does not negate the role of the government, and vice versa. The role of the government is to complement and aid the market, not replace or exclude it. Having an effective government is the essential condition of sustainable economic and social development. It can catalyze, promote and complement the market economy and individual activities, improving the efficiency of the government itself and of public resources, and enhancing the government's ability in terms of governance. During the transformation of the market economy, the role of government intervention must be redefined. The scope of intervention shall be narrowed **to limited areas, from excessive (redundant) intervention to moderate (location-based) intervention, from an absence to a strengthening.** The means of intervention must be changed from planning and administrative means to economic and legal means, and from direct control to indirect control. Intervention based on the rule of the people must be changed to the rule of law, and the intervention itself shall accept legal supervision and restriction. The

⁴⁰See Gu Xin's 'What's the Government's Role?' *The Economic Observer Newspaper*, April 5, 2014, *International Myth of Government-Dominated Development*, *The Economic Observer Newspaper*, January 18, 2013.

effectiveness of intervention shall be improved, market mechanism shall be used fully, and various challenges shall be faced and addressed. The transparency of intervention shall be increased, and the rent-seeking phenomenon in the process of intervention shall be reduced.⁴¹

Any discussion about the roles and boundaries of the government and the market in economics and politics is usually abstract, and rarely involves specific cases. Chinese scholars tend to discuss abstract concepts rather than making China-specific analyses. Therefore, scholars argue among themselves. Opinions are general more than individual.

In terms of the most important functions of the Chinese government, Wang Shaoguang and I made a very specific and empirical summary and exploration of individual opinions in China. We believe that the Chinese government has three functions. Firstly, it has the five functions of a general market economy: maintaining sovereignty and territorial integrity; formulating and implementing the law, and keeping social basic order; defining and protecting property rights; monitoring the execution of contracts; and maintaining the value of domestic currency. Secondly, it holds the six functions of intervention in areas of market failure: providing public goods; maintaining macroeconomic stability; internalizing economic externality; restricting monopolies and adjusting income and wealth distribution. Thirdly, under China's national conditions, the government has nine special functions: promoting market development, establishing a uniform market with fair competition; paying attention to public investment, promoting the construction of infrastructure; implementing industrial policy, promoting the advancement of the industrial structure, and giving full play to comparative advantages; solving the problem of unbalanced development in various regions, and promoting the development of minority areas; controlling population growth and developing human resources; protecting natural resources, working on the ecological environment, conserving the great rivers, lakes and coastal regions, and carrying out disaster prevention, reduction and relief; managing and supervising state-owned assets; implementing an action plan to gradually eliminate all poverty in China. These three sub-sets have a total of 20 functions.⁴² The first two sub-sets range from general to individual, and are universal in the world, while the last sub-set is particular to China's national conditions.

As for how the Chinese government defines its functions and public service areas, in March 2006, the *Outline of the National Eleventh Five-year Plan* stipulated that 11 public service areas were to be administrated by the government, covering compulsory education, public health, social security, social assistance, promotion of employment, poverty reduction, disaster prevention and reduction, public safety, public culture, basic science and cutting-edge technology, as well as

⁴¹Hu Angang, Wang Shaoguang: *Government and Market*, P. 3, China Planning Press, January, 2000.

⁴²Hu Angang, Wang Shaoguang: *Government and Market*, PP. 3–4, China Planning Press, January, 2000.

technical research on social public welfare, and national defense. The *Outline* stated that **this was the commitment of the government at various levels**. Evaluation of government performance and placing public services at the forefront of the administrative examination system was explored and innovated, to provide fair, accessible, high-quality and efficient public services for all of society.

The *Outline* stipulated the priority areas for 17 public finance budgets, including rural compulsory education and public health, agricultural science and technology popularization, vocational education, rural labor force training, employment promotion, social security, poverty reduction, family planning, disaster prevention and reduction, public safety, public culture, basic science and cutting-edge technology, as well as technical research on social public welfare, energy and important mineral resources, geological exploration, pollution control, ecological protection, resource management and national security. It also laid out the areas that would receive key support from the public finance budget, including restricted development zones and prohibited development areas, the central and western regions (especially the old revolutionary base areas), minority regions, border areas, poverty-stricken areas, the Three Gorges reservoir area, and resource-exhausted cities.⁴³

The *Decision* made at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the C.P.C. set out two main lines for transforming the government's functions. One was to define the positioning of government functions. The government was compelled to transform its functions, reduce direct intervention into microscopic economic activities, turn to macroeconomic regulation, market supervision, social management and public services, and accelerate the separation of government functions from enterprise management, from state-owned asset management, from public service unit, and from intermediary market organizations. The focus was placed on bottom-line macroscopic thinking, as well as in-depth research on overall, strategic and prospective initiatives and issues. Around the construction of a law-based and service-oriented government, problems arose such as redundant intervention, absence and dislocation of government functions. These had to be solved. The other line was to improve the government's overall power. This in turn would raise its effectiveness, and improve its decision-making ability, executive heft, financing power, redistribution skills, and capability to maintain social harmony and stability. A public service-oriented government was built, along with a performance evaluation and administrative examination system with public service as its main driver.

In the *Decision*, the transformation of the government functions focused on the following five aspects:

- (1) **Macroeconomic regulation and control to achieve macroeconomic stability.** Macroeconomic regulation and control is an important measure that complements the effective operation of the market in shoring up the

⁴³The *Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China*, approved in the Fourth Session of the 10th National People's Congress on March 14, 2006.

national-level economy. Macroeconomic stability covers typical public goods and provides a good economic environment for various economic activities. Scientific macroeconomic regulation and control is an inherent requirement for realizing the advantages of the socialist market economy. The *Decision* describes the main task of macroeconomic regulation and control, which is to keep the balance of economic aggregate, promote coordination of a significant economic structure and optimize the distribution of productive forces. It also serves to reduce the influence of economic fluctuations, prevents regional and systemic risk, stabilizes market expectations, and realizes the sustainable and healthy development of the economy. In the early days of China's socialist market economy, macroeconomic regulation and control was prioritized in order to reduce and overcome any spontaneity, blindness and lag within the market.⁴⁴ The Chinese government has seen many successful cases of establishing and perfecting macroeconomic regulation and control. For example, a soft landing for the macro economy was realized for the first time in 1997; a policy to expand domestic demand was implemented in 1998 in response to the Asian financial crisis; a stimulus package to expand domestic demand was introduced in November 2008 to counter the international financial crisis, dealing with market failure and maintaining macroeconomic stability. This allowed China to display the best main macroeconomic indicators of the G20 countries.⁴⁵

Methods of strengthening macroeconomic regulation and control were laid out in the *Decision*. The first step was to use the national development strategy and plan as a guide. The next step was to take fiscal and monetary policy as the main means. Both steps constituted a macroeconomic regulation system. The former aimed at five years of macroeconomic regulation and control, while the latter targeted the current year, promoting the setting of goals for macroeconomic regulation and control and the institutionalization of policy means, strengthening the coordination of fiscal and monetary policy with industry, trade and other policy means, improving the level of discretionary choice, and enhancing the future, pertinence, and cooperation of macroeconomic regulation and control.

There are two main types of national development plan. One is overall planning, such as the national five-year plans. Its main task is to clarify the national strategic intent, define the work of the government in the following five-year stint, and guide market behavior. For example, the Twelfth Five-year Plan established a series of five-year development goals and the 'Five in One' layout for modernization; in response, the government set a core goal, as well as intermediate, anticipated and obligatory goals around the layout. Economic indicators within the Twelfth Five-year Plan dropped to 12.5%, but non-economic indicators exceeded 80%.

⁴⁴Jiang Zemin: *Address to the Economic Work Symposium of Five Northwestern Provinces*, June 14, 1993.

⁴⁵Hu Angang: *A Study of Why China's Political System has Succeeded Red Flag Manuscript*, February 14, 2011.

When considering and designing the Thirteenth Five-year Plan, the government must reduce the anticipated target and increase the obligatory target. The anticipated target is designed to provide important guidance and information for the market, while the obligatory target is meant to restrain the government at both the state and local levels. It matches the *Report on the Work of the Government* made by the Premier of the State Council every year. The report determines the anticipated target for annual development, and sets the main tasks for macroeconomic regulation and policy orientation. In view of the economic cycle, macroeconomic regulation and control is a policy that is only implemented during abnormal fluctuations in the economy, and is designed as a balancing device. It does not require repeated implementation. The market also has the function of stabilizing the economy. For slight economic fluctuations, the market will self-adjust even if the government conducts no regulation and control.⁴⁶

The other type is the special plan. Special planning establishes development goals, major tasks and policy measures in individual fields. These include environmental protection, energy, and new energy, and serve to strengthen the obligatory target.

National five-year plans and special plans must fall in line with local equivalents, for which local governments must seek a 45-degree angle. Regional development itself has horizontal ordinate (namely local goals), while national development goals have a vertical coordinate, meaning that the best route for regional development is 45 degrees. Achieving local goals is conducive to meeting national targets. The proposal of national goals helps local governments acquire direct and indirect support from the state, for investment, finance and policy.

General Secretary Xi Jinping believes that macroeconomic policy should be stable and microeconomic policy flexible. Social policy should display dependence for organic unity to be achieved. If macroeconomic policy reform is stable, the market can stabilize expectations, and enterprises can conduct fair competition. If control of microeconomic policy is loosened, the endogenous power of the market can be enhanced. This, in turn, can aid macroeconomic stability. If social reform displays dependence, social pressure can be alleviated, and the bottom line of social stability can be maintained, creating conditions for a ‘stable’ macro-economy and ‘flexible’ micro-economy.⁴⁷ This is a break from traditional macroeconomics, but fits very well into the model of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

- (2) **Market regulation.** Market regulation is an important measure in maintaining and ensuring the efficient operation of the market. Fair and effective market regulation helps to stimulate market competitiveness and efficient allocation of resources. This measure essentially involves the maintenance of the basic order of the market. The market system is operated in accordance with specific

⁴⁶Yang Weimin: *Recognizing Three Basic Characteristics of Macro Regulation*, *Economic Daily*, Version 3, December 22, 2013.

⁴⁷Cited from Wang Lanjun: *New Ideas of Governing and Benefiting the People, Ruling the State, and Dealing with Politics*, *Study and Research*, Issue 5 of 2014, P. 55.

rules, and market subjects interact by following these rules. Degradation of the market rules will cause a decline in efficiency and an alienation of the operation mode. The primary factor in market regulation is unification. It requires a cleaning of all rules and practices that hinder a unified national market and fair competition, along with a strict prohibition of preferential policies, monopolies, and unfair competition.

With a large population and a vast market, China is still in a period of important development, and has tremendous potential to optimize the allocation of resources and to demand growth. The requisite is to have a unified national market system with fair competition. At present, local protectionism distorts the allocation of resources. It runs contrary to the principle of fair competition, is adverse to global development, and hinders local development. Strengthening market supervision requires hard regulation force, as well as a strengthening of the soft social constructs like the credit system. Therefore, establishing and perfecting the social credit system, praising honesty, and punishing dishonesty are particularly important. Fundamentally, this plays a positive role in lightening the burden on enterprises, reducing the requirements for market access and increasing the innovation of market subjects. Finally, market supervision must perfect the marketization exit mechanism with a 'survival of the fittest' mentality, and improve the enterprise bankruptcy system.

On one hand, the market must play the irreplaceably decisive role in the 'survival of the fittest'. Which enterprises survive and which are eliminated is decided by market competition. On the other hand, the government must provide necessary policy instruments and measures to set standards for distinguishing good enterprises with lawful operations from illegal ones, and green enterprises that support energy conservation and environmental protection from polluters with high energy consumption. It must learn to discern innovative enterprises from counterfeit enterprises, and pick off firms that promote negative externality. In doing this, a comprehensive transformation will be effected from an examination and approval system to an intervention system, inspiring vitality, creativity and positive externality among market subjects.

- (3) **Public services.** Effective public services make up for a failure in the supply of public goods on the market. The fundamental orientation of the government is to provide more high-quality public services, allowing the people to share the spoils of reform development and promoting common prosperity by improving the standard of living. In the past, China understood economic growth to be the most important factor for the development of the nation. Its main standard for evaluation was G.D.P., with the highest figure and the fastest growth as the primary goals. The *Decision* set targets for improving and developing the evaluation system, correcting the inclination of purely relying on economic growth to evaluate achievements. This solved the problem of the 'conducting baton', bidding farewell to the era of focusing on G.D.P., and beginning to judge the nation's success on the livelihood of the people. The

raising of G.D.P. (or gross regional domestic product) is not the government's achievement. The government's direct (domestic budget) investment accounts for only 5% of the gross fixed-asset investment for the whole country, and the government's direct consumption (administrative expenditure) only accounts for about one percent of G.D.P. It (G.D.P.) is actually produced by agents of economic activity such as enterprises, farmers, investors and consumers, so its scale and growth rate are not the government's responsibility. In fact, local G.D.P. and growth rates are problematic in statistical terms. According to some scholars' calculations, the sum of G.D.P. of 31 provinces, cities and autonomous regions in the first half of 2013 exceeded 13.7% of the national G.D.P., with surplus of 3.1 trillion RMB.⁴⁸ There is reason to suspect that the local G.D.P. and growth rate are exaggerated, along with those of city levels, counties and municipal levels. In fact, most local governments count and release the indicators of urban and rural residents' per capita income and growth rate. This goes some way to proving that the biggest achievement of local government at all levels is the raising of living standards—the ultimate public service.

The Twelfth Five-year Plan contained separate chapters for basic public services, with enhancing the level of basic public services as an important task for economic and social development. It determined the overall goal, requirements, scopes, contents and main tasks of basic public services. This required governments at all levels and departments to take charge of implementation, and provide an investment guarantee by public finance to ensure its completion. However, this does not mean that the government takes responsibility for everything. It must create a public service supply mode, expand public participation, arouse the enthusiasm of all parties concerned, and gradually establish a supply mechanism dominated by the government, guided by the market, and with the full participation of society.⁴⁹

Column 4.1: Basic public services and content

Basic public services are established on the basis of social consensus. They are provided by the government, adapt to the levels and stages of economic and social development, and aim at guaranteeing the most basic survival and development needs of all citizens.

Basic public services are divided into four stages. The first is bottom-line living services, including public employment services and social security. The second is basic development services, including education, medical treatment, public health, culture and sports, civil administration. The third is

⁴⁸Wang Zhiping: *Local and Central G.D.P. 'Fight' Urgent for Attention*, *People's Daily: Internal Reference*, Issue 49 of 2013, December 30, 2013.

⁴⁹Zhang Ping: *The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China*, P. 335, 344, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 2011.

basic environmental services, including public transport, communication, facilities, and environmental protection. The fourth is basic security services, including public safety, consumer security, and national defense.

- (4) **Social management.** Social management does not belong in the economic system category, so it is difficult for the market to play a role here. However, good social management is necessary for the normal operation of the market. This requires the government to improve social governance. Firstly, the government must adhere to system governance, strengthen the leadership of the party committee, give play to the leading role of the government, encourage and support the participation of various social aspects, realize the government's rule alongside social self-regulation, and acknowledge the benign interaction thereof. Secondly, the government must insist on governance according to the law, strengthen legal guarantee, and use the rule of law to resolve social conflicts. Thirdly, it must adhere to comprehensive governance, strengthen moral constraints, standardize social behavior, adjust interest relations, coordinate social relations, and solve social problems. The government must also conduct governance from the source, resolving the current problems and eliminating the root cause, while providing fundamental solutions, taking grid management and socialized services as the direction, improving the comprehensive service management platform at the primary level, and reflecting on and coordinating the demands of the people at various levels.
- (5) **Environmental protection.** This is one of the most important functions of the government, and was emphasized in the *Decision*, particularly for local governments. Due to the inherent defects of the market, it is difficult for price signals to fully reflect environmental costs. The market even plays the role of assisting the wrongdoer in terms of environmental protection and ecological safeguarding. This relies on the government to conduct effective regulation and make up the market's deficiencies in environmental protection through a series of policy instruments and means. This includes less focus on G.D.P. as a benchmark, favoring measurement indexes such as social development and ecological safeguarding. The importance of the economic growth index shall be increased, changing the locus of competition among local offices from G.D.P. to energy conservation and reduction of emissions. Resource-oriented product prices and fee reform in environmental protection will be explored further. The government will accelerate structure adjustment, and push for a resource-oriented product price mechanism and environmental protection fee system that promote structural adjustment, conservation of resources and environmental protection. The economic cost of factor price distortion will be greatly reduced, and the productivity of energy resources will be raised.

The boundary between the government and the market is not immutable. It has no fixed rule, adapting to the time and the place. With the change and adjustment of

market development stages and degrees in China, the general trend is that the market plays an ever more decisive role in the allocation of resources, and the government has an increasingly important function in market services and making up for market failure. The market and the government become the two hands of the socialist market economy. China's situation proves that two hands are always better than one.

4.5 Summary: Two Hands Are Always Better Than One⁵⁰

The government and the market are two main aspects of any society. They are at once opposite and unified. The practice of relying only on an omnipotent government or of purely relying on a market is not a safe route for economic development, particularly in China. It is necessary to understand the aspects, functions, advantages and disadvantages of both the government and the market, while considering their correlation, interdependence, and interaction. Under certain conditions, their opposition can be converted into unification. This is a materialist dialectic for dealing with the relationship between the two. If we compare an economic entity to a human body, two hands—the government and the market—are better than one. Historical experience shows that China's economic reform was different from that of the former Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries from the outset. They simply changed from one hand (plan) to another hand (market),⁵¹ replacing a real hand with an artificial one (a poor market). Conversely, China turned to the two-hand method. It adjusted the hand of the government in a transformation of functions), and strengthened the hand of the market to decontrol and develop it. It established and improved a mixed socialist market economy, making full use of the advantages of both hands, while simultaneously avoiding their disadvantages. Zhang Gaoli remarked that under the conditions of a modern market economy, the market is the invisible hand, playing a decisive role in the allocation of resources. The government is a visible hand, and is used to make up for market failure.⁵²

⁵⁰On May 26, 2014, while holding the 15th Collective Study of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee, Xi Jinping remarked: 'As for the issue of market and government function, which is dialectical, we must apply two points—an "invisible hand" and a "visible hand", and endeavor to achieve an organically unified, mutually complementary, coordinating and promoting pattern of market and government function. We must promote the sustainable and sound development of an economic society'. Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, May 27, 2014.

⁵¹See detailed discussion in the World Bank's: *World Development Report in 1996: From Plan to Market*, Chinese version, Beijing, China Financial & Economic Publishing House, 1996.

⁵²Zhang Gaoli: *Comprehensively Deepening Reform with a Focus on the Economic System*, *People's Daily*, Version 03 of November 20, 2013.

The *Decision* sought to improve the coordination between the government and the market. On the basis of deciding that the hand of government was to serve the hand of the market, it was realized that the two were not opposite but complementary. It was not simply a case of prioritizing the market over the government play less effect. They could be planned as a whole, to complement each other's advantages in an organic combination with a cooperative effect.

China's regions have their own characteristics. In areas where market development is incomplete, the role of the government may be heightened, but if it conducts excessive mediation or direct intervention into the micro economy, there may be the problem. Grasping the degree of interaction between the market and the government is something of a political art form.

Differing speeds of development necessitate a careful consideration of the relationship between the government and the market. Both must balance the invisible hand (the former) with the visible one (the latter). There are two major principles for achieving this.

One is that each performs its own functions in its proper place, giving full play to its individual advantages. The market plays a very important role in the allocation of resources, effective competition, stimulation of innovation, and adjustment of supply and demand by price lever. In one sense, the market can be a plundering force. Propelled by profit-driven capital, it can act spontaneously (and often blindly). A market subject's excessive pursuit of personal interests will cause great harm to social, collective and environmental interests, and must be controlled. The government plays an indispensable role in efficient market organization. Market resources benefit from more efficient allocation through hard investment in infrastructure and soft investment in public health, education, knowledge and information. The government also plays an essential role in correcting market failure. It ensures macroeconomic stability through regulation and control, and implements proactive employment policies to guarantee the people's livelihood. It carries out an equalization of basic public services to contain the regional development gap. In another sense, the government also conducts excessive intervention in the market, with a view to obtaining or plundering economic interests from its subjects. Thus, both hands must emphasize their individual advantages while playing down their disadvantages.

The other principle is to use the transparent, open and 'visible' hand of order and supervision to guarantee the 'invisible' hand. Both the visible hand of the government and the invisible hand of the market need to be supervised in the open and transparent management of order, namely, using the system to restrain them both. Only through a fair system can they operate above board, preserving the existing benign situation.

In conclusion, it is necessary to make good use of the visible hand of the government and the invisible hand of the market. Each will perform its individual functions in the proper place. They will be strong **but not rigid, flexible but not**

disorderly. Full play will be given to the advantages of both, with the effect of combination, complement and mutual promotion. Their disadvantages will be downplayed, leading to a situation of counterbalance, mutual hedging, and mutual offset. Throughout 30 years of Reform and Opening, this method has proven highly effective for China's economic governance. It is an important embodiment of the advantages of a socialist market economy.

Chapter 5

The Relationship Between the State-Owned and Private Economies

After the founding of New China, it was necessary to find an economic model that truly conformed to the basic national conditions and adapted to the various development stages. The relationship between the public ownership economy and the other economies had to be set. After 60 years of practice and repeated trial and error, a basic socialist economic system was created, with public ownership at the helm and diverse forms of ownership developing side by side. China's basic economic system is unique in the world, and is a major string to the Party's bow. Its advantages lie in giving full play to the respective advantages of diverse forms of ownership, and in fully mobilizing the creativity of each aspect. It is the world's most dynamic and competitive economic system by far, but it has not been plain sailing. It has also experienced a tortuous path from confirmation to negation and then to reconfirmation, walking first on two legs then one, and then back to two.

5.1 Evolution of the Relationship

In the development of the ownership structure of China's economy since the nation's founding, there have been several major system innovations, and a variety of setbacks. The process can be divided into the following stages:

- (1) **A new-democratic mixed economy in the early stages of China's founding.**
This was the first major system innovation. It involved a transformation from the traditional semi-feudal and semi-colonial economy to a new-democratic economy. Liu Shaoqi put forward that under the economic conditions of the early period, China should not copy the single public ownership system of the

This paper is the manuscript of Hu Angang's interpretation of the *C.P.C.'s Decision on Several Important Issues in Comprehensively Deepening Reform*, with Tang Xiao and Li Qiang assisting; *Report on the National Situation*, Issue 2 of 2014.

Soviet Union, but should take advantage of private capitalism, allowing the existence of diversified economic sectors. Mao Zedong agreed, and put the matter up for discussion at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the C.P.C.¹ This was the earliest ‘mixed economy theory’ among Communist leaders.

After the founding of New China, there were five different economic sectors: the socialist state-owned economy, the private capitalist economy, the individual economy of farmers and handicraftsmen, the cooperative economy, and the national capitalist economy. This was a period of coexistence, mainly relying on the private economy, but being dominated by the state-owned economy and coexistence of other economic sectors. The first land reforms were reasonably successful, but nationalization was quite limited. The new government forcibly confiscated bureaucratic capital, putting it into the state-owned economy. However, it failed to restrict and eliminate the private and capitalist economies. Article 26 of the *Common Programme* stipulated that the fundamental policy for economic construction of the People’s Republic of China should take both public and private interests into account, benefiting both labor and capital, helping the city and the countryside alike, and conducting internal and external communication to develop production and enrich the economy. The state had to adjust the socialist state-owned economy, as well as the cooperative, individual, private capitalist, and national capitalist economies in the scope of business, material supply, market sales, labor conditions, technical equipment, fiscal policy, and financial policy. It called for various social and economic sectors to share work and cooperate with one another, staying in their proper place under the leadership of the state economy in order to promote social and economic development.

Article 30 expressly stipulated that for any private economy to be advantageous to the national economy and people’s livelihood, the people’s government should encourage enthusiasm in its business and support its development. The *Common Programme* also stated that the feudal and semi-feudal land divisions should be gradually changed to give ownership to farmers. The economic interests and private property of workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie would be protected. Mao Zedong called this the ‘spirit’ of overall planning and all-round consideration. For the private economy, he put forward the policy of ‘making a difference and giving equal treatment without discrimination’. ‘Making a difference’ meant that a state operated economy with socialist nature took the leading role—different from a private capitalist cooperative economy.

Other issues were solved according to the *Common Programme*. The public and private economies were to develop at the same rate. Liu Shaoqi presented the concept of consolidating the new democratic system. He saw the new-democratic

¹See Bo Yibo: *Review of Several Important Decisions and Events*, Volume I, P. 49, Beijing, Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C. Press, 1991.

economy as a transitional economy that would take ten to twenty years to mature, enabling the five sectors to persist and develop.²

These policies fell firmly in line with China's national conditions and stages of economic development. They were different from both Western-style capitalist private ownership and from Soviet socialist public ownership. Establishing this unprecedented new-democratic economic system was the largest system change in China's modern history. The process required ten to twenty years of gradual adaptation, consolidation and improvement.

However, after just a few years, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee formulated the concept of 'One Transformation and Three Reforms' during the transition period. The idea was to expand socialist ownership by the people and collective ownership of cooperative members, bring private ownership (on the basis of labor of farmers and handicraftsmen) into collective ownership of cooperative members, and transform capitalist private ownership based on the exploitation of surplus working class labor into ownership by the people.³ The second wave of nationalization and collectivization was conducted in urban areas. The private urban economy was dismantled, and the individual urban economy was cut down. Collectivization was implemented in the rural areas, and the individual rural economy and private land ownership systems were destroyed. This was largely affected by Soviet theory.⁴

The 'Three Great Transformations' was the second major system innovation, and was laid out in three five-year plans—or longer, if necessary. It was actually completed in 1956, implying excessive speed.⁵ Unfortunately, the goal set later was not the common and smooth development of five economic sectors, but a targeted and gradual implementation of 'Three Great Transformations' by dividing the economic sectors. Transformation was basically completed in 1956. From the perspective of employment, individual urban workers reached a peak of 8.98 million in 1953, up from 7.24 million in 1949, accounting for 32.6% of total

²See Bo Yibo: *Review of Several Important Decisions and Events*, Volume I, P. 58–61, Beijing, Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C. Press, 1991.

³*Fight to Mobilize all Powers to Build our Country into a Great Socialist Nation—Study and Propaganda Outline of the Party's General Route During the Transitional Period* (printed and issued by the Propaganda Department of the C.P.C. Central Committee in December, 1953,) *Selected Important Literature Since the Founding of the P.R.C.*, Book 4, P. 603, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2011.

⁴Mao Zedong said that the Party's general route during the transition period would be proposed by the C.P.C. Central Committee based on Lenin's theory of transition periods—an important theoretical basis. See Pang Song: *China in Mao Zedong's Times (1949–1976)* (I), P. 307, Beijing, C.P.C. History Press, 2003.

⁵Huang Kecheng claimed that Mao Zedong was kind-hearted, and was troubled by the people's livelihood all his life. In his later years, Mao still held great ambitions, and wanted to succeed quickly at something that would take hundreds of years to achieve. For this reason he got into trouble and made the idealist errors. His real intention was to handle the people's affairs well, and drive for revolution. He worked towards this idea all his life. See Tang Zhouyan: *Approaching Mao Zedong*, Guangming Daily, December 23, 2013, Version V.

urban employment (27.54 million people), but fell sharply to 160,000 in 1956, only accounting for 0.5% of total urban employment (32.05 million people). Jobs in private enterprises also fell sharply from a peak of 3.67 million in 1953 to just 30,000 in 1956.⁶ Socialist ownership by the people and socialist collective ownership became the foundation of the national economy.

- (2) **Public socialist economy.** From 1956 until Reform and Opening, China had two public ownership economies: socialist ownership by the people, and socialist collective ownership. This was the basic economic system of socialism; individual businesses and private enterprises were regarded as Capitalist. The public economy accounted for nearly 100% of the national economic aggregate, while the non-public economy all but disappeared. On the basis of so-called 'poverty and blankness', and against the backdrop of the US-led Western sanctions and blockades, an independent and relatively complete industrial system and national economic system were established. Jobs for individual urban workers reached 2.31 million in the early 1960s, but had fallen to only 150,000 by 1977. Even in large and medium-sized cities with good conditions for job creation, such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin, millions of new laborers went to work in the countryside and mountainous areas. This suggests that a failure to conform to the development laws of productive forces under China's national conditions means that single public ownership will not create more jobs in urban and rural areas. Low economic efficiency influences economic development.

By 1978, the gross domestic product (G.D.P.) was only 364.5 billion RMB. There were 250 million impoverished people in the rural areas, and tens of millions of job-seekers in urban zones. China's public ownership was not single, but a mixed public ownership economy. A high public ownership economy (ownership by the people) accounted for less than one fifth of the national employed population; the degree of public ownership within other public ownership economies (such as urban collective ownership and rural people's communes) was extremely low, determined by the low level of productive forces.

However, there were still many active market forces at play in both urban and rural areas. They were seen as spontaneous forces of capitalism, transacted by the black (illegal) market and grey (quasi-legal) market. Figuratively speaking, in a country with as vast a territory as China, market forces run along the lines of the saying: 'no prairie fire can destroy the grass; it shoots up again when the spring breeze blows'. Once reform is conducted, many economic sectors will experience explosive growth.

- (3) **Transition to a mixed socialist economy.** Since the start of Reform and Opening in 1978, China's basic economic system has experienced gradual but major change from two sectors of public ownership to a coexistence of diverse

⁶Prepared by NBS: *China Statistical Yearbook 1984*, PP. 107, 111, Beijing, China Statistics Press, 1984.

economic sectors. The first was the rapid development of township enterprises. Initially, they took the form of communes and brigade enterprises with collective ownership, but were based on a market mechanism drive, without planned targets, price control, or supervision. They displayed the most market vitality of the new economic organizations. The second were individual businesses. In 1978 these accounted for 0.16% of the urban employed population. Both the *Regulations on Several Specific Policies of Original Industrialists and Businessmen* approved by the Party Central Committee in December 1979 and the *Further Promotion of Urban Employment* forwarded by the Party Central Committee on August 17, 1980, explicitly stated a necessity to encourage and foster individual urban economies.

The report to the 12th C.P.C. National Congress in September 1982 put forward the idea of developing many economic forms, and encouraging individual laborers' economies in both rural and urban areas. The purpose of this was to make appropriate developments within the scope stipulated by the state and under the industrial and commercial administration management, as a necessary and useful supplement to the public ownership economy. Article 11 of the *Constitution of the People's Republic of China* adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in December of the same year stipulated that urban and rural laborers' individual economies must fall within the scope of the law to be supplements of the socialist public ownership economy. The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the individual economy.

In October 1984, the *Decision of the Party Central Committee on Economic System Reform* made at the Third Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the C.P.C. called for various economic forms to be developed. The economic sector under the ownership of the people was the dominant force in China's socialist economy. The collective economy was an important component. The common development of various economic forms and modes of operation was to be pursued. The release of the *Decision* allowed individual urban businesses to develop rapidly during this period. By 1985, individual businesses accounted for 3.51% of the urban employed population, rising to 3.60% in 1990.

The Report to the 13th C.P.C. National Congress in 1987 reflected upon the errors of history. Starting from the late 1950s, left-leaning mistakes made China anxious for success. The belief was that relying on subjective desires and mass movements could dramatically improve productive forces; the bigger and more public the form of socialist ownership, the better. In terms of ownership and allocation, a socialist society does not require the highest degree of purity and absolute fairness. Currently, other economic sectors aside from ownership by the people have achieved limited development. This shows that the Party has made a major breakthrough in understanding the basic socialist economic system, changing from pure socialism to a mixed economic system. To this end, the Report called for continued development of an economy with various types of ownership on the basis of public ownership. A certain degree of development within the private economy is helpful to promote production, activate the market, expand employment, and

meet the demands of the people in many aspects. It is a necessary and beneficial supplement to the public ownership economy.

Article 11 of the *Constitution* included a new paragraph that read: ‘The State permits the private sector of the economy to exist and develop within the limits prescribed by law. The private economy is a supplement to the socialist economy under public ownership. The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the private sector of the economy, and exercises guidance, supervision and control over it’. This gave a green light to the development of the private sector within the mixed economy, and provided an important legal guarantee. By 1990, private enterprises accounted for 0.33% of the urban employed population, and most had changed from individual businesses.

China’s opening became the basis for national policy. This broke the pattern of ownership by the people, and attracted foreign direct investment. A new wave of modernization and competitiveness promoted the formation of a mixed economy. On May 4, 1984, the Party Central Committee and the State Council approved the *Symposium Summary of Some Coastal Cities*, opening 14 coastal port cities such as Dalian, and establishing economic and technological development zones. The *Summary* proposed a broadening of the power of examination and approval in using foreign capital for construction projects; an increase in foreign exchange quotas and exchange loans; active support for the use of foreign capital and introduction of advanced technology to reform old enterprises; preferential treatment for Sino-foreign joint ventures, cooperative enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises; the establishment of several economic and technological development zones; a ramping up of the export of products made from imported materials; adjustments to the openness of several cities; strengthening of the construction of infrastructure; firming up the guidelines of the plan for using foreign capital; and a dedication to reform.

On April 12, 1986, the Fourth Session of the Fourth National People’s Congress adopted the *Law on Foreign-funded Enterprises*, providing the legal basis for the development of a foreign economy. The Report to the 13th C.P.C. National Congress in 1987 pointed out that Sino-foreign joint ventures, cooperative enterprises and wholly foreign-owned enterprises were a necessity and a beneficial supplement for China’s socialist economy. The legitimate interests of foreign investors would be given practical protection, and the investment environment would be improved. Between 1979 and 1982, the amount of foreign direct investment was \$1.77 billion, reaching \$4.3 billion between 1983 and 1985, and rising to \$30 billion between 1986 and 1992. The proportion of foreign direct investment in the G.D.P. rose from 0.3% in 1983 to 2.3% in 1992.⁷ From 1979 to 1984, the number of foreign direct investment projects was 3724, reaching 87,543 between 1985 and 1992.⁸

⁷National Bureau of Statistics, *China Statistical Abstract 2013*, P. 69.

⁸National Bureau of Statistics, *China Statistical Yearbook 2013*, P. 243.

During this period, China did not conduct large-scale privatization for enterprises and units under the ownership of the people, but expanded the enterprises' management autonomy. It implemented a corporate responsibility contract system, changed the incentive mechanism, and promoted the transformation of enterprises. This led to a rise in employment figures within state-owned units, but the proportion among the urban employed population went into dramatic decline. It stood at 60.71% in 1990, decreasing by 17.61% from 78.32% in 1978. The proportion of urban collective-owned units among the urban employed population first increased, and then decreased, to 20.83% in 1990, slightly less than 21.53% in 1978.

During this period, China gradually evolved from a single public ownership economy to a coexistence of a public ownership economy and a non-public ownership economy. Figuratively speaking, it went from walking on one leg to two legs, gradually forming a symbiotic pattern that allowed for economic growth.

In 1993, using data from 1978 to 1992, I concluded that since the reform, one of the most ground-breaking and substantial examples of progress is the way in which the rapid development of non-state-owned economy broke the pattern of the state-owned economy, unifying the country and dominating the world. This brought significant changes to China's economic structure. The mixed economy relied mainly on the non-state-owned economy, with diverse economic sectors coexisting. China formed two major types with nine economic sectors. The two types are the state-owned economy and the non-state-owned economy. The nine sectors refer to:

- (1) the state-owned economy (economic type of production goods belonging to the state);
- (2) the collective economy;
- (3) the jointly-owned economy;
- (4) the individual economy;
- (5) the jointly-operated economy;
- (6) the share economy;
- (7) the foreign-funded economy;
- (8) the Hong Kong-, Macao- and Taiwan-invested economy;
- (9) other economies.

I also put forward two core issues. The first: is private property inviolable? Does private property conduct voluntary exchange or market exchange, or force exchange or non-market exchange? Should principles like exclusivity and universality of private property rights be admitted publicly? Private economic operators worry most about whether their private property will be confiscated, as in the nationalization movement of the 1950s. They fear that economic activity will be banned again. The second question: do state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises conduct fair competition? Are the tax system and interest rate equal?⁹

⁹Hu Angang: *From Nationalization to Denationalization*, January, 1993, modified in November, 1994, Hu Angang: *Hu Angang's Works—China Steps towards Ten Great Relations in the 21st Century*, P. 405, 419-421, Harbin, Heilongjiang Education Press, 1995.

- (4) **The development of a mixed socialist economy.** In 1992, marked by Deng Xiaoping's South Tour Speech and the 14th C.P.C. National Congress, ownership reform of China's socialist economy entered a new stage. The *Decision of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. on Several Issues of Establishing the Socialist Market Economic System* made at the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee of the C.P.C. set the policy of adhering to public ownership as the basis, with diverse economic sectors developing side by side. During the promotion of the state-owned and collective economies, the development of individual, private and foreign economies was also encouraged. The opening of the non-public economy marked the beginning of a period of flourishing development. In 1997, the 15th C.P.C. National Congress stressed that public ownership with diverse forms of ownership developing side by side was the basic economic system of the primary stage of socialism in China, and that the non-public economy was an important part of the socialist economy. In 1999, the *Decision on Several Major Issues of State-owned Enterprises Reform and Development* made at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee of the C.P.C. put forward that reform of state-owned enterprises should develop a mixed ownership economy.

By 2002, employment in private urban enterprises reached 19.99 million, 35 times that of 1990, with an average annual growth rate of 34.5%. Employment in private rural enterprises reached 14.11 million, 12.5 times that of 1990, with an average annual growth rate of 23.4%.

In urban areas, the proportion of individual businesses among the employed population increased from 3.60% in 1990 to 9.23% in 2000, and the proportion of private enterprise increased from 0.33 to 5.45%. However, the proportion of state-owned units decreased from 60.71 to 35%, and the proportion of urban collective-owned units decreased from 20.83 to 6.47% (see Table 5.1).

- (5) **The development of a mixed socialist economy.** The *Decision on Several Issues of Perfecting the Socialist Market Economy* made at the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the C.P.C. in 2003 called for a perfecting of the system of public ownership as the basis, with diverse forms of ownership developing side by side. This was designed to develop the mixed ownership economy with participation of state-owned, collective, and non-public capital, and establish and improve the management and supervision system of state-owned assets. Our assessment report shows that significant progress has been made in the above tasks.

First of all, a structure for modern corporate governance of state-owned enterprises was established. More than 90% of state-owned enterprises across the country completed reforms of their corporate and joint-stock systems. Most set up boards of shareholders, directors, managers, and supervisors, plus other organizations, and gradually standardized their corporate governance structures. Many

Table 5.1 Proportion of urban employees in various economic sectors (1978–2012). Unit: %

	1978	1985	1990	1995	1998	2000	2005	2012
State-owned units	78.32	70.19	60.71	59.14	41.90	35.00	22.85	18.43
Urban collective-owned units	21.53	25.95	20.83	16.53	9.08	6.47	2.85	1.59
Joint-stock cooperative units	0	0	0	0	0.63	0.67	0.66	0.40
Joint ownership units	0	0.30	0.56	0.28	0.22	0.18	0.16	0.11
Limited liability companies	0	0	0	0	2.24	2.97	6.16	10.21
Joint stock companies	0	0	0	1.66	1.90	1.97	2.46	3.35
Private enterprises	0	0	0.33	2.55	4.50	5.48	12.18	20.37
Hong Kong-, Macao- and Taiwan-funded units	0	0	0.02	1.43	1.36	1.34	1.96	2.61
Foreign funded units	0	0.05	0.36	1.27	1.36	1.43	2.42	3.36
Individual Businesses	0.16	3.51	3.60	8.19	10.45	9.23	9.79	15.21
Undercounting	0	0	13.59	8.95	26.36	35.26	38.51	24.36

Notes Undercounting refers to the sum of urban employees minus the sum of employees from different economic sectors

Data source National Bureau of Statistics: *China Statistical Yearbook 2012*, PP. 126–127; *China Statistical Yearbook 2013*, P. 121

state-owned enterprises implemented a diversity of equities, forming limited liability companies with mixed ownership.¹⁰

After the long and difficult process of reform, state-owned enterprises entered a golden age of rapid progress. Since Reform and Opening, state-owned enterprises have experienced decline (1978–1997), resurrection (1997–2002), and a new rise (2003–2013). During this entire period, the amount of state-owned assets greatly increased, state-owned capital layout and structure were constantly optimized, the competitiveness of the state-owned economy was enhanced, and the quality of development was significantly improved. The state-owned economy was integrated into market economy, and¹¹ a large number of state-owned enterprises grew into world-class companies. The proportion of state-owned enterprises among the total was lower, but China is¹² an increasingly powerful late-comer to the stage of the world's top 500¹³ and top 2000 companies. In 2000, only nine Chinese state-owned

¹⁰Guide to the *C.P.C.'s Decision on Several Important Issues in Comprehensively Deepening Reform*, P. 85, People's Publishing Press, 2013.

¹¹Guide to the *C.P.C.'s Decision on Several Important Issues in Comprehensively Deepening Reform*, P. 85, People's Publishing Press, 2013.

¹²The world's top 500 enterprises refers to *FT Global 500* issued by the American magazine *Fortune*, which is the most famous and authoritative list for measuring giant global enterprises; its shortlist threshold to *Fortune Global 500* is operation revenue (calculated in USD).

¹³Global 2000 refers to the *Global 2000* issued by American magazine *Forbes*, which is assessed based on several indicators such as sales volume, profit, assets, and market value. In 2012, China had 136 enterprises listed, trumped only by the U.S.A. (524) and Japan (258).

Table 5.2 Contributions of major nations to the world's top 500 enterprises (1990–2013)

	1990	1996	2000	2005	2010	2012	2013	Variation from 2000 to 2013
U.S.A.	164	153	179	177	140	132	132	-47
Japan	111	141	108	81	71	68	62	-46
UK	43	32	38	35	30	26	26	-12
Germany	30	40	37	36	37	32	29	-8
France	30	42	37	39	39	32	31	-6
Canada	12	6	12	13	11	11	9	-2
Korea	11	12	11	11	10	13	14	+3
India	6	1	1	5	8	8	8	+4
Russia		1	2	3	6	7	7	+5
Greater China	1	2	11	18	54	79	95	+84
Mainland China	1	2	9	15	43	70	86	+77
State-owned enterprises	1	2	9	15	41	65	78	+69
Private enterprises					2	5	7	+7

Data source Fortune, world's top 500 enterprises ranking list database

enterprises made it into the world's top 500, and 85 in 2013. Among were 78 state-owned and state-holding enterprises, and seven private enterprises (see Table 5.2). The development of the state-owned economy changed from large and comprehensive to strong and detailed. The fundamentality and strategic industry of the national economy and the people's livelihood was strengthened and refined, giving full play to the new advantages of a socialist market economy in centralizing the resources for development of strategic industry, and representing the collective rise of China's enterprises.

Secondly, a system by which the non-public economy had equal participation in the competition of the market economy was established. An incentive policy was put forward to develop and guide the non-public economy, and the private economy entered a golden age of comprehensive development. According to data from the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, the number of actual enterprises across the country grew dramatically. Between 2002 and 2013, the average annual growth rate was 6.90%, with the number of private enterprise growing fastest, with an average annual growth rate of 15.0%. The proportion of private enterprises among the total number across the country increased from 35.93 to 80.43% (see Table 5.3). During this period, the number of individual businesses increased from 23.77 to 44.36 million, with an average annual growth rate of 5.84%. The national total (referring to the total number of actual enterprises and individual businesses)

increased from 31.11 to 59.64 million, with an average annual growth rate of 6.09%. From the perspective of starting a business, and excluding agricultural labor forces in rural areas, **the proportion of the total number of national market economic subjects among the entire population rose from 2.42% in 2002 to 4.38% in 2013, showing that various market economic subjects had been activated to create economic aggregate, trade volume, and new employment during this period.**

By the end of November 2013, there were 15.0382 million actual national enterprises (including branches, similarly hereinafter), with registered capital (funds) of 95.29 trillion RMB—an average of 6.33 million RMB per enterprise. There were 14.5919 million domestic enterprises, with registered capital (funds) of 82.97 trillion RMB—an average of 5.69 million RMB per enterprise. There were 12.293 million domestic enterprises, with registered capital (funds) of 38.26 trillion RMB—an average of 3.11 million RMB per enterprise. There were 0.4464 million domestic enterprises, with registered capital of 12.32 trillion RMB—an average of 2.76 million RMB per enterprise. There were 44.0041 million individual enterprises, with a capital amount of 2.39 trillion RMB—an average of 54,300 RMB per enterprise. There were 950,700 professional farmers' cooperatives, with a total investment of 17,800 RMB—an average of 1.87 million RMB per cooperative.¹⁴ Compared with the end of June 2007, the proportion of the registered capital (fund) of private enterprises increased from 25.1 to 40.2%.

Here, only private enterprises above a designated size are taken into consideration. From 2002 to 2012, the number of enterprises increased 2.84 times, with an average annual growth rate of 14.4%. Even with a large number of private enterprises withdrawing from the market or going bankrupt, the birth rate was significantly higher than the death rate, and the growth rate was the largest in the world. Total assets increased 17.4 times, with an average annual growth rate of 33.1%. Assets per enterprise increased from 17.88 to 80.59 million RMB, representing the fastest growth rate in the world. Sales revenue growth increased 22.9 times, with an average annual growth rate of 37.3%—also the world's fastest. Total profits increased 40.2 times, with an average annual growth rate of 45.0%. Although many enterprises operated at a loss or failed to produce profit, on the whole, China's private enterprise sector was the world's most profitable.

From the perspective of urban employment across the country, from 2000 to 2012 the proportion of individual businesses among the employed population increased from 9.23 to 15.21%, making these businesses the third largest employment channel. The proportion of private enterprises among the employed population increased from 5.45 to 20.37%, becoming the largest employment channel. The proportion of state-owned units decreased from 35 to 18.43%, becoming the second largest employment channel. The proportion of urban collective-owned units decreased from 6.47 to 1.59% (see Table 5.1).

¹⁴*China Industry and Commerce News*, December 16, 2013.

Table 5.3 Number of actual enterprises and individual businesses across the country (2003–2013). Unit: 10 thousand

Year	Total number of actual enterprises	Private enterprises	Proportion of private enterprises (%)	Individual businesses	National total	Proportion among total population (%)
2002	734	264	35.93	2377	3111	2.42
2003	770	329	42.71	2353	3123	2.41
2004	814	402	49.45	2350	3164	2.43
2005	857	472	55.08	2464	3321	2.53
2006	919	544	59.21	2596	3515	2.67
2007	964	603	62.56	2742	3706	2.80
2008	971	657	67.67	2917	3888	2.93
2009	1043	740	70.98	3197	4240	3.18
2010	1136	846	74.40	3453	4589	3.42
2011	1253	968	77.22	3756	5009	3.72
2012	1367	1086	79.45	4059	5426	4.00
2013	1528	1229	80.43	4436	5964	4.38
Average annual growth rate from 2002 to 2013 (%)	6.90	15.00	45.43	5.84	6.09	

Notes National total refers to the total number of actual enterprises and individual businesses

5.2 State-Owned and Private: A Dual System

China has formed a unique mixed socialist economy. **It is composed of dozens of sub-economies.** Within enterprises established by joint investment, equity participation and joint production (according to the investment subject of different ownership types), at least 11 kinds of economic sectors have sprung up in China's cities and towns, including state-owned units, urban collectives, joint-stock cooperative units, jointly-operated units, limited liability companies, joint stock companies, private enterprises, Hong Kong-, Macao- and Taiwan-invested units, and individual businesses, as well as informal employment or self-employed personnel who fall outside of the statistics, including artists, actors, and tour guides.

The non-public economy has become an engine for employment, economic development, and taxation. This is why the *Decision of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. on Comprehensively Deepening Reform of Several Major Issues* (hereinafter referred to as the *Decision*) made at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the C.P.C. regarded the non-public economy and public ownership economy as an important component of the socialist market economy. Both are important foundations of China's economic and social development. It is a case of existence determining consciousness, rather than consciousness determining

existence. The ‘existence’ is China’s basic national conditions, i.e. the primary stage of socialism. The ‘consciousness’ reflects realistic demand, namely, creating jobs for a quarter of the world’s labor force. Obviously, a public ownership economy cannot meet the basic demands.

The non-public economy has become an important foundation of China’s overall economy. At present, the G.D.P. proportion of the non-public economy is more than 60%; tax contribution is more than 50%; employment contribution is more than 80%; and new employment contribution is 90%. About 70% of technological innovation, 65% of domestic patent inventions, and more than 80% of new products come from small and medium-sized enterprises of which more than 95% are publicly owned.¹⁵ **In the three decades since Reform and Opening, private enterprises have developed from nothing, expanding from small to large and then from large to vast. This has been the longest and most significant golden age of development in China’s history. The growth of Chinese private enterprises has taken just 20 years, and development has been explosive.**

As for the various advantages of private and state-owned enterprises, taking industrial enterprises above a designated size as the example, in 2012, the employment proportion of private enterprise was 32.8%, and that of state-owned enterprises was 19.9%. The proportion of taxes and surcharges of private enterprises was 13.0%, and of state-owned enterprises 70.3% (see Table 5.4). Obviously, the main contribution of private enterprises is to create jobs, especially small and micro enterprises. According to data from the *National Small and Micro Enterprise Development Report* issued by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, there were a total of 15.2784 million enterprises across the country by the end of 2013. Among them, the number of small and micro enterprises was 11.6987 million, accounting for 76.57% of the total. If 44.3629 million individual businesses and micro enterprises were included in the statistics, **the proportion of market subjects registered by small and micro enterprises for conducting industrial and commercial registration was 94.15%.**¹⁶ Small and micro enterprises accounted for the absolute majority of market subjects. To this end, an executive meeting of the State Council ruled in favor of further reducing the tax burden, helping small and micro enterprise grow, and increasing annual taxable income to 60,000 RMB (which was the upper limit of the implementation of the preferential policy of collecting half of an enterprise’s income tax), and extending the policy deadline to the end of 2016.¹⁷ The main contribution of state-owned enterprises is to create tax revenue. In this case, each complements the other’s advantages, and makes their own contributions to the health of the nation.

¹⁵*Guide to the C.P.C.’s Decision on Several Important Issues in Comprehensively Deepening Reform*, P. 68, People’s Publishing Press, 2013.

¹⁶*Economic Daily*, April 4, 2014.

¹⁷On April 2, 2014, the Premier of the State Council Li Keqiang convened an executive meeting of the State Council, and expanded the implementation scope of the preferential policies on the income tax of small and micro enterprises. Xinhua News Agency, April 2, 2014.

Table 5.4 Proportion of economic indicators of industrial enterprises above a designated size according to economic type (2012). Unit: %

	Employees	Social fixed asset investment	Number of enterprises	Total assets	Main business income	Total profit	Total taxes
State-owned units	8.92	25.68	1.97	13.28	8.34	6.27	47.13
Urban collective-owned units	0.77	3.20	1.40	0.74	1.18	1.45	0.96
Joint-stock cooperative units	0.19	0.47	0.70	0.41	0.44	0.49	
Joint ownership units	0.05	0.34	0.14	0.13	0.12	0.11	
Limited liability companies	4.94	27.36	19.48	29.25	24.12	22.48	
Joint stock companies	1.62	5.73	2.62	12.76	9.70	12.36	
Private enterprises	14.73	24.40	55.06	19.85	30.74	32.62	23.40
Hong Kong-, Macao-Taiwan-funded units	1.26	2.74	7.54	8.62	8.68	7.99	
Foreign funded units	1.62	2.81	9.01	13.81	15.20	14.57	
Others	NA	4.19	2.08	1.15	1.48	1.68	
Individuals	11.25	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	

A common development pattern for diverse economic sectors has been formed, which is embodied in the fact that different economic types have their respective proportions and characteristics among the main indicators. In terms of employment, the private economy has made the biggest contribution. In terms of fixed investment of the whole of society, the state-owned economy and private economy are neck and neck. In terms of the number of industrial enterprises above a designated size, the state-owned economy is significantly smaller than the private economy, which shows the differing orientations and characteristics of the state-owned economy and the private economy. In terms of assets, investment, revenue and profit, the vitality of limited liability companies and joint stock companies must not be ignored, as they will be the locus of future development for the mixed economy. In addition, the ratio of profit to income of the private economy is higher than that of the state-owned economy, which contradicts the idea of an expansion of state-owned enterprises and reduction of private enterprises.

This bipedal system is different from the single leg of a sole public ownership economy within the traditional planned economic system, and is also unlike the private economy-based single leg of the Western free-market economy. Walking on two legs can be seen as superior to just one, inasmuch as it is more stable, more rapid, and more sustainable.

Chinese enterprises, whether state-owned or private, are the vehicles for creating material wealth, helping China to become the world's second-largest economic entity and the largest exporter. They are also vehicles of technological innovation, leading China to become the world's largest applicant of patents for invention and the fourth-largest for international patents. They have made a major contribution to China's rise. The common development of the state-owned economy and the non-state-owned economy is the root cause and basic characteristics of China's economic boom.

5.3 The Future of China's Mixed Economy

The mixed ownership economy fits with China's basic national conditions, and has adapted to development to become an important feature of the socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics. Since this system was put forward in the report to the 15th C.P.C. National Congress, it has gradually developed to maturity. It is different from private ownership under laissez-faire Western capitalism, and also distinct from the public ownership of traditional socialist countries. It is not a subjective choice, but the result of objective practice. A mixed ownership economy is more dynamic than a single economy with only one type of ownership.

In Zizhang's *Knowledge of Palace Affairs* it was stated that 'no fish can survive if the water is too clean. For the same reason, no company can succeed if the requirements are too critical.'¹⁸ From the perspective of materialistic dialectics, all societies contain contradictions,¹⁹ making an excess of 'purity' impossible. Not even a socialist society can be too 'pure'. Conversely, a mixed society is more realistic, and a mixed economy is more competitive and viable. Thus, it is easy to understand why China implemented a mixed new-democratic economy, taking both public and private interests into account, then introduced nationalization and collectivization, canceled the private economy, and set up a public economy in its place. After Reform and Opening, it restored the private economy alongside the public economy, and formed a unique mixed socialist market economy taking both public and private interests into account in the process of exploring and establishing a basic socialist economic system. Only in the 'negation of negation' can a cycle be created. The higher stage repeats some characteristics of the old stage, forming a development process from junior to senior and from simple to complex.

The development of China's mixed economy looks to reach a new level in the future. The introduction to Part 2 of the *Decision* (Upholding and Improving the Basic Economic System) pointed out that a basic economic system led by public

¹⁸Dadai's *Record of Rites—Zizhang's Knowledge of Palace Affairs*.

¹⁹Mao Zedong said that 'the world consists of contradictions. Without contradiction, nothing would exist. Our task is to handle these contradictions properly'. Mao Zedong: *On Ten Great Relations*, April 25, 1956, Mao Zedong's Collected Works, Volume 7, Beijing, P. 44.

ownership with diverse forms of ownership developing side by side was an important pillar of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics, and also the foundation of the socialist market economy. The public ownership economy and the non-public ownership economy were both crucial to the socialist market economy, forming the basis of China's economic and social development.

Progress hinges on a consolidation and development of the public ownership economy. It involves adhering to the principal position of public ownership, promoting the leading role of the state-owned economy, and enhancing its vitality, control and influence. Economic development of non-public ownership must be encouraged, and the economic vigor and creativity of non-public ownership must be promoted.

The basic economic system of socialism with Chinese characteristics is a mixed economy with public ownership as the principal part and diverse forms of ownership developing side by side—a 'two-legged' layout. Considering both fundamental and long-term interests, it is a relationship of symbiosis, co-prosperity and mutual success. In terms of public policy and market competition, it is a relationship of equality and fairness. The difference between them lies only in the forms of enterprise ownership; they adopt the same policy. Both are important components of the socialist market economy, creating a fair competitive environment, and enjoying equal rights, opportunities and rules. Their property rights are inviolable.

An important measure in achieving the 'bipedal' structure of a state-operated and private economy was to realize the development of a mixed ownership economy put forward in the *Decision*. Cross-shareholding was used for mutual integration. Developing a mixed ownership economy is essentially a case of brooking no differentiation among the various ownership economies, and eliminating the barriers between the types, creating a situation of fair competition.

Basic characteristics such as difference, diversity and diversification of Chinese society determine that mixed a economic structure best fits the national conditions, particularly in terms of the disparity between urban and rural areas, regions and departments.

Various economic sectors can realize complementary advantages, and form a community of interests. China's rapid economic development shows that the relationship between them is not contradictory, but allows for mutual promotion and coordinated development. The vehicle of the state-owned economy is the state-owned enterprise, while private enterprises offer development momentum to the private economy. The relationship between state-owned and private enterprises illustrates that different economic sectors have their own advantages. Both can prosper in the socialist market economy, while playing varying roles and functions. Within international market competition, state-owned enterprises are resource-, capital-, technology- and talent-intensive. Their core task is to conduct robust competition with the world's top 500 and top 2000 enterprises. They are rising rapidly, occupying the heights of strategic emerging industries and participating in scientific and technical innovation.

In fact, the ownership characteristics of China's state-run enterprises have undergone major changes, taking on the likeness of mixed ownership. To be precise, the term 'state-owned enterprise' now also refers to state-held enterprises—very different from the previous wholly state-owned enterprises.

According to statistics from the Ministry of Finance, 90% of the country's state-owned enterprises have already completed reforms to their company systems. Among the companies listed in A Shares, 43% are state-owned holding enterprises, some of which are listed overseas. The final settlement data of the Ministry of Finance shows that ownership interest belonging to the parent company of state-owned enterprises in consolidated statements is around 80%. This suggests that 20% of total operating revenues and realized profits of state-owned enterprises are not enjoyed by the parent company of enterprise group, and that the degree of diversification of property rights in state-owned enterprises is improving, approaching the level of mixed ownership.²⁰

At present, central enterprises and their subsidiary enterprises introduce non-public capital to form mixed ownership companies, which already account for 52% of the total number of enterprises. From 2005 to 2012, state-owned listed holding companies introduced more than 638 private investment items with an accumulated total of 1.5146 trillion RMB by convertible bonds issued by the stock market. By the end of 2012, there were a total of 378 listed holding companies of the central enterprise and its subsidiary enterprises, and the proportion of non-state-owned equity among listed companies exceeded 53%.²¹ In addition to 113 central enterprises under the supervision of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, the central enterprise included the following three categories:

- (1) China Railway Corporation, China Post Group Corporation and China National Tobacco Corporation, with the Ministry of Finance performing the duties of contributor representative or supervision of state-owned assets;
- (2) Central cultural groups after reorganization, with the Ministry of Finance performing the duties of contributor representative—109 in total;
- (3) Enterprises subordinate to the central department, of which the subordinate relationship retained a close link with the department's execution of duty—6200 in total.

At present, there are 43 financial state-owned enterprises under the central management, including state-owned commercial banks of industry, agriculture and construction, four asset management companies, and other non-banking financial institutions such as state-owned securities and insurance. The central financial enterprises also belong to the central enterprises.²²

²⁰*Clarifying Concepts, and Paving the Road for Reform—Interview with the Director of the Comprehensive Department of the Enterprise Division of the Ministry of Finance, Economic Daily, March 20, 2014.*

²¹*Guide to the C.P.C.'s Decision on Several Important Issues in Comprehensively Deepening Reform, People's Publishing Press, 2013.*

²²*Clarifying Concepts, and Paving the Road for Reform—Interview with the Director of the Comprehensive Department of the Enterprise Division of the Ministry of Finance, Economic Daily, March 20, 2014.*

For the future development of state-owned enterprises into mixed ownership enterprises, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council put forward²³ four main ideas in accordance with the gist of the *Decision*. First, a small number of state-owned enterprises, state-owned capital investment companies and state-owned capital operating companies related to national security can adopt the wholly state-owned form. Second, state-owned enterprises of important industries and key areas related to the lifelines of the national economy can maintain absolute state-owned holdings. Third, important state-owned enterprises within pillar industries, and high and new technology industries are permitted to keep state-owned relative holdings. Fourth, state-owned enterprises without controlling state-owned capital coming under the control of social capital can take the form of state-owned shared or entire withdrawals. The State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council encourages strategic investors with capital, technology, and management advantages, as well as institutional investors into social security funds, insurance funds and equity investment funds to participate in the reform and reorganization of state-owned enterprises.

After the reform of diverse equities, state-owned enterprises will have four kinds of situation:

- (1) Some state-owned enterprises will become public companies within the overall listing;
- (2) Some state-owned enterprises will become unlisted mixed ownership enterprises;
- (3) After all subordinate enterprises of state-owned enterprises have completed reform of their corporate and joint-stock systems, enterprises that meet the requirement can be transformed into state-owned capital operating companies;
- (4) A small number of state-owned enterprises responsible for national security will be transformed into wholly state-owned companies.

Through optimizing the equity structure of its state-owned enterprises, China can build and develop a mixed ownership economy. Joint holding, relevance, and spillover of products, services, trade, and industry can be used to encourage large enterprises to drive small ones, and promote state-owned enterprise to push non-state-owned one, forming a unique chain of enterprise, trade, and industry.

State-owned enterprises must perfect the management system of state-owned assets, taking capital as leverage, and defining their function and role in manipulating state-owned capital to serve national strategic targets. They must pay more attention to important industries and key areas relating to national security and the national economy, focusing on providing public services, developing important

²³The Vice Director of State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, Huang Shu's introduction in the news press of the State Council Information Office of the P.R.C., *People's Daily*, December 20, 2013.

forward-looking strategic industries, protecting the ecological environment, supporting scientific and technological progress, and safeguarding national security.

If the buzzword for state-owned enterprises is 'reform', the motto of private enterprises is 'transformation', namely, completing the transformation from primary (mom-and-pop stores, and individual businesses) to intermediate (family-owned enterprises), and then to advanced (modern enterprises) through the establishment of a modern enterprise system. Relative to countries with developed market economies and centuries of history, China's private enterprises have only been running for 20 years. However, their speed of growth is far higher. They have the limits aside from the external environment (such as market access limitation), their financing channel is narrow and fraught, and they are not attractive to high-end employees. They are mainly restricted by their internal capabilities, or lack thereof. According to a survey by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, the private sector lacks management experience. All except 42% of the total owners used to be managers and individual business operators; the rest have little experience in business management. Many were laborers or farmers before starting their businesses.²⁴ This reflects the fact that most Chinese entrepreneurs begin as individual business operators, laborers and farmers, and their companies are based on blood relationships, family, friends and relatives, and other traditional resources. Modes of familial and paternalistic corporate governance are widely adopted. According to the statistics, 99% of private enterprises in China are small and medium-sized; 90% are family enterprises,²⁵ with poor scientific and technical innovation, low core competitiveness, prominent conflicts of interest between labor and capital, and little cohesive force. Non-public enterprises must be encouraged to participate in the reform of state-owned enterprises. The development of mixed ownership enterprises with non-public capital holding should be promoted, and private enterprises must contribute to establishing a modern enterprise system according to the requirements of the *Decision*. In this sense, it is necessary to encourage the two types of enterprises to form a community of interests, to learn from each other and grow together. This new mixed economic model consists of symbiosis, co-prosperity and mutual benefit within the socialist market economy. Cooperation can create millions of enterprises, hundreds of millions of jobs, and a G.D.P. of trillions of RMB each year.

China's mixed economy has huge positive externality and spillover for the rest of the world. Its state-owned enterprises and private enterprises need to enter the competition, expand cooperation, and strengthen the nation's economic power on the world stage. Development space both domestically and abroad is a huge opportunity for all economic sectors.

²⁴Zhang Chunlin, et al.: *China: Promote the Innovation Dominated by Enterprises*, PP. 74–76, Beijing CITTIC Press, 2009.

²⁵Guide for the C.P.C.'s *Decision on Several Important Issues in Comprehensively Deepening Reform*, P. 100, People's Publishing Press, 2013.

5.4 Summary: Two Legs Are Better Than One

The practice of Chinese economic ownership has experienced several development paths. It moved from a new-democratic mixed economy to a socialist public ownership economy during the first 30 years. A socialist ideal was engendered, underpinned by the belief that the bigger and more public the form of socialist ownership was, the better. However, walking on one leg is never as productive as walking on two.

In the last 30 years, China's economic reform rapidly created a unique socialist economy with mixed ownership, reaching a new pattern of mutual connection, spillover, cooperation, and competition. This led to smooth and orderly development featuring mutual integration—the structure of a mixed economy with a public orientation, in which different economic sectors coexist and advance side by side. This 'bipedal' system was different from the single leg of the public ownership economy under the traditional planned economic system, and was likewise dissimilar to the private economy-based leg of the Western free-market economy. It had little in common with the economic transition of the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries through the privatization of state-owned enterprises, in which one leg was 'cut off', and an artificial leg (so-called private monopolies) was affixed. China breathed life into its state-owned enterprises through reform, simultaneously offering strong support to the private economy. This proved the many advantages of a 'two-legged' set-up'.

The Third Plenary Session of 18th Central Committee of the C.P.C. served as a new milestone for China's mixed economy, which had reached a state of maturity. China's economic aggregate and quality will be expanded and improved based on an economic composition and structure that conforms to national conditions. China's future economic development must continue on 'two legs'. State-owned enterprises must be enlarged and strengthened, as must private companies.

China now has the most companies of any nation in the world, exceeding that of the United States and the E.U. by a large margin. According to statistics, the E.U. has 20.7 million small and medium-sized enterprises, while the United States has five million.²⁶ China has more than 15 million actual enterprises, more than 44 million individual businesses, and nearly six million small and medium-sized enterprises. It has entered an era of entrepreneurialism. Chinese entrepreneurs are a vehicle for G.D.P. and job creation. They are responsible for many technological innovations and create a significant amount of wealth. The rise and fall of an enterprise should not be judged by the type of ownership. Telling a good company from a bad is very simple. It includes judging:

- (1) technological innovation versus forgery/faking;
- (2) credibility versus fraudulence;
- (3) environmental protection versus pollution;

²⁶Oliver Wyman, *2020 Asian Financial Prospect*, 2014.

- (4) benefits to both labor and capital versus hostility;
- (5) performance of social responsibility versus failure to perform;
- (6) evergreen versus and transient.

Any enterprise meeting the first five conditions of a good enterprise has the potential to become evergreen.

Chapter 6

Central-Local Relations

As a huge country with a high population, a vast territory and imbalanced economic development across various regions, China has both the advantages and disadvantages of all large nations, particularly in terms of politics. This means that a careful balance between central and local relations is critical, especially under the governance of a single party. China deals with central-local relations using two initiatives, having learned that one initiative leads to improper handling. Mao Zedong believed that a combination of central and local initiatives was the key to success.¹ In essence, this refers to the formation of a mechanism for incentive compatibility, through which each initiative can play its proper role, and national strength can be united to focus on state affairs.

The *Decision of the CC.P.C.C. on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform* (hereinafter referred to as *Decision*) laid out at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the C.P.C. called for the proper handling of central-local, global-local, and present-future relations, as well as the adjustment of interest patterns. The differing functions of central and local governments were defined thus: ‘to strengthen the central government’s duty and capability in terms of macro-control, and to reinforce local governments’ duties such as public services, market supervision, social administration and environmental protection.’ During the progress of comprehensively deepening reform, central-local relations have affected the overall situation of reform, requiring that central and local governments give better play to the two initiatives along with their own advantages, in order to perform their own functions, and realize both national and local governance.

Guide to the C.P.C.’s *Decision on Several Important Issues in Comprehensively Deepening the Reform*, P. 100, People’s Publishing Press, 2013.

¹Mao Zedong: *On Ten Great Relations* (April 25, 1956), *Mao Zedong’s Collected Works*, Volume 7, P. 31, Beijing, People’s Publishing House, 1999.

Over the past over 60 years, especially since Reform and Opening, there have been significant changes within central-local relations. Highly centralized power has gone through several structural reforms, being delegated to local governments. This has resulted in a standardized separation of central and local power (including property and affairs); through trial and error, stable relations have been maintained based on institutional construction, having developed based on frequent policy adjustment. Through information sharing and communication based on a more democratic and interactive system of negotiation, a cooperative relationship has developed from opportunist central-local relations (for example, the changeability of government policies, and local countermeasures to deal with government policies). Within the economy, the delegation of power from the central government to local government facilitates the exploitation of local comparative advantages, activating economic vitality and local creativity. In politics, the process of progressively institutionalized centralization of power helps strengthen political leadership and cohesion, effectively eliminating various disadvantages of central-local relations. A balance can be struck between democracy and centralization, between power separation and centralization, between centrifugal and centripetal forces, and between local vitality and the national situation. The general trend is for central-local relations to become increasingly institutionalized, standardized and routinized, and thereby grow increasingly transparent, predictable and stable. This has guaranteed long-term peace and order for China, and is unique in the world.

6.1 The History of China's Central-Local Relations

Throughout Chinese history, central-local relations have always been related to national unity, social stability and economic growth. After the country was unified during the Qin Dynasty in 221 B.C., a system of prefectures and counties was implemented across the nation, and was continued in the Han Dynasty. Qin laws and politics were practiced by hundreds of generations,² laying the foundation for the basic pattern of central and local organizational structures in Chinese society for over 2000 years. On this basis, the rulers of past dynasties made adjustments and reforms, seeking a more suitable central-local pattern. The *Extension Order* of the early Han Dynasty and the province system in the Yuan Dynasty succeed in handling central-local relations, ensuring prosperity. However, the resulting order and public security never lasted very long. In most of China's history, central and local governments faced internal contradictions and conflicts. When more focus was placed on outside affairs, the inside was ignored; local power grew too strong, and military governors in the Han and Tang Dynasties rebelled, with a disastrous

²Mao Zedong: *Seven-Character Lvshi 'On Feudalism' to Guo Moruo*, August 5, 1973, *Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the P.R.C.*, Book 13, P. 36, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 1998.

effect. If power was too centralized and local power too weak, local initiatives grew frustrated, for which the poor and weak Song Dynasty offers a bitter example.

The root cause of this pattern lies in the advantages and disadvantages of China's system of unification. On the one hand, China has been a unified country with centralized power for over 2000 years—an arrangement that is unmatched in human history, reflecting China's unique geographic environment and social changes. The early history of China—an agricultural country located in the East Asian monsoon region—revolved around preventing floods and droughts and invasions by³ northern nomadic people. Due to the demands of providing cross-territory national public products on a super-large scale, such as water conservation projects, resisting foreign adversaries, and disaster relief, China has developed a unique, well-shaped, and consistent political system of centralized power and unification.⁴ It leverages the power of the whole nation to deal with various crises and challenges. This also explains why national unification has been an important theme throughout the long history of Chinese civilization.

China is a continental country with a vast territory. It is characterized by differing climates and customs in different areas, and extremely imbalanced development, leading to the existence of several economic units under a single umbrella. An ancient Chinese saying held that there were 'different customs every 100 *li*, and every 1000 *li* besides'.⁵ Yet even under a unified political system, different regions still have individual requirements for governance and development. Due to the disadvantages brought by unification, such as high governing and organization costs, such requirements have caused contradictions and even conflicts in central-local relations. This is also the root cause of frequent local separatism and national secession throughout Chinese history.

However, as a whole, from the perspective of the 2000 years since the first Emperor of Qin, the period of unification accounts for just two thirds of the whole timescale, and secession less than one third. The centralization of power and national unity has constituted two distinct characteristics of China's

³An old Chinese saying goes that there is "one famine every three years, one disease every six years, and one calamity every twelve years" (Huainanzi Tianwenxun). According to the statistics of Xiao Guoliang, a Chinese economic historian, in the almost 3000 years from the Zhou Dynasty to the Qing, there were up to 5168 calamities, including 1052 droughts, 1029 floods and 473 locust plagues. This was organized and calculated by the author based on Xiao Guoliang's *Royal Power and China's Society and Economy* (Beijing, Xinhua Press, 1991).

⁴*Ci Hai* defines the 'great unification' as the unification of the entire territory. Yang Songhua defines the system of unification as a historic period of up to 2132 years from BC 221 (the First Emperor of the Qin) to 1911 BCE when the Qing Dynasty was overthrown by the Revolution. Ancient China implemented a set of basic systems for politics, economics, culture, and S&T. One emperor and one government played the core role, and a national system of unified administration was implemented in all nations inside China's territory. Yang Songhua: *The Great Unification System and China's Vicissitudes*, Beijing Publishing Press, 2004.

⁵*Book of Han—Wang Ji's Record*.

traditional agricultural society.⁶ This reflects the fact that with the growth of the agricultural society, the population grew during the unification period and declined during secession; the growth period was longer than the decline. Although China's national territorial area accounts for less than 7% of the world, its total population makes up a quarter to a third of the global total.⁷

China's central-local relations in the early agricultural era can be summarized as 'unity in diversity'. It evolved into a unified country from a diversified one, with a certain degree of diversification retained. Since ancient times, China has been a unified multi-national and multi-regional country.

Its historic reality and cultural traditions required China to build and maintain a powerful central government, to deal with various large-scale challenges effectively. However, in the meantime, under the preconditions of a unified government decree, China's governance had to take into account the realities of various regions, adjusting measures to local conditions, and reducing governance costs, so as to facilitate local economic development and cultural prosperity. This meant that Chinese rulers in all dynasties had to eliminate the disadvantages of unification while playing up its advantages, finding a balance between the two poles of central-local relations, and coordinating central-local relations and contradictions.

In modern times, China began to transit from a huge and unified government based on traditional agriculture to the largest modern unified state in the world. However, the transition was not immediate. It was triggered by the relentless challenges of industrialization and Western powers. When the West was in the throes of its own industrial revolution under a capitalist system, China maintained a traditional agricultural society due to the historic limitations of unification. In the late Qing dynasty, the nation was locked into a state of inefficiency.⁸ During the century before the shift, many battles were fought and lost. Traditional central-local order gradually collapsed and central power grew slack. Local vassals rose up, and the agrarian society began to unwind. The late Qing government failed to prosper because of an influx of Western power. Cracks began to show during the First Sino-Japanese War, and eventual collapse finally occurred with the 1911 revolution, throwing China into an era of disintegration. The Beiyang Government in the Republican Era took a new path, and warlordism was rife. Although the Kuomintang government implemented political and military unification nationwide, vassals still vied with each other over politics and the economy.

Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1954) calls the modern state the 'tax state'. A prominent characteristic of a modern state is its extracting capacity, which is the basis of other capacities. According to Wang Shaoguang's research, during

⁶Hu Angang (editor): *China's Development Outlook*, P. 196, Zhejiang People's Publishing House, 1999.

⁷Angus Maddison: *The World Economy: Historical Statistics*, Chinese version, P. 265, Beijing, Peking University Press, 2009.

⁸Yang Songhua: *Great Unification of the System and China's Vicissitudes*, Beijing Publishing Press, 2004, Yang Songhua: *Great Unification of the System and China's Vicissitudes*, Beijing Publishing Press, 2004.

Imperial times, China's national finance accounted for only a small part of the entire national economy, and government revenue never exceeded 4% of the G.D.P.⁹ From 1916 to 1928, China had no state financial system. Its political power mainly relied on domestic and foreign loans.¹⁰ In 1928, the Kuomintang Government took great pains to transform the financial system, but the share that the state extracted from national revenue increased only slightly.¹¹ Until 1936, the total budget of the Nanjing government only accounted for 8.8% of the G.D.P.¹²

This was an era of extreme corruption in the central government, with weak governance. It was a time in China's modern history when social resources could not be used and mobilized effectively to initiate internationalization, urbanization and modernization. The nation declined rapidly. In 1913, China's G.D.P. accounted for 8.8% of the world's total, decreasing to 4.6% in 1950.¹³ This was the lowest it had been since 1820, and represented a historic turning point.

6.2 Changes in Central-Local Relations After the Establishment of New China

If a country wants to modernize, it must take advantage of the available resources, and unite power from all fields to build economic and social order. It must win the support of its citizens, and maintain the unification of the entire nation. This requires powerful and effective modern governance, to formulate and implement various economic and social policies, and to effectively launch the modernization process. It is even truer for a successor of industrialization and modernization, especially against the background of the Second World War. National competition is essentially a competition of state capacity. The strong win and the weak fail.

⁹Perkins, Dwight, Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: the Case of Nineteenth-Century China, *J. of Economic History* 27, 4, 1967, PP. 478–492. See Wang Shaoguang: *Enlightenment of American Progressive Era*, Beijing, China Financial and Economics Publishing House, 2002.

¹⁰Young, Arthur N, *China's Nation-Building Effort, 1927–1937: the Financial and Economic Record*, PP. 1–11, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1971. See Wang Shaoguang: *Enlightenment of American Progressive Era*, Beijing, China Financial and Economics Publishing House, 2002.

¹¹For further discussion of financial reforms during this period, see Young, Arthur N., *China's Nation-Building 1927–1937: the Financial and Economic Record*, PP. 1–11, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1971. Young acted as a financial counselor to the Kuomintang government from 1929 to 1947. See Wang Shaoguang: *Enlightenment of the American Progressive Era*, Beijing, China Financial and Economics Publishing House, 2002.

¹²Wang Zhiyong: *Brief Introduction to Finance in the Republic of China*, PP. 115–116, Taipei, Imperial Bookstore, 1952. (没翻译完)

¹³Angus Maddison: *The World Economy: Historical Statistics*, Chinese version, P. 269, Beijing, Peking University Press, 2009.

After the establishment of New China, unification was realized once again. Despite being the poorest and most backward state in world, it had the political awareness and governance capacity of a modern state. As evaluated by Gilbert Rozman, **the most significant factor in the P.R.C.'s separation from old China was the founding of a powerful central government; the most direct result was that various skills and resources were mobilized for the sake of rapid economic growth. The Chinese Communist Party displayed an extraordinary capacity for mobilizing and expanding resources.**¹⁴

The founding of China represented a transition from division to unity, from decentralization to concentration, and from decentralization of power to concentration thereof. National unification was realized through the centralization of the decision-making power of the Party Central Committee,¹⁵ unification of military organizations and commands,¹⁶ and unification of the financial and economic systems. **This trumped the unification of the Qin Dynasty 2000 years before, and also went beyond the later achievements of the European Community and the E.U.**¹⁷

A highly unified system greatly reinforces the state's capacity. Compared with its modern equivalents, the new Chinese government had a stronger capacity for finance extraction. In 1950—the first year after the founding of the P.R.C.—national fiscal revenue accounted for almost 15.3% of the total national revenue. Three years later, this proportion exceeded 31.4%, four to five times higher than the revenue of the Kuomintang Government. The high proportion of the budget revenue of New China relative to the national revenue was reflected in the longitudinal comparison of state history, as well as in horizontal comparison with 11 other countries during the same period. The per-capita revenue of these 11 countries was almost equal to China's in the 1950s.

At the founding of New China, **a central-local system of a modern state with a high centralization of power was implemented** in the basic structure of

¹⁴Gilbert Rozman, *The Modernization of China*, Chinese version, P. 6, Zhejiang People's Publishing House, 2003.

¹⁵Since the later period of the War of Liberation, the Communist Party of China has paid great attention to unification in terms of ideology, politics and organization. In 1948, the C.P.C. Central Committee issued the *Instructions on Strictly Executing the Report System*. The C.P.C.'s Decision on All Central Bureaux, Sub-offices, Military Regions, Military Commissions and Former Commissions Seeking Instructions from and Reporting to the Central Government, was intended to strengthen the unified leadership of the C.P.C. Central Committee, and centralize all possible powers and those that had to be centralized into the central government and representative organizes of the central government.

¹⁶The Common Programme of September 1949 stipulated that the P.R.C. build a unified army, namely, the P.L.A., and a people's security force, to be commandeered by the People's Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central People's Government, and to be subject to unified command, system, establishment, and laws.

¹⁷The European Union (English: European Union; French: Union Européenne, Germany: Europäischer Union) is hereinafter referred to as the E.U., which is headquartered in Brussels, and which developed from the European Community.




Fig. 6.1 Proportion of central fiscal revenue, expenditure in national fiscal revenue, and general expenditure (1952–1978)

central-local relations. It was a modern state built on the basis of a modern tax system. In 1950, the financial management system for unified collection and allocation was implemented, whereby financial revenue was handed over to the central government, and fiscal expenditure was checked by the same. From 1951 to 1957, China implemented a classified revenue and hierarchic management system, as well as three-level financial management of central government, provinces (municipalities) and counties (cities), and a revenue classification method. This divided the boundaries of central and local revenue and expenditure.

During the First Five-Year Plan period, fiscal revenue accounted for up to 32.7% of national revenue, and the central fiscal revenue accounted for 14.8%. Central fiscal expenditure accounted for three quarters of national fiscal expenditure (about 74.1%) (Fig. 6.1). Meanwhile, a highly centralized and unified system of planned economy was established, giving the central government power to dispose of financial resources.

This system was created against a background of nation building, and played an extremely important role in the early construction of New China. It also had a significant hand in the completion of radical democratic and social reform, initiating national industrialization, and spurring the planned organization of political, economic and social construction in the early days. Of course, as a result, a high degree of administrative authority was centralized to the central

government¹⁸ by the Party Central Committee and State Council, making for certain historic limitations. For example, power became too centralized, and the governance of the central government grew excessive, leading to a lack of both economic and political democracy. In particular, the central committee and ministries did not directly command provincial committees and provincial people's committees.¹⁹

With regard to central-local relations in the early days of New China and the excessive power of the central government, Mao Zedong initiated the first reform of the economic system, adjusting central-local relations by a process of decentralization. In April and May 1956, Mao noticed a difference between the Soviet and American modes, and proposed that China avoid the Soviet method of high centralization, aiming instead for the American federal mode. He believed that excessive centralization and weak local power were bad for socialism.²⁰ He called for party committees in all provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions to curb any unfeasible, impractical and subjectivist activity, and stop what he called the 'five excesses' (excessive tasks; meetings and training sessions; documents, reports and forms; organizations; and part-time activist roles).

Under Mao's guidance, the central government and State Council began to improve the economic management system in June 1956. However, radical change did not occur; instead, under the institutional framework, central-local relations were adjusted, authority was delegated to lower levels, and the disadvantages of high centralization of power were eliminated.

¹⁸*Decision of the State Council on Improving the National Administrative System (Draft), Selected Important Literature since the Founding of the P.R.C.*, Book 9. P. 326, Central Party Literature Press, 2011.

¹⁹Mao Zedong: *On Ten Great Relations*, April 25, 1956, *Mao Zedong's Collected Works*, Volume 7, P. 31, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1999.

²⁰When discussing local-central relations, Mao Zedong said: 'Our Constitution provides that local governments have no legislative power, and that legislative power should be centralized in the National People's Congress. We have learned from the Soviet Union. It seems that this doesn't apply to the U.S.A. American states can make laws, and state laws can oppose the federal constitution. It seems that state legislation in finance and tax revenue is different. The U.S.A. is a developed country, taking only 100 years to become prosperous, which is worth investigating. Its political system is also worth studying. It seems that we need to expand local power. Weak local power is disadvantageous to socialist construction'. The above content is not included in Mao Zedong's *On Ten Great Relations*, but was recorded by Bo Yibo based on Mao's speech at the Expansion Meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee on April 25, 1956, and the Supreme State Conference held by Mao Zedong on May 2, 1956). See Bo Yibo: *Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, Volume II*, Beijing, Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C. Press, 1993. Mao Zedong believed that excessive centralization was unfavorable, and was not good for mobilizing all powers to build a powerful country. "Drawing lessons from the Soviet Union, the C.P.C.'s history should be reviewed, so as to resolve the issue of centralization and decentralization properly". Mao Zedong: *Concluding Remarks at the Expansion Meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee*, April 28, 1956, *Mao Zedong's Collected Works*, Volume 7, P. 52, 54, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1999.

In September of the same year, Liu Shaoqi remarked in the political report of the Eighth C.P.C. National Congress: “we cannot imagine that in such a large country, the central government is capable of undertaking all affairs, and handling them well, so it is absolutely necessary to delegate part of administrative authority to local governments”.²¹ Thus, the Eighth C.P.C. National Congress decided to improve China’s administration system, dividing the administration scope of enterprises, careers, plans and finance, expanding the administrative authority of all provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, and improving the work of all ministries of the central government based on unified leadership, hierarchical administration, and the timely adjustment of measures to local conditions.²²

In October of the same year, the State Council formulated the *Decision on Improving the State Administration System (Draft)*, laying out the administrative authority of the central government, as well as all provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities. It was classified into four types: central administration, including enterprises and institutions in relation to the overall national economy; local administration; double administration dominated by the central government and supplemented by local governments; double administration dominated by local governments and supplemented by the central government. Under this framework, the functions of central and provincial governments were defined in 12 aspects: planning; finance; industry; infrastructure; agriculture, forestry, and water conservation; transport; post and telecommunications; commerce; culture, education, science and health; politics and law; and labor, institutions, and minorities. It was prepared in 1956, trialed in 1957, and implemented during the Second Five-year Plan.²³

At the party secretary meeting of the central government, provinces, cities and districts in January 1957, Mao encouraged local governments to ask for money and power from the central government. Chen Yun advised local comrades to delegate enterprise management power to lower levels, and gave specific instructions on stand-by financial resources in local places. The thinking was that the central government could not undertake all national affairs, and should decentralize authority.

In November 1957, the State Council made the *Decision on Improving Industrial Management System*, aimed to expand the authority of industrial management in provincial (municipal) autonomous regions, and to delegate the management of some enterprises from the central committee to provinces

²¹Liu Shaoqi: *Political Report at the Eighth National People’s Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee, Selected Important Literature Since the Founding of the P.R.C.*, Book 9, P. 76, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2011.

²²*Suggestions on the Second Five-Year Plan for National Economic Development at the Eighth National People’s Congress of the C.P.C. Central Committee* (1958–1962), approved on the Second National People’s Congress of the Eighth C.P.C. Central Committee on September 27, 1956. *Selected Important Literature Since the Founding of the P.R.C.*, Version 9, P. 319, Central Party Literature Press, 2011.

²³*Selected Important Literature Since the Founding of the P.R.C.*, Book 9, PP. 327–328, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2011.

(municipalities) and autonomous regions. This began widespread reform of the delegation of central powers to local governments.

In February 1958, Mao put forward the idea of a ‘constitutional monarchy’, and proposed further decentralization, in order to break the deadlock of excessive control by the central government and central ministries.²⁴ This ‘constitutional monarchy’ was distinct from the highly centralized planned economic system, and made significant impact. In March the same year, Mao Zedong claimed at a meeting in Chengdu that centralization and local decentralization could coexist. It was his view that any power that could be centralized should be, and likewise any power that could be decentralized should be.²⁵

Driven by Communist Party leaders such as Mao Zedong, the central government initiated a series of reforms aimed at a planned system and central-local structures. In 1958, the Central Committee of the C.P.C. and the State Council convened several meetings. The major subjects were the economy and improvement of the economic management system. Its basic gist was to speed up economic development, and to accelerate the pace of the delegation of management authority to lower levels.²⁶ In 1958, the key point of the reform to the economic management system was the delegation of power to local governments at all levels. In the same year, in the *Decision on Strengthening Work in Coordinated Regions*, the Central Committee of the C.P.C. divided China into seven coordinated regions: north-eastern, northern, eastern, southern, middle, southwestern and northwestern, through which local power could be strengthened.²⁷ Moreover, large numbers of enterprises and institutions affiliated to all ministries of the central government were delegated to local governments—88% in total—and the proportion of the industrial output value of enterprises directly under the central government in total industrial output value decreased from 39.7% in 1957 to 13.8% in 1958.²⁸

²⁴At a Spring Festival Gathering held by the central government, Mao Zedong said: “**Excessive centralization of power constrains productivity. I am an advocate of a ‘constitutional monarchy’. The central government must handle affairs, but not too much. Most affairs can be handed over to provinces and cities that do better than us (central government, departments and ministries)**”. See Bo Yibo: *Review of Several Important Decisions and Events*, Volume II, PP. 796–797, Beijing, Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C. Press, 1993.

²⁵Mao Zedong: *Speech at the Chengdu Meeting*, March, 1958, *Mao Zedong’s Collected Works*, Volume 7, Beijing, People’s Publishing House, 1999.

²⁶Bo Yibo: *Review of Several Important Decisions and Events*, Volume II, PP. 797–801, Beijing, Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C. Press, 1993.

²⁷Wu Li (editor in chief): *China’s Development Path* (II), P. 819, Hunan People’s Publishing House, 2012.

²⁸On June 2, 1958, the C.P.C. Central Committee issued a notice that all textile work, 96% of the light industry, 91% of the chemical industry, 82% of civil machinery, 77% of metallurgy, 74% of the coal industry, 73% of the water reservoir industry, and over 60% of other industries must be delegated to lower levels. All central departments were required to finish delegating corresponding enterprises and institutions to lower levels before June 15. See Bo Yibo: *Review of Several Important Decisions and Events*, Volume II, P. 798, Beijing, Party School of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. Press, 1993.

After 1957, China entered an era of power delegation to local governments. During the process of decentralization centered on administration, a large batch of enterprises under the central government was delegated to local governments for management. The proportion of central revenue and expenditure within national fiscal revenue and expenditure decreased significantly, lower than 30 and 50% respectively, which was a major breakthrough in the central government's economic plans. Strictly speaking, China no longer practiced financial centralization, preferring the local mode. Even though power was centralized again in the early 1960s, the basic pattern remained unchanged. This was due to a dependence on the route of institutional change; once a new interest pattern was formed, even a powerful central government could not break it. It could only make local adjustments instead of overall adjustments, and only enforce increment adjustment instead of stock adjustment. Although China's body politic still belonged to the system of highly centralized political administration, its fiscal system was different from the Soviet centralization of finance. It was a case of delegating powers to lower levels under the framework of a planned economy.

However, under a planned economic system (whether centralized or decentralized), the essential issues of stimulating central and local initiatives were not resolved. This was because no matter how their relations reformed and changed, the institutional framework remained the same. It was essentially a transfer of planned administrative authority from the central government to local governments. All enterprises were directly controlled and managed by the government, and did not have the market agency of independent decision-making. For instance, under the political mobilization of the Great Leap Forward, the pursuit of local interests and zealous implementation of economic leaps caused overheating in the economy, forcing adjustments to be made. **Thereby, what emerged was a vicious circle of 'dead once controlled, released once dead, disordered once released, and controlled once disordered'.**²⁹

This situation was reflected in Mao's second economic reform in 1970. Its main aim was the adjustment of the national economy of the first half of the 1960s—the 'anti-adjustment' of the 're-centralization' of the central government. It also served as a defense against foreign powers. In February 1970, the State Council convened a national planning session in which it criticized the so-called 'industrial dictatorship', and proposed a reform of the economic system intended to strengthen

²⁹With regard to China's economic system, Bo Yibo (one of China's most prominent economic system planners, and a proponent of the 1958 economic reform) considered whether a socialist market economy had been officially established in China (1993). When summarizing the lessons of the 1958 economic reform, he believed that if we focus on the disadvantages of the centralization of power (planned economy), the power will be delegated to local governments; if too much power is delegated to local governments, the central government must centralize power. This was not realized under the socialist system; we only emphasized the implementation of the planned economic system, ignoring and negating the role of market mechanism. See Bo Yibo: *Review of Several Important Decisions and Events*, Volume II, PP. 797–804, Beijing, Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C. Press, 1993.

'regional dictatorship'.³⁰ This was the thrust of Mao Zedong's endeavor to implement his vision of a 'constitutional monarchy', which cleared the way for the delegation of economic administration authority to lower levels, and led to significant reform of bureaucracies.

After decentralization, the number of enterprises and public institutions directly under the central government decreased to 1674 from 10,533, and the proportion of their output value to the total industrial output value fell to 6% from 42.2%. However, the reform of the centralized planned economy failed, and power was re-centralized in the mid-1970s. With adjustment, the national economy recovered quickly, which indicated the advantages of a central planned economy in mobilizing and transferring national resources, and proved its capability of dealing with economic crises. It also revealed the inertia inherent in the system.

Through Mao's two economic reforms of 1957 and 1970, China's central-local economic relations were transformed into relative local decentralization from high centralization. Local governments came to own over half of the fiscal expenditure. As shown by the structure of national fiscal revenue, the proportion of central finance decreased from 43.2% in 1957 to 15.5% in 1978. The proportion of central finance decreased from 71.8% in 1957 to 47.4% in 1978.³¹ Compared with countries such as the former Soviet Union, China has neither a standard central planned economy nor a standard central planned economic system. Instead it has a bound central planned economy. Thus, once economic reform is launched, it is easier to implement a market economy and enact central and local decentralization. However, the shift is progressive, and necessitates a transitional period.

6.3 Changes in Central-Local Relations After Reform and Opening

After the Reform and Opening of 1978, China's central-local structure entered a stage of local decentralization. In order to stimulate local innovation, both the tax system and the distribution of power were re-adjusted. In the meantime, China began to transform from a socialist planned economy to a socialist market economy, launching a unique double-track system.

After 1980, a reform of the fiscal system was carried out, in which revenue and expenditure were divided between the central and local governments. In 1988, the

³⁰The central government issued the *Notice on Delegating Directly Affiliated Enterprises of Industrial and Traffic Departments of the State Council to Local Governments, Request for Instructions by Core Teams and Revolutionary Committees Built by All Departments of the State Council, Outline of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (Draft)*, which required directly affiliated departments of the central government to gradually delegate most enterprises and institutions to local governments in 1970.

³¹Prepared by NBS: *China Statistical Abstract (2008)*, P. 14, Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2008.

system was named ‘Fiscal Responsibility’, involving the administrative decentralization of power.³²

On July 9, 1979, the State Council trialed a new fiscal management method. It implemented *Several Provisions on the Fiscal Management Methods of Revenue-Expenditure Linkup, Full-Amount Dividend, Proportion Responsibility, and No Change for Three Years* (hereinafter referred to as the *Provision*). The Provision indicated that since 1980, the state had trialed a fiscal management method in provinces and cities.³³ This system saw a division of revenue and expenditure between the central and local governments. The objectives of the fiscal reform were to expand local property rights and mobilize local economic development, and to improve local governments’ attempts to increase revenue and decrease expenditure, all while taking responsibility for local fiscal balance, and operating under the centralized leadership and plan of the central government. It was not a unified system, but encompassed four different methods that were implemented in 25 provinces and autonomous regions.

In 1984, a system of dividing revenue and expenditure between the central and local governments was set up. In 1985, in order to realize simultaneous reform with tax for profits, the State Council decided to implement classified tax types, assessment of revenue and expenditure, and hierarchical responsibility. Fiscal revenue was classified into fixed revenue of the central government, fixed revenue of local governments, and shared revenue of central and local governments. As for the classification of expenditure, the pattern of the original system was basically maintained, with only minor adjustments. At that time, there was no unified, standard, normative or fair fiscal system nationwide. Five different systems had been formed: a total-amount dividend system; a quota super-solution system; a quota subsidy system; a responsibility system; and a minority area system.

In 1986, a system of tax distribution was designed, to replace the method of dividing revenue and expenditure between the central and local governments. The plan was later canceled. From 1988, national provincial and sub-provincial cities (cities in the planned list) were all included in the fiscal responsibility system.³⁴ This indicates that institutional change is a route to depend on and is difficult to change.

The fiscal responsibility system implemented six methods in various regions:

1. a responsibility system for progressively increasing revenue: six regions including Beijing;
2. a responsibility system for full-amount dividends: three regions—Shanxi, Anhui, Tianjin;

³²Wu Jinglian: *Course on Contemporary China’s Economic Reform*, P. 226, Shanghai, Shanghai Yuandong Press, 2010.

³³Tan Zongji, Ye Xinyu: *Record of the P.R.C.’s Reform and Major Changes—Initiating a New Pattern of Modernization (1977–1983)*, Volume IV, (I), PP. 235–236, Changchun, Jilin People’s Publishing House, 1994.

³⁴Wu Jinglian: *Course on Contemporary China’s Economic Reform*, PP. 234–235, Shanghai, Shanghai Yuandong Press, 2010.

3. a responsibility system for full-amount dividends and growth dividends: three cities with independent planning status—Dalian, Qingdao, Wuhan;
4. a responsibility system for progressive increase of the super-solution amount: two regions—Guangdong, Hunan;
5. a responsibility system for super-solution quotas: three regions—Shandong (excluding Qingdao), Shanghai, Heilongjiang;
6. a responsibility system for quota subsidies: four regions including Jilin.

In 1988, the central government introduced a fiscal responsibility system for local governments. This responsibility contract provided the amount that each province was to pay the central government, which increased progressively at the agreed speed, with surplus revenue belong to each province. In return, each province was responsible for retaining revenue to meet its own expenditure needs. For poor provinces, fiscal responsibility fixed the central government subsidy in the nominal value at the price level of 1987, so during the inflation of 1988 and 1989, these subsidies depreciated quickly. Consequently, the fiscal system saw fundamental changes. Because the tax distribution system needed to disconnect with expenditure, local governments realized self-financing under the fiscal responsibility system.³⁵

These fiscal reforms were breakthroughs from the original centralization of power and the traditional system of a planned economy dominated by an industrial monopoly. Its basic ideas were the decentralization of power and surrendering of profits, i.e. to delegate more property rights (including the rights of fiscal revenue and expenditure) to local governments, give local finance a larger share of the ‘cake’ of the total fiscal revenue, and develop a transitional fiscal system dominated by regional monopolies.

Reform expanded the autonomy of local governments, and mobilized their initiatives for developing local economies. It allowed local governments to drive economic growth, and encouraged competition in local economic development. However, it also formed a non-unified, non-standard, and unfair fiscal system. It motivated all regions to build large, small, complete, self-sufficient, and closed economic systems, and aggravated vicious competition and economic blockades. It intensified random behaviors, in-fighting and undermining among the regions.³⁶

More importantly, the adjustment of the central-local structure of local decentralization of power directly affected the proportion of national fiscal revenue and expenditure in the G.D.P., which decreased to 14.5 and 15.5% in 1991; in the meantime, the proportion of central fiscal revenue and expenditure in national fiscal revenue and expenditure also decreased (Table 6.1), which undermined the central

³⁵Loren Brandt, Thomas Rawski, *China's Great Economic Transformation*, Chinese version, P. 364, Shanghai, Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2009.

³⁶Deng Xiaoping: *The Central Government Must Have Authority*, September 12, 1988, *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume 3, PP. 277–278, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1993.

Table 6.1 Proportion of fiscal revenue and expenditure and central fiscal revenue and expenditure in the G.D.P. (1981–1991). Unit: %

Year	Proportion of fiscal revenue in the G.D.P.	Proportion of fiscal expenditure in the G.D.P.	Proportion of central fiscal revenue in fiscal revenue	Proportion of central fiscal expenditure in fiscal expenditure
1978	31.1	30.8	15.5	47.4
1979	28.2	31.6	20.1	51.1
1980	25.5	27.0	24.5	54.3
1981	24.0	23.3	26.5	55.0
1982	22.8	23.1	28.6	53.0
1983	22.9	23.6	35.8	53.9
1984	22.8	23.6	40.5	52.5
1985	22.2	22.2	38.4	39.7
1986	20.7	21.5	36.7	37.9
1987	18.2	18.8	33.5	37.4
1988	15.7	16.6	32.9	33.9
1989	15.7	16.6	30.9	31.5
1990	15.7	16.5	33.8	32.6
1991	14.5	15.5	29.8	32.2

Source China Statistical Abstract (2010), PP. 76 and 77, Beijing, China Statistics Press, 2010

government's capacity to apply macro-control and balance regional development nationwide, and also hampered the establishment and formation of a unified, open and level-playing domestic market.

For this, Deng Xiaoping said: 'The central government must have authority'. On September 12, 1988, in his discussion with Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Hu Qili, Yao Yilin, Wan Li and Bo Yibo from the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the C.P.C., he specified that if the Party Central Committee and State Council had no authority, the situation would spiral out of control. My core opinions are the central government must have authority. The central government refers to the Party Central Committee and State Council. The macro-control is reflected in that the central government can live up to its word.³⁷ Chen Yun describes China's political and economic pattern as 'too many vassals, discussion without decision, decision without action and lack of coordination'. With respect to this, Deng Xiaoping thinks that Chen Yun's remark is right. In September, 1989, he discussed with the members of Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the C.P.C.: Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Yao Yilin, Song Ping, Li Ruihuan, Yang Shangkun, and Wan Li, and emphasized again that the authority of the Party Central Committee must be strengthened. It's not allowed to disobey the order of

³⁷Deng Xiaoping: *The Central Government Must Have Authority*, September 12, 1988, *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume 3, PP. 277–278, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1993.

the Party Central Committee and the State Council. Especially, in case of difficulty, if the central government and State Council have no authority, the problem cannot be resolved.³⁸

This is consistent with my own judgment, and that of Wang Shaoguang. In May 1993, we indicated in the *Chinese State Capacity Report* that the capacity of the central government for controlling macro-economy decreased, leading to the formation of a 'vassal economy'. The layers were either small and complete, large and complete, self-contained, blocked, or had trade barriers. The economy is the basis of politics, and economic strength decides political power. A 'vassal economy' inevitably results in political fallout and weakened authority in the central government, and its consequences are worrisome. Compared with large industrialized countries, China's local government has overinflated financial resources, too much administrative power, and too much economic intervention.³⁹ This is a result of decreasing national strength and weakened central-local relations. Jiang Zemin told the responsible personnel in eight provinces in China's north and northeast: 'Metaphorically speaking, our development is a boat sailing forward. Central and local governments are in the same boat. Departments in different regions must help each other. They must not strike out alone for personal benefit. If the boat capsizes, nobody will survive.'⁴⁰ In order to safeguard China's economic reform, the Party Central Committee decided to conduct institutional innovation, building a tax distribution system, and adjusting central-local relations.

6.4 Reform of the Tax Distribution System and Changes in Central and Local Systems

In April 1993, Jiang Zemin told relevant central government ministers in the Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs that power should be separated rationally. He called for the establishment of a central and local taxation system, and a better handling of the distribution relationship between central and local governments. He proposed that the central government concentrate necessary financial resources to handle the affairs that could not be undertaken by local governments. Through the implementation of a tax distribution system, the pattern

³⁸Deng Xiaoping: *With Stable Reform and Opening Policies, China Stands a Good Chance* (September 4, 1989), *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume 3, P. 319, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1993.

³⁹Wang Shaoguang, Hu Angang: *A Study of China's State Capacity*, Shenyang, Liaoning People's Publishing House, 1993.

⁴⁰Jiang Zemin: *On the Socialist Market Economy*, P. 117, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2006.

of central and local interests would change. Jiang promised that after the proportion of central fiscal revenues was increased, not all revenue would be used to increase central fiscal expenditure; a large part would be returned to local governments.⁴¹

In September that year, Jiang attended at a meeting of ten provinces in south-central and southwestern China in which he laid out the specifics of central, local and shared tax for central and local governments, thereby implementing the tax distribution system.⁴²

In November that year, the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee of the C.P.C. proposed significant reform pattern of the socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics, moving into an era of ‘institutional innovation’ from a period of decentralizing power and surrendering profit. In the new market economy, the central government put together a macro-control system, specifying that the power of macroeconomic regulation would be centralized. This was the beginning of the central-local tax distribution system, which was officially implemented in 1994.⁴³

In June 1996, I made an initial evaluation of the tax distribution reform, and concluded that it was the largest institutional innovation of since the founding of New China. I saw it as a significant adjustment of the pattern of interest between central and local governments. In the short term, the reform was an indication of whether China’s wider economic reform would succeed; in the long term, it would prove China’s ability to maintain lasting peace and order. The achievements of this reform seem to have exceeded those of the American constitution, the French Revolution, and Japanese reformers.⁴⁴

Its major policies and intentions were:

1. to gradually increase the proportion of fiscal revenue in G.D.P. and the proportion of central fiscal revenue in national fiscal revenue, and determine the proportions of central and local fiscal revenues;
2. to realize the standardization of fiscal allocation between governments, from six fiscal responsibility types coexisting under one fiscal responsibility system to a unified fiscal relationship between central and local governments;
3. to establish independently-functioning central and local tax systems;
4. to implement a central-local return and transfer payment system, so as to adjust the revenue distribution structure and regional layout and narrow the regional development gap;

⁴¹Jiang Zemin: *On the Socialist Market Economy*, PP. 59–60, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2006.

⁴²Jiang Zemin: *On the Socialist Market Economy*, P. 136, Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2006.

⁴³C.P.C.’s *Decision on Several Issues about Building Socialist Market Economic System* (approved in the Third Plenary Session of the 14th C.P.C. Central Committee on November 14, 1993), C.P.C. Party Literature Research Office: *Selected Important Literature Since 14th C.P.C. Central Committee*, Book I, P. 534, Beijing, People’s Publishing House, 1996.

⁴⁴Hu Angang: *China’s Development Prospects*, P. 133, 183, Hangzhou, Zhejiang People’s Publishing House, 1999.

Table 6.2 Changes in China's central and local finance systems (1994–2012). Unit: %

Year	Proportion of the central fiscal revenue in G.D.P.	Proportion of the local fiscal revenue in G.D.P.	Proportion of transfer payment in local fiscal expenditure
1994	6.03	4.80	42.76
1995	5.36	4.91	38.17
1996	5.14	5.26	35.24
1997	5.35	5.60	33.98
1998	5.80	5.90	35.04
1999	6.52	6.24	38.08
2000	7.04	6.46	38.21
2001	7.83	7.12	40.59
2002	8.63	7.08	44.28
2003	8.74	7.25	42.83
2004	9.07	7.44	42.25
2005	8.95	8.17	39.97
2006	9.46	8.46	39.85
2007	10.44	8.87	38.52
2008	10.41	9.12	41.83
2009	10.54	9.56	46.59
2010	10.58	10.12	45.03
2011	10.85	11.11	43.34
2012	10.81	11.76	43.02

Source National Bureau of Statistics—Data Query—Annual Data—<http://data.stats.gov.cn/2013.01.16>

- to improve and standardize the compound budgeting system. The central financial deficit no longer overdrafts to the bank; it is resolved by issuing long and short-term national debt. It is beneficial to control inflation and implement macro-economic regulations.

Looking back, the tax reform of 1994 was highly successful, setting a strong foundation for the future. Firstly, it greatly improved the state's capability to extract fiscal revenue. The proportion of fiscal revenue in the G.D.P. increased from 10.3% in 1995 (the historic lowest point) to 22.6% in 2012, providing a guarantee of basic public services, social order, and common prosperity. A mutually beneficial relationship between central and local governments was achieved. From 1995 to 2012, central and local fiscal revenues achieved double-digit growth, with an average annual growth rate of 17.1 and 18.3%. The proportion of the transfer payment from central finance to local governments (central fiscal expenditure minus local fiscal expenditure) in local fiscal expenditure increased from 38.2% in 1995 to 43.0% in 2012 (see Table 6.2),⁴⁵ and the variation coefficient of per-capita fiscal expenditure

⁴⁵Data source: National Bureau of Statistics: *China Statistical Abstract 2013*, P. 73, Beijing, China Statistics Press, 2013.

in various regions decreased from 76% in 2006 to 48% in 2012. This served to balance financial resources, and facilitated the equalization of basic public services in different regions.

China's middle-western area was the biggest beneficiary. Its development led to a narrowing of regional disparity. It is useful to make a comparison of 31 provinces, cities, autonomous regions in China and the 27 countries of the E.U. (see Table 6.3). Calculated on the basis of constant price, the variation coefficient of per-capita G.D.P. in China was 71% in 2000, and 50% in the E.U.—a difference of 21%. This indicates that China's regional disparity was higher than the internal disparity among the E.U.'s constituent countries. Until 2012, the variation coefficient of China's per-capita G.D.P. decreased by 21%, while the E.U.'s decreased 45% (a fall of just 5%). The former was higher than the E.U. by only 4%, which suggests that the fiscal transfer payment from the central government to local areas (especially central and western regions) promoted development and reduced the regional gap.

In 2000, China's HDI (human development index) was 13.4%, and the E.U.'s was 6.2%—a difference of 7.2%; until 2012, China's HDI decreased to 7.5%—down by 5.9%, and that of the E.U. decreased to 4.7%—down by 1.6%. An important conclusion can be reached: as Deng Xiaoping said, the essential characteristic of socialism is common propriety. Empirical study proves that China's socialist economic system, especially tax distribution and fiscal transfer payment, helps to narrow the gap of regional economic and social development, and is superior to the E.U. system in terms of revenue.

Since the founding of the P.R.C., China has worked on building a stable central-local relationship based on institution, and centralization and local decentralization have gone through several cycles of evolution. From the perspective of the fiscal system, central-local relations have changed at least 17 times—five times in the 1950s, twice in the 1960s, six times in the 1970s, three times in the 1980s, and once in the 1990s (see Table 6.3). Each structural or political adjustment has paved the way for change.⁴⁶

Tax distribution reform was the most successful system overhaul since Reform and Opening. Once stability and standards had been fixed, future adjustments could be made under the larger framework. No repeated adjustments occurred between 1950 and 1988. Eventually, China's central-local relations moved away from the arbitrariness of past policy adjustments of the central government and avoided unforeseeable changes. The practice of using local countermeasures to cope with government policies was ended, and steps were made towards institutionalization, standardization and routinization.

⁴⁶Hu Angang: *China's Development Prospects*, PP. 197–198, Hangzhou, Zhejiang People's Publishing House, 1999.

Table 6.3 Changes in China's fiscal system (1950–1994)

Serial no.	Year	Changes in the fiscal administration system
1.	1950	Unified revenue and expenditure; two lines of revenue and expenditure; fiscal administration power is unified by the central government
2.	1951	Hierarchical administration under unified leadership; three-grade management of the central government, administrative regions, and provinces (cities)
3.	1953	The 'revenue classification and dividend' method; three-grade management of the central government, provinces (cities), and county
4.	1958	Determining expenditure based on revenue; no change for five years; decentralization of fiscal administrative power
5.	1959	Full-amount dividend; fixed amount for one year; expenditure-revenue linkup; proportion dividend
6.	1961	A fiscal administration system based on strengthening centralization and unification; centralized fiscal power in central government
7.	1968	Two lines of revenue and expenditure; all fiscal revenue is paid to the central government
8.	1971	Fiscal responsibility system; fixed revenue and expenditure; revenue and expenditure contracts; payment guarantee; balance retention or full-amount dividend; revenue retention
9.	1973	Trial implementation of the 'fixed revenue proportion of retention' method; pro rata division of overcharge; expenditure responsibility based on index
10.	1975	Rectification of finance; fixed revenue and expenditure; revenue-expenditure linkup; full-amount dividend; fixed amount for a year
11.	1976	Revenue-expenditure linkup; full-amount dividend; more local revenue; no more local expenditure; less local revenue and local expenditure
12.	1977	Trial implementation of a fixed ratio responsibility system in six provinces and cities; revenue payment and retention proportion fixed for four years (more revenue and more expenditure, less revenue and less expenditure, pursuit of balance)
13.	1978	Increased revenue and dividend; expenditure-revenue linkup; increased revenue and stand-by financial resources
14.	1980	Classified revenue and expenditure; hierarchical responsibility
15.	1986	Classified tax types; evaluation of revenue and expenditure; hierarchical responsibility
16.	1988	Six responsibility systems: (1) increasing revenue; (2) full-amount dividends; (3) full-amount dividends and growth dividends; (4) increase of the super-solution amount; (5) super-solution quota; (6) quota subsidy
17.	1994	Implementation of central and local tax distribution systems

In 1995 Jiang Zemin set time aside to classify the central and local authorities of economic administration. He called for them to specify their own affairs, property and decision-making, unify their duties, and seek standardization and legislation.⁴⁷

⁴⁷Jiang Zemin: *Correct Handling of Several Important Issues in the Drive for Socialist Modernization*, September 28, 1995, *Jiang Zemin's Selected Works*, Volume 1, P. 472, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 2006.

The institutionalization, standardization and routinization of central and local fiscal relations alleviated asymmetries in the information, power, and interests between central and local governments. The process pushed for predictable, stable, and coordinated relations, and provided valuable experience in the correct handling of central-local relations.

6.5 Further Development of Central-Local Relations

At the 18th C.P.C. National Congress an ambitious objective was proposed, to build a moderately prosperous society by 2020. A convention held at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the C.P.C. marked the start of a new era of five-in-one comprehensive reform. New objectives and all-around reforms augured a fresh phase for central-local relations.

In the name of comprehensively deepening reform, the new central-local relations had two objectives: firstly, the mobilization of the initiatives of central and local governments; secondly, maintaining China's national unity and long-term peace and security. In essence, the two aspects were one in the same, and supplemented each other. Only with the adequate coordination of the two development initiatives would China be able to reach its objectives. Otherwise, national unity and stability would collapse. In China's basic administrative framework of that time, an 'industrial dictatorship' existed alongside 'regional dictatorships', with the latter dominating.

To this end, central-local relations were confronted with three asymmetries. The first was an asymmetry of information. China's government agency was classified into five and a half grades (including a dozen sub-provinces). With more layers, asymmetry of information, incompleteness, and uncertainty would be more obvious, leading to difficulties in governing the state or regions. The second was an asymmetry of power. The prominent issue of excessive centralization faced the industrial monopoly, along with excessive decentralization of the regional monopoly. This was not only a matter of bureaucracy, but also of engaging local countermeasures to deal with government policies. The third was an asymmetry of interests. Issues arose in regional handling, local interests, obstacles, and interest demands by various departments. There were major inconsistencies in long-running problems, global roadblocks, sustainable development, and the starting points of central and local governments interests. These three asymmetries could only be countered with proper handling of local-central relations.

The key to resolving them had two aspects. The first was instrumental measures, i.e. the adoption of several policies such as fiscal incentives, transfer payments, tax deduction and exemption, performance assessments, and the union of central and local forces. The main thrust was creating compatibility of incentives and interests in central-local relations. The second was structural measures, namely improving the existing asymmetry within central and local governments. This called for radical structural adjustments, to effectively reduce the asymmetries of information and

power, and create a compatibility of interests. This included a correspondence of central-local patterns and affairs, a matching of affairs and duties, and a reduction of hierarchies.

According to the *Decision* made at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the C.P.C., central-local relations should be adjusted from the following aspects:

1. **Creating a central and local communication mechanism.** By that point, China had built a very effective mechanism for the communication of information and decision-making between central and provincial governments, reducing asymmetry of information, and improving mutual trust and cooperation. Examples include the ‘Two Session Mechanism’, the plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the C.P.C., the central economic working conferences, and symposia of provincial and ministerial figures. It also included the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, politics, propaganda, rural working conferences convened in March each year for prominent personnel within provincial parties and government administration. At these conferences, major leaders from the central government delivered keynote reports and summaries, and exchanged significant information about domestic and foreign decisions and policies. These conference systems were to be boosted, to promote the making of democratic and institutional decisions, and to implement these decisions according to local conditions and by specific and operable means. This called for the central and local governments to work together in their handling of various affairs.
2. **Creating a macro-regulation system.** This was guided by the national development strategy and effected by means of fiscal, monetary, industrial, and price policies. When formulating plans and macro-economic policies, the central government had to negotiate with local governments, considering regional disparity and providing guidance according to classification, while giving full play to the information advantage of provincial governments. Local governments were required to formulate plans that met the strategic requirements of national development, and guarantee the implementation of obligatory targets within the state development plan.
3. **Conducting reform of the tax system, so as to specify the classification of central and local fiscal revenue.** On the basis of maintaining the overall stability of the pattern of central and local financial resources, based on the characteristics of central and local finance and taxation, the finance and tax collection of central and local governments were adjusted to further classify central and local revenues.⁴⁸ The various tax types suitable for the central government and for local governments were identified. Since the tax distribution reform of 1994, central fiscal revenue had been larger than local fiscal revenue. It was not until 2011 that local fiscal revenue exceeded central fiscal revenue.

⁴⁸Lou Jiwei: *Maintaining the Financial Pattern of Central and Local Governments, Increasing the Rights of the Central Government over Affairs*, Phoenix Net, November 21, 2013.

According to the latest data, the local fiscal revenue in 2012 was RMB 6.11 trillion, and central fiscal revenue was RMB 5.61 trillion—a ratio of 1:1.09. In future, the ratio should be 1:1, which requires further optimization of the tax structure, improvement of information-based means of collection, and a more detailed classification of tax types.

4. **Adjusting the right of affairs and shared responsibilities of central and local governments, and specifying central and local functions.** The general direction was to reinforce the right of affairs of the central government appropriately. In fact, the proportion of central fiscal expenditure in the national expenditure decreased continuously from the implementation of the tax distribution system, and has now fallen to 15%—the lowest in the world, especially the G20 powers. Thus, most of the expenditure of the national public products provided by central finance is transferred to local governments. **The Third Plenary Session attached great importance to the right of affairs of the central government and the responsible sharing of expenditure.** It required the reinforcement of macro-regulation duties and the capacity of the central government, and the duties of local governments such as public services, market supervision, social management, and environmental protection. The right of affairs of the central government was classified into three types. First came national defense, diplomacy, national security, national unified market rules and management. At this point, China was already the second largest economy in the world. It had to assume the responsibility for global public products, participate in global economic governance, and facilitate the further development of southern countries. Hence, the central government needed to provide national public products (namely, the right of affairs of the central government) as well as increase the right of affairs to govern public products. In future, the right of affairs of the central government will be resolved by central fiscal expenditure.

Second was the right of mutual affairs and amortized expenditure of central and local governments, which related to social guarantee and significant trans-regional project construction, such as environmental management and ecological conservation. Public products involving national ecology were provided by money contributed by the central government and power contributed by local governments.

Third was the local right of affairs, mainly including regional public services. These regional public services mainly relied on the support of local fiscal revenue. They gave full play to the role of local initiatives, and took advantage of local information. They were mostly provided by local governments, but when their capacity was too weak to realize the equalization of basic public services nationwide, the country had to contribute (financial subsidies or transfer payment) to provide timely help. The central government could assume the expenditure responsibility of local governments by means of transfer payment. For trans-regional public services with the potential to exert huge impact on other regions, the central government assumed part of expenditure responsibility of local rights of affairs by transfer payment.

5. **Completing the transfer payment system.** The transfer payment system was an important means of mobilizing the initiatives of central and local governments and balancing regional development. This reform included the clearing, integration and standardization of special transfer payment items. Previously, the incomplete fiscal payment system led to flooded projects, and super-large scale and scattered funds. This was a product of excessive provisions from the central government, leading to a need for further decentralization. Going forward, as many local affairs as possible would be classified as general transfer payments. Meanwhile, the clearing and standardization of key expenditures, increased fiscal revenue and expenditure (or total output value linkup) involved seven fields: education, science and technology, agriculture, culture, health care, social guarantee, and family planning. Until now, expenditure linkup with the G. D.P. has accounted for 48% of national fiscal expenditure. In future, general transfer payments will be further increased, especially in old revolutionary base areas, minority zones, frontier lands, and poverty-stricken regions. In addition, the central government has proposed that local gaps in financial resources formed by the implemented policies of capital increment be filled by general transfer payments.
6. **Making institutional arrangements for optimizing the national governance structure and promoting direct management of counties by provinces.** In accordance with the *Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, the government of five and a half levels was changed to a four-level government (with the exception of autonomous prefectures), and governments at city and county levels came under the direct management of provinces: the former covered cities, and the latter provided public services in rural areas. This reform promoted relevant institutional arrangements. The responsibility for implementing a basic guarantee mechanism of financial resources at county level switched to provincial governments from local finance, and reinforced the responsibility of annexed territory management (and others), which helped to decrease the 'two costs' of national and local governance, giving full play to the role of the 'two initiatives' of central and local governments.
7. **Streamlining administration and delegation of power to lower levels.** This involved a reform of the reviewing, administration, and assessment institutions of central and local governments to conduct streamlined administration and delegate power to local governments and society. To this end, the central government proposed a negative list that delegated economic and social matters facing grassroots organizations to local and grassroots governments. In a country like China, high and rigid centralization does not suit the national situation; scattered local decentralization of excessive competition is not consistent with the national conditions. The central government must therefore trust local governments, and local governments must rely on the central government. In this way, a direct conflict of interests between central and local governments can be avoided. In the meantime, reforms were imposed on the existing performance assessment system, to weaken the role of G.D.P. in regional

assessment. Plans were made based on functional zones, so as to realize region-specific assessment based on local difference. This widened the role of local initiatives, autonomy and creativity, and encouraged independent innovation along the lines of ‘first try, first implement’ in local governments. It permitted local governments to become involved in businesses, unbound by the laws and regulations of the central government or state. Meanwhile, the central government (leaders and department heads) conducted field visits for the purposes of investigation. Their experiences were disseminated nationwide. This allowed breathing space for local governments, allowing them to make mistakes, and correct them; when formulating targets and policies, the central government had to consider the characteristics and interests of various local governments and treat them as individuals. Any sort of sweeping approach or coercion would not wash.

6.6 The Future of Central-Local Relations

The new doctrine of central-local relations is reflected in the balancing and handling of traditional contradictions and conflicts between central and local governments. Specifically, it includes the balance of three aspects:

The balance between political union and economic separation of power: recent history indicates that only with close unification under the firm leadership of the C.P.C. can China resist foreign aggression, realize national independence, and complete nationwide modernization. Thus, in political terms, China must stick to a single party leadership, including the principle of placing cadres under party supervision, and choosing provincial leaders on the recommendation of central government. They must be democratically elected in local peoples’ congresses, and other organizations. Only when central and local power is united can a new regional development mode of national support and assistance to oriented areas be created, to reflect the superiority of the socialist political institution. However, along with rapid modern economic development, new technologies, and new economic fields, an active economic system must allow freedom in minor affairs. China must encourage local governments to pursue initiatives within the allowed scope, and adjust measures to local conditions when necessary. This is the only for economic development to continue in today’s climate.

The balance between a huge construction program and freedom in minor affairs: China’s overall situation must be taken into consideration when making long-term development plans. The ‘huge construction program’ refers to the fact that the central government should shoulder the responsibility for national planning at all levels. ‘Freedom in minor affairs’ means that decision-making power is conferred to local governments to handle affairs, so that they can self-adjust, self-govern and self-develop. Action may be taken in the event of no ban. Specifically speaking, in fields that come under the requirements and instructions of

the central government, action must be taken under command; in fields banned by the central government, action cannot be taken; in the fields above the baseline of the central government, action may be taken without a ban, and bold innovation and tests are encouraged.

The balance between ‘powerful centralization’ and ‘local decentralization’: China is a great power with global influence, yet it faces various challenges. Many Chinese issues have the effect of ‘pulling one hair and affecting the whole body’, so the central government must own the capacity to mobilize the whole nation, i.e. ‘powerful centralization’. Thus, in the face of major opportunities, challenges and crises alike, China can concentrate the power of the whole nation to handle affairs. When disaster strikes, help comes from all sides. It is a case of ‘one state, one dream’ in the face of significant opportunities. China is a county of great diversity, but in the face of minor issues that cannot be overlooked, it must provide enough space and authority for local governments to realize decentralized governance. Each must nurture its own special powers. The high governance cost of bureaucracies, and disadvantages such as repeated governance by multiple parties must be avoided, and higher targets must be reached.

After specifying the balance of central-local relations, attention should be paid to striking such a balance. This requires a reduction to the minimum of the interests, information, and power asymmetry of central and local governments, based on various stages of productivity development. China must create a set of incentive-compatible systems and institutions that can fully mobilize the initiatives of central and local governments, combining stability and flexibility. However, the final standard for testing the systems and institutions is whether vitality can be created in the economy, and whether national cohesion can be guaranteed in politics.

In China, unity and diversity have coexisted, with centralization and decentralization of power running parallel. To have centralization without decentralization creates a ‘Machine Kingdom’ with thousands of sides; to have decentralization without centralization leads to disintegration into a ‘world of vassals’. Thus, it is necessary to unify the basic institutions, implement centralization of power to guarantee national ‘unification’ (of politics, the legal system, basic policies, and the market) so as to take advantage of socialist power to handle affairs and manage the effect of the scale economy.

In the meantime, China must pursue a suitable mode of decentralization to guide local diversity while guaranteeing unification. All regions must put forth new ideas, enjoy freedom, and nurture their own characteristics and advantages, for the benefit of the whole nation. Finally, an organic combination of the ‘unification’ and ‘diversity’ of Chinese central and local governments can be realized, along with the ‘unity in diversity’ of modern China. Under the preconditions of a unified multi-national country, two points of interest and two responsibilities of central and local governments are attributed to two incentive-compatible motivations, and mutual promotion is realized to build a moderately prosperous society.

6.7 Summary: Two Initiatives Are Better Than One

After the First Qin Emperor established his government, China was unified for 2000 years. During the feudal age, unified China was based on a central-local system that was the longest lasting in world history. The emperor controlled the largest population on the planet, and realized relatively effective governance. However, feudal autocracy could not last forever.

Since the founding of New China, the state system and central-local unification pattern built by the C.P.C. have inherited the political ideas and cultural traditions of ancient China. However, it is different from the autocratic monarchy whereby 'one person governs the world'. It is a modern socialist state that combines new centralization and local decentralization organically under the leadership of one modern political party.

Relying on the 'two initiatives', this giant governs the entire country from one center and many satellites. China implements the only unitary system in the world. Its basic administrative framework includes an 'industrial dictatorship' and a 'regional dictatorship', with the latter dominating. As a result, central-local relations face asymmetries of information and power. Reform is the way to eliminate them, along with the building of a modern state institution. The 'two costs' of central and local governance must be greatly reduced, and an incentive-compatible mechanism must be established, giving full play to the role of the 'two initiatives' of central and local governments.⁴⁹ The essence of giving full play to the role of the 'two initiatives' of central and local governments is to implement an incentive-compatible principle, effectively resolving the contradictions and conflicts between national and local interests, and reaching consistency and maximization of their objective functions. The functional division of central and local governments should be specified, and there should be a labor division and cooperation system as well as an incentive-compatible mechanism of central decision-making, national planning, department guidance, provincial government responsibility, and implementation by governments at prefecture and county levels. This can promote the socialist capability of handling affairs. When disaster strikes, help comes from all sides. The central government must believe in local governments, rely on them to handle affairs, support their innovations, correct their errors, and guide their development.

⁴⁹In 1982, Zhao Ziyang, then Premier of the State Council, said: '**We must stick to central planning, local freedom, centralization, local decentralization, set our chess-pieces in order, and give play to the role of local initiatives**'. To publish Zhao Ziyang *Several Problems Facing the Current Economic Work*, March 4, 1982, *Compilation of Important Works Since the Third Plenary Session* (II), P. 1194, People's Publishing House, 1982.

Chapter 7

Governance of China and the U.S.A.—A Comparison and Analysis

Against a backdrop of economic globalization, national competition is essentially a case of governing capacity, focused on national institutions. The general rule is that no progress or slow progress means regression. This can be called a ‘simple truth’, which Chinese leaders have grasped when faced with the issue of global competition. The Report to the 16th C.P.C. National Congress in 2002 highlighted the fact that no progress means regression.¹ Based on this, over the past decade China has displayed a strong competitive edge, especially in terms of institutional advantages. However, the question remains: can an international comparison be made on the performance of national governance? Can we assess China’s institutional advantages from its political institution and national governance?

With respect to these matters, I conducted a special international comparative study, particularly the comparison between the governance of developed countries, so as to gain a full picture. For China, ‘knowing the enemy’ allows for a deeper understanding of itself. This requires the professional international comparison with quantitative analysis.

Compared with the U.S.A. and the E.U. during the same period, China has shown the best governance performance and the most powerful capacity for national governance. **It has realized unique institutional innovations and gained countless advantages. To make a comparison like this is to do away with the long-held ‘blind superstition’ of Western countries. It is a case of ‘laying down**

This paper was created by Hu Angang and Yang Zhulong.

¹*Jiang Zemin’s Selected Works*, Volume 3, P. 528, Beijing, People’s Publishing House.

burden and starting the machine’, as Mao said, and² ‘emancipating our minds to seek truth from facts’. China can learn from Western countries, but it must not lose its originality in the process.

Xi Jinping addressed the Special Seminar of Major Provincial and Ministerial Cadres on Implementing the Issues of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the C.P.C. and Comprehensively Deepening Reform in February 2014. He made a basic judgment of China’s national governance system and capacity. He remarked that the state governance system and governance ability were good on the whole, with a unique advantage of being able to adapt to China’s national conditions and development requirements. At the same time, there was room for improvement. Xi called for comprehensive and systematic reforms across all fields, to further modernize the national governance system and capacity.³

In order to understand Xi Jinping’s speech, it is necessary to approach following issues from the viewpoint of international comparison: What is national governance? How can it be measured? How can international comparison be conducted? How can we assess China’s national advantage and unique characteristics in terms of governance capacity? It is a question of forming and obtaining an overall effect in the modernization of the state governance system and ability. This chapter contains quantitative analysis and international comparison of the national governance of China and the U.S.A., and the above questions are answered. It is divided into several parts: Part 1 provides a quantitative analysis of the two countries’ national governance from 2000 to 2012. The results show that in the Republican administration of George W. Bush (2001–2008) and the Democratic administration of Barack Obama (2009–2012), governance in the U.S.A. could be judged as inferior to that of the Chinese government. Part 2 describes the fundamental difference between the two national governance systems, namely the political system and political party system. Part 3 compares the specific mechanisms of national governance. It analyzes the fundamental reasons for the difference in cultivating and selecting party and state leaders, the design of state development and integration of power in political parties. Part 4 briefly summarizes why China’s governance can be viewed as superior to that of the U.S.A. It explains the establishment of self-awareness and confidence within China’s governing body, and the eschewing of American superstitions from the perspective of institutional vitality.

²Mao Zedong said: “The so-called ‘laying down of the burden’ means that many of our mental burdens should be cast off. For many things, if we fall into a blind belief in them and lose self-awareness, they will become our burden. The so-called ‘starting the machine’ refers to using our thinking organs. Our brain is dedicated to thinking. In order to cure the intense blindness in our party, we must advocate exploration, learn the methods to analyze matters, and develop the habit of analyzing”. Mao Zedong: *Lay Down the Burden, Start the Machine*, April 12, 1944, *Mao Zedong’s Selected Works*, Volume 3, PP. 947–949, Beijing, People’s Publishing House, 1991.

³Xinhua Net, Beijing, February 17, *Xi Jinping: Sticking to Institutional Confidence, Not Refusing to Make Progress*.

7.1 Comparison of Governance Performance (2000–2012)

Based on the administrative policies put forward by the Chinese and American governments, such as the former's *Government Work Report* and the latter's *State of the Union Address*, this section examines the actual governance of the two nations in six dimensions: economy, finance, employment, social security, scientific and technical innovation, and social order. Generally speaking, it focuses on the capacity for economic growth, fiscal sustainability, expanding national employment, improving social security, promoting scientific and technological innovation, maintaining social security, and guaranteeing citizens' personal safety. These key indicators are replete with information, and are more comparable, direct and objective than other indicators. What's more, they can withstand checking and verification by other researchers. This book takes the public data of both countries from 2000 to 2012, as well the data from 2013 of China, as the basis for evaluating both governments' performances. For the sake of comparison we have used the two-term presidency of Republican George W. Bush and the one-term presidency of the Democrat Barack Obama, and the Chinese government led by C.P.C. leaders over three terms.

Firstly, China's economic growth level is higher than that of the U.S.A. According to data from the World Bank, calculated based on the constant price of 2005, the annual average growth rate of China's economy from 2000 to 2012 was 11.1%; the U.S.A.'s was 1.8%. When the Global Financial Crisis erupted in 2008, the growth rate of the American economy was -0.4%, dropping to -3.1% in 2009; during the same period, China's remained at 9.6 and 9.2% respectively (see Fig. 7.1). According to data from 2013, China maintained an economic growth rate of 7.7%,⁴ while the U.S.A.'s was only 1.9%. China's annual average economic increase from 2000 to 2013 was 10.6%, while the U.S.A.'s was only 1.9% (see Fig. 7.1).⁵

From the perspective of G.D.P., using IMF data and calculating based on purchasing power parity (P.P.P.), the chasing coefficient of China's economic aggregate in 2000 after the U.S.A.'s was 30.3% and increased to 79.4% in 2012 (see Fig. 7.2), narrowing 4.1% annually on average.

From the perspective of the national per-capita income, using World Bank data and calculating based on P.P.P., the chasing coefficient of China's national per-capita income to the U.S.A.'s increased from 6.6% in 2000 to 17.9% in 2012 (see Fig. 7.3), which means that during that decade, the U.S.A.'s advantage decreased from 15 to 5 times. In that period, the U.S.A. waged two wars, and caused a global financial crisis, which directly affected its economic growth. Meanwhile, China was seizing strategic opportunities, maintaining high economic growth, and laying a solid foundation for the comprehensive development of national causes, further surpassing the U.S.A.

⁴National Bureau of Statistics: *National Economy and Society Statistical Bulletin of 2013, February 24, 2014.*

⁵*The Economist*, Feb. 15–21, 2014, p. 84. Data source: *The Economist*, Feb. 15–21, 2014, p. 84.




Fig. 7.1 China’s G.D.P. Growth rate versus the U.S.A.’s (2000–2012, constant dollar price 2005). *Data source* World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/cn/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>




Fig. 7.2 Chasing Co-efficient of China’s G.D.P. relative to that of the U.S.A. (2000–2012, P.P.). *Data source* IMF database




Fig. 7.3 Per-capita income of China versus the U.S.A. (P.P.P.) (2000–2012). *Data source* World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org.cn/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

In addition, the sustainability of China’s finance is superior to that of the U.S.A. The proportion of general government debt in the G.D.P. is an important indicator for measuring the financial sustainability and health of a nation. In accordance with the IMF database, from 2000 to 2012 the proportion of the U.S.A.’s general government debt in the G.D.P. decreased only slightly from 2004 to 2006. During George W. Bush’s presidency, this proportion rose from less than 55–70%, which was closely related to a significant increase in military expenditure due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. After Bush’s presidency, the U.S.A. pushed Congress to pass a \$700 billion bailout programme⁶ as some sort of panacea.⁷ The result was that the proportion of the U.S.A.’s general government debt in the G.D.P. started to rise from 2009, increasing to 106.6% in 2012. Comparatively speaking, although the proportion of China’s general government debt in the G.D.P. increased sharply

⁶This plan was proposed by the Bush administration in September and October 2008. It was a financial rescue plan approved by Congress to allow the United States Department of Treasury to clear bank balance sheets by buying the securities supported by bad mortgages, including strict control of senior officers’ wages and dismissal packages, the supervision of bailout expenses, and the government’s negotiation with owners defaulting on mortgage loans. A rescue fund of up to \$0.7 trillion was created, of which \$0.35 trillion was used directly to purchase assets related to bad mortgages. The rest could not be allocated without the approval of Congress. Phoenix Finance’s citation from the British *Times* on September 29, 2008: http://finance.ifeng.com/news/hqcj/200809/0929_2203_812064.shtml.

⁷This evolves from ‘After us, the flood’ said by Madame de Pompadour, the mistress of Louis XV of France. See *Random House Dictionary of the English Language* (1997).




Fig. 7.4 Proportion of China's General Government Debt in the G.D.P. (2000–2012, %). *Data source* IMF database

to almost 35% in 2010, it soon fell back to 26% in 2011, and then dropped to 22% in 2012, nearing the average level of 20% or so since 2002 (Fig. 7.4).

Moreover, China's performance in promoting employment is far better than that of the U.S.A. Employment is vital to individual livelihoods, and is the largest and the most significant proof of a government's performance. In accordance with China's five-year development plans, the number of newly employed workers in cities and towns was nine million during the 10th Five-year Plan, and 9.5 million during both the 11th Five-year Plan and the 12th. The rate of registered unemployment in cities and towns is controlled below 5%. According to statistics, from 2001 to 2013 the accumulative number of newly employed workers in cities and towns reached 138 million, and the registered unemployment rate in cities and towns in 2013 was controlled at 4.1% (Table 7.1).

The U.S.A.'s total employment figure at the end of 2010 was lower than that of 2008 by 6.3 million (see Fig. 7.5); during the period of decline that followed the eruption of the Global Financial Crisis, the U.S.A. lost eight million employment opportunities. Even when offset by the 4.6 million jobs created by the American private sector from March 2010 until the present day,⁸ the net decrease during Obama's presidency stands at 3.4 million. This falls short of the promise made by the administration: in November 22, 2008, Obama vowed to create 2.5 million

⁸Xinhua Net: News Analysis: *White House Owners' Employment Issue*, September 8, 2012. Link: http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-09/08/c_113005785.htm.

Table 7.1 Employment targets versus real figures in Chinese cities and towns (2001–2013)

Period	Planning control index	Target value	Actual value
10th five-year plan	Number of newly employed workers in cities and towns over the past five years (ten thousand people)	4000	4200
	Registered unemployment rate in cities and towns (%)	5	4.2
11th five-year plan	Number of newly employed workers in cities and towns over the past five years (ten thousand people)	4500	5771
	Registered unemployment rate in cities and towns (%)	5	4.1
2011–2013	Number of newly employed workers in cities and towns (ten thousand people)	2700	3797
	Registered unemployment rate in cities and towns (%)	5	4.1

Data source Outline of National Planning During the 11th Five-year Plan (2006), Outline of National Planning during the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011)

National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China: *Statistical Communiqué of the National Economy and Social Development in 2013*, February 24, 2014

jobs⁹ before 2011. He promised to create three million in the last ten days of December, and then later inflated the figure to four million in January 2009.¹⁰ The difference between the promised number and the actual figure is 7.4 million. During the time period under analysis, America's unemployment rate increased to above 9% in 2009, then fell back to 8.2% in 2013, and dropped back to 6.6% in 2013.¹¹ This is higher than the registered unemployment rate of 4.1% in Chinese cities and towns.

In terms of basic social security, China covers a larger scope and is more efficient than the U.S.A. Taking the coverage of medical insurance for example, from 2001 to 2012, the proportion of the Chinese population not covered by basic medical insurance dropped from 94.3 to 1%; however, during the same period, the proportion of the American population not covered rose from 13.5 to 16.3%. This later dropped to 15.4% in 2012 after Obama's health reform bill was passed in 2010, but 47.74 million people still have no medical insurance (see Fig. 7.6).

On the other hand, the proportion of medical expenditure in the American G.D.P. is too high, and the input efficiency is too low. From 2000 to 2012, the proportion of China's total public health costs in the G.D.P. increased from 4.62 to 5.32%, at the accumulated growth rate of 0.84%; the U.S.A.'s increased from 5.74 to 8.28% in 2011, at the accumulated growth rate of 2.54%—three times larger. Notwithstanding, the per-capita life expectancy in the U.S.A. fails to see significant growth. From 2000 to 2012, it increased from 77 to 78.49 years,¹² up by

⁹Obama Promises to Create 2.5 Million Jobs, *Xinhua Daily*, November 24, 2008, A8 Version.

¹⁰Xinhua Net: *Obama's Economic Stimulus Plan to Adjust the Employment Target to 4 Million*, January 12, 2009, link: http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2009-01/12/content_10644852.htm.

¹¹Data source: The Economist, Feb. 15–21, 2014, p. 84.

¹²American data source: CIA, *The World Factbook*, 2013.




Fig. 7.5 Changes in employment numbers and the unemployment rate in the U.S.A. (2000–2012). *Data source* IMF database




Fig. 7.6 Proportion of the population not covered by Basic Health/Medical Insurance in China and the U.S.A. (2001–2012, %). *Notes* Chinese data before 2008 covers the number of urban employees with basic medical insurance, and that of 2009 also includes urban residents. *Data source* US Census Bureau: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/data/historical/HIB_tables.html. Chinese data from past China Statistical Yearbook




Fig. 7.7 Proportion of R&D input in the G.D.P. in China and the U.S.A. (2001–2013, %). *Data source* World Bank Database (until 2008) *China Statistical Yearbook 2013* (China’s data from 2009 to 2012) *Science & Engineering Indicators (2014)* of United States National Research Council (the U.S.A.’s data from 2009 to 2011) *Statistical Communiqué of the National Economy and Social Development in 2013* (China’s data in 2013)

0.124 years annually on average; China’s per-capita life expectancy increased from 71.40 to 75.2 years, up by 0.317 years annually on average¹³—0.193 years longer than in the U.S.A. This shows that although the U.S.A.’s medical expenditure is the highest in the world, social injustice means that life expectancy cannot be effectively prolonged.

From the perspective of pushing scientific research and promoting technological and R&D innovation, China’s momentum is stronger. From 2001 to 2012, the proportion of China’s R&D input in the G.D.P. increased from 0.95 to 1.98% in 2012, almost doubling, and further increased to 2.09% in 2013¹⁴; the proportion of the U.S.A.’s R&D input in the G.D.P. increased only slightly. The proportion in 2012 was only higher than that of 2011 by 0.08 percentage points. Although the proportion of China’s R&D input in the G.D.P. in 2012 was still smaller than that of the U.S.A.’s in 2011, the difference in 2012 is half as small as in 2001 (see Fig. 7.7).

As for the output of scientific research, we can take the quantity of domestic applied and granted patents as an example. China is still catching up with the U.S.A. (see Table 7.2). According to data from the W.I.P.O. in 2014, from 2000 to

¹³Chinese data source: 2000 National Bureau of Statistics: *China Statistical Abstract (2013)*, P. 38, Beijing, China Statistics Press, 2013; 2012 data are estimated by the author based on 2010 data.

¹⁴NBS: *National Economy and Society Developed Statistical Bulletin of 2013*, February 24, 2014.

Table 7.2 Patent application and granting in China and the U.S.A. (2000–2012)

Year	Quantity of applied patents			Quantity of granted patents		
	U.S.A. (piece)	China (piece)	China/U. S.A. (%)	U.S.A. (piece)	China (piece)	China/U. S.A. (%)
2000	295,895	51,906	17.54	157,496	13,058	8.29
2003	342,441	105,317	30.75	169,035	37,154	21.98
2005	390,733	173,327	44.36	143,806	53,305	37.07
2008	456,321	289,838	63.52	157,772	93,706	59.39
2010	490,226	391,177	79.80	219,614	135,110	61.52
2011	503,582	526,412	104.53	224,505	172,113	76.66
2012	542,815	652,777	120.26	253,155	217,105	85.76
Average annual growth rate (%)	5.2	23.5		4.0	26.4	

Notes Quantity of domestic applied and granted patents is the sum of that of residents and non-residents

Data source WIPO (January, 2014) http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country_profile/#U

2012 the quantity of domestic applied patents in the U.S.A. and China increased at annual growth rates of 5.2 and 23.5% respectively. China's major growth source was domestic residents, and the U.S.A.'s was non-residents. China's chasing coefficient after the U.S.A. increased from 7.54 to 120.26%—1.2 times larger than the opposite. China has morphed from a lagger to a leader. The constitution of patent sources dominated by residents further indicates that China's technological innovation has witnessed significant improvement, and that the potential for R&D and innovation is flourishing after stimulation. According to the quantity of granted patents, in 2000 and 2012 the average annual growth rates of the U.S.A. and China were 4.0 and 26.4% respectively. China's chasing coefficient after the U.S.A. rose to 85.76% from 8.29%. Now, China ranks the third in the world, and will soon surpass the U.S.A. and Japan.

Lastly, from the perspective of social order, China can indeed be viewed as superior. As the first 'super' country in the world, China has been playing the role of 'world police' for a long time, sparing no effort in maintaining the so-called 'world order'. Yet in the meantime, domestic social order and safety levels are worrying. The *Human Development Report 2013* published by UNDP regards the murder rate (the number of murders per 100,000 people)¹⁵ as one of the most important indicators to measure the personal safety levels of a nation's citizens—a comprehensive social index. From 2004 to 2011, China's index was 1.1. The average for a country with China's characteristics and development is 2.1; the U.S.A.'s index was 4.2, almost four times as high, with¹⁶ a death toll from murder of 13 thousand. China can thus be considered as a relatively safe country in global terms, with a social safety level significantly higher than the U.S.A. and countries

¹⁵The number of criminals causing others to die. In India the indicator is 3.4, and in Brazil 21.0.

¹⁶UNDP: *2013 Human Development Report*, PP. 144–177, 2013.




Fig. 7.8 Murder cases in China versus the U.S.A. (2001–2011). *Data source* <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html>

with an extremely high level of human development. The state safety index system shows that about five to six people in every 100,000 die from being murdered—a figure that is about three times lower in China; the death toll from murder cases decreased by about 40% from 2004 to 2008, and fell to fewer than 15,000; the U.S. A. maintains an annual murder toll of 15,000–16,000 (see Fig. 7.8).

The U.S.A. is the largest military power in the world, and the nation with the highest levels of gun violence. According to public information provided by Wikipedia, gun violence is a hot topic in American society, especially in urban regions, and is closely related to youth and gang issues. Privately owned guns have become popular suicide weapons in America; in fact, most deaths from guns are

suicides, and 16,907 suicides were enacted with guns in 2004. The Second Amendment to the *Constitution of the United States* offers the right to hold and carry weapons. The proponents of gun ownership encourage the public to defend this right.¹⁷ For many years there have been frequent shootings on American army bases and school campuses. This issue is proving very difficult to resolve. It causes serious psychological trauma to the populace, and is a *bête noir* of political interest groups (mainly the Rifle Society). Thus, while the U.S.A. is the richest country in the world, it is one of the least safe societies to live in.

An empirical analysis of the comparison between the governance of the two nations between 2000 and 2012 places¹⁸ China in the top spot in terms of political leadership, economic growth, national revenue, and fiscal sustainability, as well as employment levels, complete medical security, and the promotion of scientific and technological innovation. Superior or not, China has certainly narrowed the gap with the U.S.A. The overall comparative trend sees America stepping back, and China progressing. Then what is the root cause of the obvious gap between the two nations' governmental performance in the past 10 years? The following section will conduct in-depth analysis of national governance systems.

7.2 Comparison of Political Systems

A national governance system is made up of a series of institutions on which the ruling party relies to govern the state. China and the U.S.A. have very different national governance systems. Their political systems are also distinct, a fact that is reflected in the organization of political power, the political mechanism, the party system, the election system, and the decision-making mechanism. The formation and development of these political systems is a long process, decided by the factors such as history and culture.

For the U.S.A., the first is the state system. America is a federal country made up of 50 relatively independent states. The federal government holds the power of taxation, borrowing, mintage, maintaining the army, hosting diplomacy, and other powers not listed in the *Constitution*. Unless otherwise stipulated by the *Constitution*, the excising rights of the state are reserved by the state.

The second is political organization. The U.S.A.'s political organization is a typical presidential system, in which the electorate votes for the President and Congress. The President is the head of the state and the leader of the government. In administration, the President's personal responsibility system is implemented, and

¹⁷<http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/>—the U.S.A.'s gun violence issue.

¹⁸An increasing number of Western scholars are rethinking it. Two American researchers wrote: 'especially over the past decade, we spend so much time and energy and the next generation's money in confronting terrorist wars, tax reduction, and arbitrary loans. Now, we have no way to go'. See Thomas L. Friedman, Michael Mandelbaum: *That Used to Be US*, translated by He Fan et al., P. 11, Changsha, Hunan Science & Technology Press, September, 2012.

he or she constrains and leads the government from the White House in accordance with the *Constitution*. The government obeys the President instead of Congress; the President is independent from Congress, and is only accountable to voters. He or she has no power to dissolve Congress.

The third is the political mechanism. For the U.S.A. this means the separation of three powers. The government department led by the President exercises executive power, and the Supreme Judicial Court and Congress exercise judicial power based on the secondary and local courts at all levels. Congress is composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and exercises legislative power.

The fourth is the party system. The U.S.A. has a two-party system, with the Democratic Party and the Republican Party as the most important. They contend in all political platforms corresponding to ‘three powers’, especially the fierce competition for the role of President and seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives; the current election system means that other parties do not flourish.

The fifth is the election system. The U.S.A.’s system covers Presidential and Congress elections. The President’s term of office is four years, and he or she is elected by the Presidential Elector Electoral College on a majority basis. One term in Congress lasts six years. Each state congress elects two representatives, with internal re-elections for some posts every two years. The term of office for a member of the House of Representatives is two years, and each state determines its number of members in proportion to the total; members are elected by the people directly, and are all re-elected every two years.

The sixth is the decision-making mechanism. The U.S.A.’s version is closely related to its political organization, mechanism, and party structure. The official implementation of American public policies often goes through three stages: draft preparation, deliberation and approval by the Senate and House, and signature by the President; at the stage of draft preparation and deliberation in Congress, both parties and speakers from all interest groups control decision-making through platforms such as special committees and by applying the right of veto. In recent years, decision-makers have exercised increasingly frequent vetoes, holding up the decision-making process and leading to low efficiency.

Compared with the U.S.A, the political system in China is more united and efficient. Firstly, its unitary state system has provided the legal basis for national unification and social stability. It has decided the central government’s capacity for controlling territory at a local level, and is conducive to the united strength of the whole government. Secondly, as the ruling party, the C.P.C.’s governance and administration are increasingly institutionalized, standard and routinized; the collective leadership system of the Party and the state is increasingly consolidated and improved. For example, a party democracy including a deliberative democracy is developing, and democratic centralism with Chinese characteristics guarantees decision-making free from disruptive errors. Moreover, multi-party cooperation and the political consultation system led by the C.P.C. have promoted the unity between political parties. The Chinese political party stands for the people’s interests, pushes

for development, and plays a constructive role in the decision-making process. It surpasses the U.S.A.'s 'separation of three powers', and will disseminate the power balance into the current political situation of mutual undercutting. It is capable of responding to the people's increasing material and cultural demands,¹⁹ and of bringing the development of China's economy in line with that of the U.S.A.

7.3 Summary: Can China's National Governance Be Viewed as Superior?

The comparative study in this chapter shows that in the first decade of the 21st century, the C.P.C. achieved better administration than either of the U.S.A.'s two parties. It realized better national governance, and comprehensively narrowed the gap in economic and social development around key indicators. Reasons for this include: the selection and cultivation of outstanding and capable leaders in the C.P.C. and the state, the successful formulation and implementation of the design of state development, and the realization and consolidation of party political power.

Why is China's governance more successful than the U.S.A.'s? The bottom line is that the C.P.C. continuously improves and develops its national governance system, taking institutional continuation and innovation into account. It thereby develops a better capacity for national governance, which corresponds to the stage of national development and the requirements of national governance.

China's national governance system is not remained static since the founding of the C.P.C. and New China. It has undergone a process of maturation and transformation. Within the five-year plan system, for example, at the early stage the party leaders made preparations personally.²⁰ After Reform and Opening, the plenary sessions of the C.P.C. central committee were used to debate and approve the suggestions for the preparation of the Tenth and Eleventh Five-Year Plans,

¹⁹American political scientist Robert Dahl said: 'the most crucial characteristic of democracy is the government's continuous responsiveness to its citizen's preferences.' See Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, p. 1, Yale University Press, 1971. Wang Shaoguang distinguished 'needs' and 'wants' in his *Political System and Political Way*, and believes that 'needs' refer to that which is required by human beings for a decent standard of living, especially by the elimination of poverty, education, health, and environmental protection; 'wants' are things that people desire, which may be far beyond the boundaries of a decent standard of living, which can be induced, manufactured, illusory and everlasting. See Wang Shaoguang's *Political Ideal Order: Exploration of Chinese and Western Ancient and Modern Times*, PP. 117–118, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, July, 2012.

²⁰The First Five-Year Plan was formulated by Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun under the direct leadership of the C.P.C. Central Committee.

absorbing research by experts and scholars, and listening to non-party personnel's opinions and advice. The decision-making mechanism was thus made more scientific, democratic, standard and routinized. Its contents shifted from economic command plans to development strategies, from economic planning to comprehensive development, from micro-economic intervention to macro-regulation, and from domination by economic indicators to guidance by public service indicators.²¹

Through constant research, adjustment and reform in governance practices, China's governance system has succeeded in coping with the challenges brought about by development by means of active institutional changes.

Coincidentally, the U.S.A.'s development in various periods is also closely related to its progress in governance. As two important signs of the reform of the civil service system, the *Pendleton Act* promulgated in 1883 and the *Civil Service Reform Act* of 1978 disseminated in 1883 were crucial factors in promoting the American government at all levels to practice incorruptible and efficient administration; the balance of political power slanted towards the federal government, and the U.S.A. transformed from a confederation to a federal country. This played an important role in the U.S.A.'s recovery from the 'Great Depression' in the first half of the 20th century, and laid a solid foundation for becoming a super power.

Hu Jintao said: 'If the laws change with the time, the country can be effectively governed²²; if the governance is suitable for the time, success can be achieved'.²³ **It is apparent that reform is the only way for institutional life to continue. This logic applies to both China and the U.S.A.** As disclosed in the report of the 18th C.P.C. National Congress, the development of practices, the understanding of truth, and the innovation of theories are all limitless. Both the pioneers and the successors of modern state institutions must persist in self-improvement and eliminate institutional disadvantages, so as to adapt to the time and create benefits for the people. Although the U.S.A.'s history is short, it has formed a modern state institution since the founding of the P.R.C. As a nation, America has lasted for over 200 years, making it something of an old-timer among modern states. However, from the perspective of comparison and analysis, although the U.S.A.'s national governance system is rather mature, it is still not perfect. Its obvious defects and problems have not yet been effectively dealt with; meanwhile, China's national governance system is younger, and displays more vitality and stronger awareness of reform.

It would pay to eschew the U.S.A.'s institutional superstitions, and set store in the modernization of China's governance system and capacity, just as Mao Zedong

²¹Hu Angang, Yan Yilong, Lv Jie: *From the Economic Indicator Plan to the Strategic Development Plan: Transformation of China's Five-Year Plans (1953–2009)*, *China Soft Science*, Issue 8 of 2010.

²²*Hanfeizi* Volume 20: *Popular Feelings and Law*.

²³Hu Jintao: *Making Progress along Socialist Road with Chinese Characteristics, and Striving For Comprehensive Achievement of a Well-off Society*—Report on 18th C.P.C. National Congress, November 8, 2012.

advised that China move away from its admiration of the Soviet Union's power of construction.²⁴ The C.P.C.'s history is a constant eradication of superstition and an exploration of new roads. The modernization of China's governance system and capacity will continue with theoretical and institutional innovation, realizing the benefits of socialism with a more competitive national governance mechanism and more persuasive governmental performance, so as to make new and greater contributions to the human race.

²⁴See Mao Zedong's comments in the Soviet Union's *Book II of Political and Economic Textbooks* on February 6, 1960.

Erratum to: The Modernization of China's State Governance

Angang Hu, Xiao Tang, Zhusong Yang and Yilong Yan

Erratum to:

A. Hu et al., *The Modernization of China's State Governance*,
DOI [10.1007/978-981-10-3370-4](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3370-4)

In the original version of the book, the author names “Xiao Tang, Zhusong Yang, and Yilong Yan” and their corresponding affiliations have to be included. The erratum book has been updated with the change.

The updated online version of this book can be found at
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3370-4>

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017
A. Hu et al., *The Modernization of China's State Governance*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3370-4_8

Postscript

On November 12, 2013, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th C.P.C. Central Committee made the *Decision of the C.P.C. on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform* (hereinafter referred to as the *Decision*). The *Decision* put forward the overall goal of comprehensively deepening reform, namely improving and developing the socialist system with Chinese characteristics, and promoting the modernization of the state governance system and governance ability. Centered on this general objective, the *Decision* set various targets, significant principles, timetables and roadmaps for the decade ahead, which formed a new milestone in China's era of Reform and Opening.

Many questions arose in the aftermath. Why did the C.P.C. Central Committee propose this objective? How can it be understood? How can the national governance system and capacity be modernized in real terms? How does this figure in the general process of state modernization? How can we evaluate China's national governance system and governance capacity objectively? What are the steps involved in promoting modernization? How can the performance of national governance be evaluated scientifically? Can conducting international comparison enhance institutional awareness and confidence?

With regard to this, on February 17, 2014, Xi Jinping gave a clear reply in his *Address to the Special Seminar of Major Provincial and Ministerial Leading Cadres on Implementing the Tenets of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th C.P.C. Central Committee and Comprehensively Deepening Reform* (hereinafter referred to as the *Address*). Although the amount of information about the *Address* broadcast by Xinhua News Agency was limited to fewer than 2000 words, it served as an abstract to convey the core opinions and important conclusions. In my opinion, the *Address* put forward an original political theory, and also a frontier academic subject—rather like the outline of a book. Their key point was to study the *Address* carefully, understand it fully, and put it into practice in systematic and scientific work.

On February 19, 2014, at the invitation of the Beijing Committee of the Communist Party of China, I gave a lecture on *Promoting the Modernization of the National Governance System and Governance Capacity* in a rotational training class for 300 leading Beijing cadres at municipal and county levels. I also lectured

on this subject at Tsinghua University and in several regions and departments, all the while modifying my own stance. This laid a solid foundation for writing this book, as did my work with Tsinghua University's Research Institute of National Conditions.

Our thoughts and research on the construction of China's state institution are the fruits of more than two decades' labour. In an effort to aid China's long-term peace and order, the book came into being with my hope of summarizing my long-term studies. In writing this *Postscript*, I will express my ideas about the topic.

My *Population and Development: Systematic Study of China's Population and Economic Issues* published in January, 1989 (Zhejiang People's Publishing House, 1989) predicted the trend of China's modern economic development (1980–2020). It was based on five assumed conditions: to continue with the implementation of the routes and targets of Reform and Opening since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th C.P.C. Central Committee; to avoid bad decisions like the Great Leap Forward that caused severe economic fluctuations; to eschew political turbulence and social turmoil like the Cultural Revolution; to control the population effectively and strictly; to guard against large global natural disasters; to repel large-scale foreign invasions and avoid military confrontation with other countries. If the above conditions are met, we may enter a new stage of economic growth until 2020.

China will transit from low income to middle and high income; the industrialization process will speed up and economic aggregate will expand rapidly; there will be obvious changes to the economic structure; society will undergo deep, all-around reform, and system and concepts will see great change. A new pattern of opening will be formed and developed, more closely related to the world economy. At the start of the 21st century, China's economy is still relatively young; this is a crucial opportunity for the nation to rise.

My *China: Entering the 21st Century* published in March, 1991 (China Environmental Science Press, 1991) regards the strategic objective of China's long-term development as a multi-objective system: firstly, there should be political and social stability; secondly, there should be steady economic growth; thirdly, we must establish social justice; fourthly, there must be an improvement in living standards; finally, we must push for protection and construction of the Chinese nation. Therein, I hold that political and social stability is the basis for realizing other objectives. We must therefore select the mode of social reform carefully, deepen it progressively, and promote long-term peace and stability by robust reform. We must seek sustainable development in long-term stability, and promote modernization. However, our understanding of how to realize the objective remains superficial.

In May, 1993, Wang Shaoguang and I completed *A Study of China's State Capacity* (Liaoning People's Publishing House, 1993). Its *Conclusions* express explicitly that the *Book of Changes* warns: 'Don't forget danger in safety, don't forget death in existence, and don't forget disorder in order'. This cannot be

emphasized too much. The starting point from which the author wrote the *Book of Changes* was not typical. It did not start from the best point and strive for the best results, but began from the worst points in an attempt to avoid the worst results. What are the worst results? The former Soviet Union and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are the most typical examples. From economic ‘fragmentation’ to extremely decentralized financial resources, and to political opposition, these nations finally fell into social unrest and collapse.

Starting from a brand new theoretical perspective—a theory of national capacity—discussions are made on how China builds a modern market economic system. Our research concludes that national capacity is one of the major conditions for a country to realize industrialization and modernization. The enhancement of national capacity is the augmentation of the central government’s capacity to promote Reform and Opening, and the ability to accelerate industrialization and modernization. It is one of the most important ways to realize economic growth, close the gap between pioneering and advanced countries, and make use of the late-mover advantage and the ‘surpassing effect’. In future, the basic task of China’s reform will be institutional innovation, to build modern market economic system, and rebuild the political and financial systems by adapting to modern society and matching China’s national conditions. To build such an institution is the basis for maintaining China’s long-term peace and security, and improving national capacity.

In 2000, I collaborated with Wang Shaoguang, Zhou Jianmin and others to establish a research team for the study of national institutions. It was composed of members from several disciplines such as economics, politics, sociology, international relations, and public policies. After two years, we published *The Second Transformation: Construction of the State Institution* (Tsinghua University Press, 2003), which reflected our thinking and in-depth analysis of China’s institutional construction during modernization. We think that one country’s modernization includes at least two major aspects: firstly, economic modernization, covering agriculture, industry, scientific technology, and national defense; secondly, institutional modernization, namely, to realize the modernization of basic national institutions and the practice of ‘good governance’, so as to guarantee maximum national interests and benefits. State system construction is the basic system and infrastructure of a modern state, and is both related to and complementary with the economic construction of state modernization. The construction objectives of a basic national institution are to create institutional conditions, environments and functions for guaranteeing ‘good governance’ and long-term peace and security. This includes national fundamental interests and benefits in five aspects: national safety and territorial integrity, economic development and stability, social justice and human security, political awareness and social stability, and ecological balance and environmental protection.

In addition, we summarized the basic national institution into eight mechanisms: mandatory, extraction, consensus, supervision, coordination, expression, integration, and redistribution, laying a solid foundation for a progressive realization of socialist democratic politics.

In 2007, we translated *Governance in China* by O.E.C.D. (Tsinghua University Press, 2007). I discussed the following issues in the Chinese version of the Preface: Promoting Government Reform and Realizing Good Governance: what is the background of the changes in China's governance? How can it be observed from the perspective of the world? What changes have happened to the modernization of China's governance and national institutions? How can we understand the transformation process of China's state institution? What are the reasons for these changes? What challenges does China still face? How should China deal with these challenges to realize good national governance? For those issues, my core opinions are that the institution is a particular (national) public product, with the state or government is its main supplier, implementer, and guarantor.

Institutional construction has been constructed, aiming to reduce national, social, and Party governance costs. Over the past 28 years, the principal line of China's Reform and Opening has not been only economic development and construction, but also institutional construction and innovation. I still believe that institutional construction not only requires us to establish political willingness and objectives, but also a capacity for learning, innovation, and implementation. We call this 'capacity building'.

As the ruling party, the C.P.C. must be able to promulgate reform measures promptly based on social demand, formulate corresponding measures, wield powerful executing capacity, and effectively carry out policies, measures and methods once promulgated. Promises must be kept and action must be resolute. Strong state capacity construction is just what many developing countries lack, and is also the root cause of development difficulties. Many of these nations' blueprints and visions are unfeasibly utopian. Thus, from a global perspective, the C.P.C. is not only a political party of theory but also of practice.

In 2009, Wang Shaoguang and I published *The Second Transformation: Construction of the State Institution* (revised and enlarged edition, Tsinghua University Press, 2009), including four important manuscripts that reflected our latest research on the construction of national institutions. In the revised version of the Preface, I summarize national modernization around two aspects: the famous 'four modernizations', and national institutional modernization. The former reinforces a country's hard power, and the latter underlines its soft power. They are mutually complementary for nation building. I still believe that over the past 30 years since the start of Reform and Opening, China's national institutional construction and political reform have been far wider, more impressive, more complex, and more difficult than anyone imagined. It is an unfinished revolution, but we have lighted upon a gradualist method of 'learning from practice, and practice during learning'. We need to practice, summarize, and innovate constantly, so as to promote China's forward development.

In March 2010, I lectured at a special seminar for provincial cadres about transforming the economic development mode and adjusting the economic structure held by the China Executive Leadership Academy. One local deputy provincial

governor told me that he had read my two versions of *The Second Transformation: Construction of State Institution*, and had been impressed. He asked if I was still researching the topic, and if I had come upon any new results. I replied honestly that I had made no further breakthroughs, but was working on it.

The study of nation institutional construction can never be fully understood or completely finished. We must approach it from a position of necessity and consciousness. It demands deep academic study. As Engels said, once a society has a technical demand, this demand drives scientific advancement harder than ten universities. China is a huge country with a billion-strong population, and any demand will be the largest in the world. From the perspective of academic studies, existence decides awareness; from the standpoint of analyzing the national situation, China's social existence decides social awareness. The key question is whether we are sensitive to the society and academy. If so, we can transform a social subject into an academic topic to be researched.

When the Decision of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th C.P.C. Central Committee and Xi Jinping's address proposed the topic of promoting the modernization of the national governance system and capacity, my interest was aroused, as was my fascination with international studies. In March 25, 2014, the School of Public Policy Management at Tsinghua University invited Joseph E. Stiglitz, the Nobel laureate in economics, to deliver a lecture entitled *Growing Inequality: Reasons and Consequences*. Before the lecture, he mentioned Xi Jinping's address, and asked for my opinions on the connotation of the modernization of the national governance system and capacity—specifically, their relationship with China's reform? In the late 1990s, when Stiglitz took the post of W.B. Vice President and Chief Economist, he proposed new topics such as global public products and global governance. However, the Third Plenary Session was the first time for Xi Jinping had called for modernization of the national governance system and capacity. Thus, for China's academic community, Party leaders' policies impose major demands, requiring us to consider academic topics from a global, historical, and theoretical stance.

This book has made bold attempts to tackle this vast new academic subject. The first step is always the hardest. It is a product of our renewed interest in academic innovations concerning the national situation.

Themed on the modernization of China's national governance, the book adopts the method of self-answering. We have endeavored to look back into history to observe how the leaders of New China conducted the institutional construction of a modernized state. We adopted a global view to compare the various development paths and institutional changes of China and other countries, especially Western nations, so as to consider the uniqueness and potential superiority of the Chinese way.

For China, two hands are always better than one, walking on two legs is better than walking on just one, and two initiatives are indeed superior to one. Lastly, from the perspective of empirical analysis, we have compared the national governance of China and the U.S.A. between 2000 and 2012, concluding that the former

trumps the later. This goes some way to bearing out the prophecies of Mao Zedong¹ and Deng Xiaoping.²

From November 2013 to April 2014, the entirety of the manuscript was published internally in the form of the *Report on National Situation*, which was provided to central government leaders and provincial and ministerial personnel for reference and comment. This promoted knowledge sharing and interaction between our academic research and the C.P.C. Central Committee. It gave them a wider understanding of the Central Government's latest theoretical output. Similarly, through our research, the C.P.C. Central Committee can explore better ways of national governance. This is consistent with our role as a university think-tank, namely an information channel, knowledge exchange, and theoretical bridge between the academic body and the decision-making community. In the meantime, we feel that the important decisions of the C.P.C. Central Committee are becoming more democratic and wise, because they have absorbed the wisdom of the Party, the nation, and the academic community. This was reflected in the Decision of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th C.P.C. Central Committee and the leaders' address.

This book has provided a best-case scenario, which inspires us to learn, innovate and practice the concepts of knowledge for the people and the country.

This book is the fruit of collective study, writing and modification. The process of academic study is more important than results. I have established special friendship with the teachers and students at the Research Institute of National Conditions. I am genuinely pleased to witness their academic development and innovations.

I have designed, written, and modified this book. Doctor Yan Yilong assisted me in organizing the special study on the 'Modernization of China's National Governance' selected by Research Institute of National Conditions, and acted as one of its authors. My young doctoral students Tang Xiao and Yang Zhusong have been directly involved with the writing, organization of material, research and calculations, editing, and modification, for which they deserve respect. In addition, several students are still participating in the study. They have written on the topic, but because the book is limited by length, their contributions are not included. They will be published in other forms in the future, and will constitute a part of the special study on the modernization of China's national governance.

This book is published with the support of China Renmin University Press. It is our sixth book in a special series. For this, I would like to express my sincere gratitude.

Hu Angang

June 6, 2014, Tsinghua Garden

¹In January 1962, Mao Zedong opined that socialism was superior to capitalism, and the development of China's state economy would be much faster than that of capitalist countries. *Mao Zedong's Selected Works*, Volume 8, PP. 301–302, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1999.

²In 1987, Deng Xiaoping pointed out in a discussion with foreign guests that what China needed to do was buckle down to developing the productive forces faster through reform, maintain the socialist path, and demonstrate the superiority of socialism by its achievements. *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works*, Volume 3, People's Publishing House, 1993, P. 256.